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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)
)
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant)
Cross Respondent,
) SUPREME COURT NO. 36916-2009
)
v.
)
)
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
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corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE
TAYLOR, individually and the community
)
property comprised thereof, BRIAN FREEMAN, )
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Defendants-Counterclaimants)
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CROP USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.,
)
)
an Idaho corporation;
)
Defendant-Respondent -Cross Respondent, )
)
and
)
)
)
401(k) PROFIT SHARING PLAN FOR THE
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION,
)
)
Intervenor-Cross Appellant-Cross
)
)
Respondent.
)

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Continued from Volume XXXIX

Intervenor's Request for Judicial Notice filed March 10, 2009 ..................... 7789-7967
Defendant R. John Taylor's Joinder in Intervenor's Motion to
Strike Portions of the Expert Witness Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson
Filed by Plaintiff on 2/26/09 & 3/3/09 filed March 10, 2009 ........................ 7968-7970
Defendants Bryan Freeman and Jolee Duclos' Joinder in
Intervenor's Motion to Strike Portions of the Expert Witness
Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson Filed by Plaintiff on
February 26, 2009 and March 3, 2009 filed March 10, 2009 ........................ 7971-7974
Joinder of Connie Taylor, James Beck, and Corrine Beck Re:
Intervenor's Motion to Strike Portions of the Expert Witness
Affidavit of Paul E. Peterson Filed by Plaintiff on 2/26/09 and 3/10/09
filed March 11, 2009 ...................................................................................... 7975-7978

TABLE OF CONTENTS

11

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

)
)
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant)
) SUPREME COURT NO. 36916-2009
Cross Respondent,
)
v.
)
)
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
) INDEX
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an Idaho
) VOLUMEXL
corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE
)
T AYLOR, individually and the community
)
property comprised thereof, BRIAN FREEMAN, )
a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person )
and JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
)
)
Defendants-Counterclaimants)
Respondents-Cross Appellants-Cross
)
Respondents,
)
)
and
)
)
CROP USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.,
)
)
an Idaho corporation;
)
Defendant-Respondent-Cross Respondent, )
)
and
)
)
40 1(k) PROFIT SHARING PLAN FOR THE
)
)
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION,
)
)
Intervenor-Cross Appellant-Cross
Respondent.
)
)

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

INDEX

I

Defendant R. John Taylor's Joinder in Intervenor's Motion to
Strike Portions of the Expert Witness Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson
Filed by Plaintiff on 2/26/09 & 3/3/09 filed March 10, 2009 ........................ 7968-7970
Defendants Bryan Freeman and Jolee Duclos' Joinder in
Intervenor's Motion to Strike Portions of the Expert Witness
Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson Filed by Plaintiff on
February 26, 2009 and March 3, 2009 filed March 10, 2009 ........................ 7971-7974
Continued from Volume XXXIX

Intervenor's Request for Judicial Notice filed March 10,2009 ..................... 7789-7967
Joinder of Connie Taylor, James Beck, and Corrine Beck Re:
Intervenor's Motion to Strike Portions ofthe Expert Witness
Affidavit of Paul E. Peterson Filed by Plaintiff on 2/26/09 and 3/1 0/09
filed March 11, 2009 ...................................................................................... 7975-7978

INDEX

II

he gain control of the company in the ncar future.

To the extent that funds andlor

property is recovered that exceed the arnotmts owed to Reed Taylor, he will deposit such
funds andlor property with the Court for the distribution to innocent shareholders of AlA
Services.
24.

Clements Brown has never been authorized to represent AlA Insurance or

AfA Services in Taylor v. A fA Services.

el

al. Clements Brown has not represented the

interests of AlA Insurance or ALA Services, but instead has represented the interests of
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Deck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan
Freeman, CropUSA and other interested parties.
25.

As the only authorized officer and board member of AlA Insunmce, Reed

Taylor, has not and will not authorize or consent to Clements Brown as being attorneys
for A[A· rnsurance or representing the company in any fashion or consent to the
representation of Jolm Taylor. As a person who is required to be a member of the board
of AlA Services, Reed Taylor has not and will not authorize Clements Brown to
represent A IA Services nor has he or will he authorize or consent to Clements Drown's
representation of John Taylor. Thus, Clements Brown had no scope of representation
when it purportedly represented AIA Insurance and AlA Services because it is unlawfully
representing AlA Services and ArA Insurance.

26.

Reed Taylor is the pledgee of alJ of the shares of A (A Insurance, the only

shareholder of AlA Insurance by way of holding aU of its shares as collat~ral, the only
officer and director of AlA Insurance, and by far the largest and only secured creditor of
AlA Services (Reed Taylor is owed over $8,500,000 and AlA Services is insolvent).

ALA Services and AlA Insurance's value and net assets are insufficient to pay Ihe over
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$8,500,000, plus interest and attorneys' fees and costs, owed to Reed Taylor. Therefore,
Reed Taylor is entitled

(0

bring certain claims directly against Clements Brown for

certain damages.
27.

At all material times, Reed Taylor was owed over $6,000,000 by AlA

Services through a promissory note dated August 1, 1995.

Reed Taylor is presently

owed over $8,500,000 by AlA Services. At all material times, Clements Bro\'r71 had full
knowledge of ALA Services' debt and contractual obligations owed to Reed Taylor.
28.

AIA Services defaulted on the terms of the $6,000,000 promissory note

when it failed to pay the promissory note upon maturity on August 1, 2005. Although a
fonnal demand was unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured on
August J, 2005, demand for payment was properly served upon AlA Services by Reed
Taylor on December 12,2006. AlA Services was insolvent in 2001, and has continued to

be insolvent from said date.
29.

Since 1996, as security for the over $8,500,000 owed by AlA Services,

Reed Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all of the stock of AlA
Insurance and all of the commissions and related receivables of AlA Insurance and AlA
Services. Pursuant to the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement datcd July 1,
1996, Reed Taylor had the contractual right upon default of AlA Services to vote the
stock of AfA Insurance, and take operational control of AlA lnsurance. Reed Taylor's
right to vote the stock of AIA Insurance was also perfected through AlA Services'
irrevocable power of attorney granted to Reed Taylor tbat was couplcd with an interest as
rcquin:d by I.e § 30-1-722.
III
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30.

On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor voted the stock of AlA Insurance and

attempted to take control of it pursuant to his contractual rights as provided under the
law, the contract documents, and I.e. § 30-1-722.

However, the interested purported

directors and officers of AlA Insurance (including John Taylor) by and through Clements
Brown intentionally assisted in breaching the terms of the Redemption Agreements and
refused to acknowledge Reed Taylor's valid vote of the stock of AlA lnsurance and
refused to surrender control as required.
31.

Clements Brown further cngaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting

interested parties (including John Taylor) in obtaining andlor maintaining a restraining
order and preliminary injunction against Reed Taylor, when Clements Brown knew there
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so was an intentional violation and
tortious jnterference with Reed Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and funds
of AlA Insumnce were being misappropriated andlor not safeguarded (Le., restraining
and/or enjoining Reed Taylor would permit assets and funds to continue to be
misappropriated).
32.

Reed Taylor has a pending civil action against AlA Services, AlA

Insurance, CropUSA, John Taylor, and others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance,
civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and oUlcr claims under

NC:l

Pcrce County Case No. CV-07-00208 ("Taylor v. AlA Services, el al. "), and lherdn Reed
Taylor obtained an order

of panial summary judgment for AlA Services' default of t11C

$6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement. By way of this panial summary judgment andlor his prior vote
of the stock, Reed Taylor would and should be in actual control of AlA Insurance but for

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 11
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

771f

the actions of John Taylor. which Clements Brown, with full knowledge of Reed Taylor's
rights. fadlitated and aided and abctled to the dClriment of AlA Services. AlA insurance
and Reed Taylor.
33.

With Clements Brown's full knowledge, Reed Taylor's claims asserted in

Taylor v. AL4 Services, el af. included claims for breaches of fiduciary dUly, conspiracy,
fraudulent conveyance, and fraud perpetrated by John Taylor and others (including
CropUSA). including but not limited to claims that John Taylor had wrongfully
transferred over SI,5oo,000 of AlA Insurance's cash to CropUSA. for no consideration
and had transferred approximately $700,000 of the assets of AlA Insurance to CropUSA
for no considenttion. John Taylor was at aU times material also an interested director,
officer and shareholder of CropUSA. Also included in the civil action were other claims
thal John Taylor and others had engaged in sdf-dealing andlor fraudulent transactions
with AlA SClVices and/or AlA Insurance to the detriment of the corporations and Reed
Taylor, and for the personal benefit of John Taylor and other interested parties (including
CropUSA).
34.

[n 2007, Clements Brown appeared in the civil action. Taylor v. AlA

Services. cl al., and assumed legal representation of two distinct clients, AfA Services, a
corporation, and AlA Insurance, a corporation, and also represented the interests of John
Taylor, an individual, and the interests of other interested patties (including Connie
Taylor, James neck and Michael Cashman), lhereby exceeding any possible scope of
purported representation. At all matcrial timcs John Taylor was an interested purported

CEO and director of AlA SelVices and AlA Insurance and an interested majority
shareholdc:r of AlA SeTvices.

The civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil
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conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of fiduciary duty perpetrated by John Taylor and
others against AlA Services and AlA Insurance. and such acts having damaged and
continuing to cause damages to the corporations. their shareholders and creditors.

In

violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, Clements
Brown undertook to represent the three named clients AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and
CropUSA. which such entities had no true common interests and each having
irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the other.
35.

In May 2007, Reed Taylor's attorney advised Clements Brown that it was

not appropriate for Clements Brown to represent John Taylor, AlA Services and AlA
Insurance, and/or to take direction from John Taylor because of various conflicts of
interest and the fact that John Taylor was an interested party with substantial claims
against him.

Despite the warning and demands made by Reed Taylor's altorney,

Clements Brown breached its fiduciary duties (including the duty of loyalty) owed to
AlA Services and AlA Insurdl1ce, and was a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and its duty of care.
36.

On March 28, 2007, Clements Brown finally recognized the violations of

ethics and conflicts of interest and withdrew from representing AlA Services and AlA
Insurance. Although Clements Brown should have withdrawn from representing John
Taylor, AlA Services and AlA [nsurancc in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporatioll. et aI.,
Clements Brown committed a further violation of the (daho Rub of Professional
Conduct and their duty of care by terminating the representation of the corporalions and

continuing to represent John Taylor. which was a breach of their dUlY of loyalty to the
corporations.

Clements Brown's actions constitute a violation of the "hot pot..<tto··

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 13
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR WDICIAL NOTICE

77'13

doctrine because it never received propcr, authorized and informed written consent from
the corporations and it kn~w that the corporations should be pursuing claims against John
Taylor and others.
37.

Clements Brown inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint

Defense Agrccmcnt(s) knowing that ALA Services, ALA (nsurance, CropUSA Insurance,
Inc., John Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in Tay/or

P.

AlA Services. et

al. had dear irreconcilable conflicting and diverging interests in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and duty of care, and to the detriment AlA Services, AlA Insurance
and Reed Taylor. In Taylor v. AlA Services, e/ at., a Joint Defense Agreement was not

permissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, cOllversion and the
commission of other torts such as breaches of fiduciary duties through conspiracy and
aiding and abetting, along with other causes of actions. The Joint Defense Agreements
were entered into without obtaining informed consent from disinterested and authorized
representatives of the corporations, and the Joint Defense Agrccm(!nts were also
independently not appropriate or pennitted when certain partks to the Joint Defense
Agreements should be asserting claims against other parties to such agreements.
38.

'Inc Joint Defense Agrecmcnt(s) facilitated and/or substantially assisted by

Clements Brown has substantially assisted in others (including John Taylor, James Beck,
Connie Taylor, Michael Caslunan and CropUSA) to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud,
traudulent conveyances. conversion, breaches

of fiduciary duties and other claims, while

also asshYting Clement" Brown in inappropriately and unlawfully ubtaining payment of

fees and cost'! for its services and in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the
law, and Clements Brown's duty of care.
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39.

Clements Brown assisted AlA Services, AlA Insurance, CropUSA. John

Taylor, and others in entering into various inappropriate agreements and transactions
which were in violation of the Rllles of Professional Conduct, the law and its duty of
care, were not in the best interests of the corporations. not authorized by disinteresled
parties, constituted fraud andlor the inappropriate transfer of assets and funds belonging
to AlA Services andlor ALA Insurance, were not anus-length transactions, andlor were
done so without requiring AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance to retain separate
independent counsel that were retained by separate independent uninterested and
authorized parties.
40.

As the former purported attorneys for AlA Services, an entity, Clements

Brown owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of
care, and under the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the
assets and businesses of the corporation, and sinee ArA Services was insolvent, to its
creditors including Reed Taylor. As fonner purported attorneys for AlA Services, and in
light of the claims made against John Taylor and others by Reed Taylor, Clements Brown
owed a duty to its entity client not to assume representation of the interests of Jolm
Taylor. individually andlor through a Joint Defense Agreement, or with any other
interested parties.
41.

As the former purported attorneys for AlA Insurance, an entity. Clements

Brown owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. its duty of
care and the law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of
the corpora.tion's stock, Reed Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and
assume control and who had exercised his contracluaJ rights and had voted the shares but

FIRST t\MENDED COMPLt\INT - 15
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whose rights were breached and rejected by interested unauthorized directors, officers
and olhers who were in control of the corporation including John Taylor.

As past

purported attorneys for AlA Insurance and in light of the claims made against John
Taylor and others by the Reed Taylor, Clements Brown owed a duty to its entity client
not to assume representation of the interests of John Taylor, individually andlor through
any Joint Defense Agreement, andlor of other interested parties (including CropUSA,
Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Caslunan).
42.

As attorneys representing John Taylor (including through a Joint Defense

Agreement), Clements Brown owed its duties first and foremost to its former purported
clients AlA Services and AlA Insurance as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct, duly of care andlor the law. As attorneys for John Taylor by and through taking
directions andlor accepting decisions made by

him

knowing that he was interested and

should have claims asserted against him, and in light of the claims against John Taylor by
the Reed Taylor, Clements Brown owed a duty to its purported corporate clients not to
assume representation of tbe intcrests of John Taylor, CropUSA or other interested
parties directly or indirectly through any Joint Dcfense Agreemcnts. Clements Brown
failed to notify or obtain appropriate informed consents or approvals from appropriate
and authorized parties or disinterested shareholders in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.. Clements Brown's duty of care, and the Rylaws and Articles of
Fonnation of the corporations, all to the detriment of Reed Taylor.
43.

As the fonner purported attorneys for AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance

(individually or through any Joint Defcnse Agreement) Clements Brown owed duties of
loyalty to the corporations and could not represent John Taylor in Taylor v. AlA Service!)',
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et al., or represent or assist John Taylor in Donna J. Taylor v. R. John Taylor because
Clements Brown's loyalty belongs exclusively to AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance.
Furthennore, Clements Brown could in no way participate in any joint defense of
CropUSA or other interested parties (such as John Taylor. Connie Taylor, James Beck,
and/or Michael Cashman) as ArA Services and/or AlA Insurance should have been
asserting claims against CropUSA, each other. and other interested and uninkrested
parties.
44.

Clements Brown represented, and continue to represent, the interests of

John Taylor (individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement) and with full
knowledge that John Taylor is an interested party and purported director of AlA Services
and AlA Insurance and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the
course of litigation involving Clements Brown's former clients, AlA Services and AlA
Insurance to the detriment of the corporations and Reed Taylor.

45.

During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, Clements

Brown has coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP ("Quarles Brady"),

the law firm that has represented AlA Services and AlA Services beforl! and throughout
litigation with Clements Brown in Taylor v. AlA Services, et 01. During the course of the
civil action aller March 28, 2007, John Taylor and olhers have further engaged in
inappropriate and/or wrongful lransactions involving themsc\ves, AlA Services, AfA
Insurance, and CropUSA, which Lidnsactions have occurred with Clements Brown's
knowledge and/or assistance, and to the detriment of AlA Services, AlA rnsurance, and
Reed Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee.
46.

Clements Brown is liable to Reed Taylor for an umount to be proven at

fIRST AMENDED COMPLArNT - 17
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trial because Clements Brown has encouraged, conspired with, provided substantial
assistance to, and/or aided and abetted John Tayior, Connie Taylor, James Heck, Michael
Cashman, Bryan Freeman, JoLec Duclos, AlA Services, AlA fnsurance, CropUSA,
andlor other interested parties in the commission acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances,
conversion, tortious interference, breaches of fiduciary duties. and other unlawful acts.
The acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, tortious interference. conversion, and breaches
of fiduciary duties include, but are not limited to: 1) While purporting to represent AlA
Insurance and AlA Services, Clements Brown assisted and/or aided and abetted John
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion of Reed Taylor's contractual rights
to control and operate AlA Insurance, which has proximately caused damages to Reed
Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AlA Services and AlA Insurance, Clements
Brown inappropriately assisted andlor aided and abetted John Taylor and other interested
parties to engage in tortious transactions involving John Taylor, AlA Services, AlA
Insurance. and/or CropUSA, which such trdOsactions have been to the detriment of AlA
Services, AfA Insurance, and Reed Taylor, and proximately caused damages to Reed
Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3) While representing John Taylor, individually
or through a Joint Defense Agreement, Clements Brown has had full knowledge that its
client is an interested party and purported director of AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and
Crop USA, and is personally conducting andcolltrolling the course of litigation involving
Clements Brown's former clients, AlA Services and AlA Insurance, and Clements
Brown has assisted and/or aided and abetted John Taylor and others (including.
CroplJSA) and has coordinated and participated with Hawley Troxell and Quarles &
Brady in John Taylor's engaging in t011ious transactions involving himself: AlA
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Services, AlA Insurance, and CropUSA, which transactions hav\! been to the detriment of
AlA Services and AlA Insurance and proximately caused damages to Reed Taylor as a
creditor and stock pledgee.

47.

In connection with Clements Brown's inappropriate representation and/or

joint defense of Jolm Taylor, AlA Services, A[A. Insurance, CropUSA, and other
interested parties (including Connie Taylor, James Beck, and Michael Cashman)
Clements Brown accepted payments of attorneys fees and costs believed to exceed
$100,000 in violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and as
participating andlor assisting in inappropriate corporate acts and the aiding and abetting
of others in the commission of torts, including breaches of fiduciary duties and
conversion.

48:

Over the course of the litigation in Reed Taylor v. AlA Services. et a/.,

Reed Taylor's attorney in that action advised Clements Brown on numerous occasions
that its

con~uct

violated Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, was

inappropriatc, and constituted the aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested
parties (including John Taylor and CropUSA), among other potential legal claims against
them. In early 2007, Clements Brown was advised that its inappropriate actions would
result in claims being filed against them by Reed Taylor.

Reed Taylor's counsel

reiterated these wamings orally and in writing on numcrotL" occasions.

Despite the

warnings from Reed Taylor's counsel, Clements Brown conduct persisted thereby further
damaging Reed Taylor. Clements Brown's disregard of Mr. Bond's warnings call only
be construed as intentional improper acts to assist John Taylor and other interested parties

to the dcu'iment of Reed Taylor.
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49.

Clements Brown wrongfully assisted John Taylor and other interested

parties in operating CropUSA with the funds, assets, employees, trade secrets and other
things of value inappropriately obtained from AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance, and
by assisting John Taylor and other interested parties (including CropUSA and Michael
Cashman) in preventing claims from being asserted and prosecuted against them.
Clements Brown wrongfully assisted andior failed to prevent interested parties (including
Jolm Taylor) in transferring the long-tenn employees of AlA Insurance to CropUSA,
while at the same time representing to the Court in Taylor v. AlA Services, et al., that the
corporations were being operated properly andior failing to advise the Court of the
inappropriate acts, misappropriation of assets, and inappropriate and/or Imlawful
transactions.

All the while Clements Brown was aware of andlor assisted in the

inappropriate payment of salaries, benefits, compensation, and director fees of $20.000
per year when A[A Services was insolvent.
50.
pro(~ct

Despite Reed Taylor's demands that Clements Brown take action to

the assets

nlld

funds of ALA Services and AlA Insurance and recover funds and

assets from John Taylor, CropUSA and other interested and uninterested parties for the
benefit of the corporations and Reed Taylor, Clements Brown refused to act in
accordance with the Rules of Profession Conduct, its duty of care, and the law. Despite

Reed Taylor's demands that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be
considered andlor protected bccaullt! of the wrongful acts of John Taylor and other
interested parties, Clements Brown refused

10

act and failed to fully and properly disclose

all pertinent facts to the disinterested shareholders and request their votes.

III
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51.

In various motions, responses and affidavits submitted to the eourt in

Taylor v. AlA Service.~. et a!., Clements Brown made arguments that did not benefit AlA
Servit:es, AlA Insur.mce, or Reed Taylor. inappropriately made other arguments
preventing valid claims from being asserted against John Taylor, James Beck, Connie
Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other interested and uninterested parties, and failed to take
action against responsible parties (including John Taylor, Crop USA, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, Michael Cashman, Lancelot Investors Fund, and others). In the instance of
Michael Cashman, Clements Brown successfully argued to the Court in Taylor v. AlA

Services, et al., that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual when Clements
Brown knew that such actions were directly impacting the assets and funds of its fonner
purpolted clients, AlA Insurance and AlA Services.

52:

. Despite Reed Taylor's demands lhat disinterested directors andlor parties

must direct the litigation on behalf of the corporations. Clements Brown refused and
permitted and/or assisted John Taylor and other interested parties to direct the litigation
to the detriment of the corporations and Reed Taylor. Despite Reed Taylor's demands
that action be taken to tenninate AlA Insuranee'5 impf-opcr guarantee of a $15,000,000
line-of-credit for CropUSA, Clements Brown refused to act, failed Lo inform or fully
disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the existence of such inappropriate loan
guarantees or rcport the unlawful actions to the Court.

53.

Clements Brown's conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Prot~ssional

Conduct, the law and its duty 01 care. which require Clements Brown to disgorge all
attorneys' fees and costs paid to them in Taylor v. AlA Services, el al., and tor any other
related andior unrelated legal services. Despite Reed Taylor's demands to comply with
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the Rules of Professional Conduct and its duty of care, Clements Brown refused to do so.
54.

Through the acts of Clements Brown, the value of AlA Insurance and the

assets of AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance have plummeted in value, the corporations'
value and assets have been impaired, andlor the assets and funds have been trmsferrcd to
CropUSA. Through the acts of Clemenls Brown, ownership of CropUSA was vested and
has remained vested in interested parties (including John Taylor), while the major
creditor Reed Taylor and minority shareholders were left with nothing. Despite Reed
Taylor's demands that action should also be taken for the interests of the innocent
minority shareholders and creditors, Clements Brown has refused to take acLion and
inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including John Taylor, Connie Taylor,
James Beck and Michael Cashman).
55:

Despite Clements Brown having made several legal arguments that lacked

merit, lacked good faith and/or were not grounded in facls, Clements Brown participated
in providing a settlement offer to Reed Taylor in Taylor v. AlA Services, ef al., which
included a provision that he release all claims against Clements Brown as a condition of
the settlemellt.

The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rules of

Professional Conduct and Clements Brown's duty of care and its obligations to its fonner
purported clients, AlA Services and AlA InslIrdnce.
56.

Clements Brown has assisted in the Inappropriatc acts of John Taylor and

other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed Taylor nnd Donna Taylor, Reed
Taylor's tonncr wile and the holder of all outstanding Preterred A Shares of AlA
Services. Like Reed Taylor, Donna Taylor is required to be a member of the board of
directors of AlA Services. Like Reed Taylor, Clement') Brown has assisted John Taylor
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and other interested parties in preventing Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor from being
members of the board of directors of AlA Services, which has further far reaching
ramifications regarding the validity of any corporate act and results in additional damages
against Clements Brown.
57.

With full knowledge of AlA Services' obligations to ensure that Reed

Taylor and Donna Taylor are members of AlA Services' board until they were paid in

full, Clements Brown proceeded to attend and participate in inappropriate board meetings
and take and/or recommend inappropriate action based upon board meetings held by
interested purported directors without Reed Taylor or Donna Taylor being present and
without providing them with their right to be present, which further results in all such
meetings and decisions being null and void, and Clements Brown being liable for the
associated-damages for substantially participating in such actions.
58.

Clements Brown assisted and/or failed to prevent andlor notify

disinterested parties or the Court that AlA Services had inappropriately pledged its sole
remaining other significant asset, the $1,200,000 Mortgage (in which Reed Taylor held a
sccurity interest), to CropUSA to facilitate the payment of over $100,000 [or Clements
Brown's services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and

the law.
59.

Clements Brown omitted and/or misrepresented matcrial [acts to the Court

in Taylor v. AfA Services. et (J/., to the detriment of Reed Taylor. [n several instances,
Clements Brown persuaded the Court to take action that was not in the best interests of
Ihe corporations or Reed Taylor, to the detriment of the Clements Brown's purported
clients, AlA Services and AlA Insurance, and Reed Taylor (including requesting Iiltle or
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no bond and consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when Clements Brown
knew that the corporations were not being operated properly or their assets safeguarded).
60.

Clements Brown has inappropriately assisted John Taylor and other

interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or services provided
and bome by ALA Insurance andlor AlA Services for the benefit of CropUSA, John
Taylor and other interested parties.
61.

Clements Brown had full knowledge of John Taylor's Executive Officer's

Agreement. Even though John Taylor has breached the terms of his employment contract
with AlA Services by competing against AlA Services through CropUSA (and violating
the corporate opportunity doctrine). by soliciting employees of AlA Insurance, and other
inappropriate actions, Clements Brown has intentionally refused to act in the best
interests of AlA Services, AlA Insurance, their shareholders, andlor Reed Taylor, to the
detriment of Reed Taylor.
62.

Clements Brown assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining

funds, assets and property to CropUSA to defraud AlA Services' creditor Reed Taylor
(including, without Iimitalion, over $95,000 owed by llacific Empire Radio Corporation
to AlA Insurance, assistance in transferring shares of the Pacific Empire Radio
Corporation to John Taylor, and failing to collect the over $300,000 owed by John
Taylor) by not reporting such acls to disinterested parties or other appropriate and
authorized parties as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct and it-q duty of care.
63.

In April 2007, Clements Brown pcnuitted andlor assisted interested pa11ies

in holding a joint board meeting of AlA Services and AIA Insurance with full knowledge
that Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor were being intentionally denied their right to be on
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the board of AlA Services and participating in such meetings (DOlUla Taylor has
subordinated ber right to payment in favor of Reed Taylor). At the meeting hdd, in April
2007. Clements Brown permitted and/or assisted John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor
and James Beck to the purportcU boards of A[A Services and AlA Insurance knowing

that they were interested parties who AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance should be
pursuing claims against, that they inappropriately held shares in CropUSA, that they were
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws.
64.

Clements Brown inappropriately permitted andfor assisted two interested

parties, Conrne Taylor and James Beck, to approve andlor consent to a Joint Defense
Agreement with Clements Brown and others, which also facilitated the inappropriate
joint legal representations of interested parties with conflicting irreconcilable interests

and the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to various attorneys in violation of the Rules
of

Prof(!~siona]

Conduct and its duty of care, to the detriment of AlA Services, i\IA

Insurance and Reed Taylor.
65.

At all relevant times, Clements Brown has been fully aware of Reed

Taylor's rights to property in which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as
collateral.

66.

Clements Brown also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of

AlA Services (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the signif1cant claims
against ule interested parties (including Juhn Tllylor and CropUSA) and the significant
misappropriation of the corporations' asselc;, but provided legal services on behalf of the
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interested parties and unlawfully accepted payment from AlA Services and AlA
Insurance. [n connection with the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to other named
parties in Taylor v. AlA Services, el aI., Clements Brown failed to obtain the necessary
approvals from Reed Taylor or other disinterested and/or authorized parties to the
detriment of AlA Services. AlA [nsurance and/or Reed Taylor.
67.

Despite demands to the contmry. Clements Brown continued to take

instructions and/or directives from the unauthorized boards (or John Taylor) of AlA
Services and/or AlA hlSurance knowing that the boards are not properly seated and are
comprised of interested parties (including John Taylor) with significant claims that
should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty
of care, and/or thc law.
II. CLEMENTS BROWN'S AIDING AND ABETTING AND CONSPIRACY
68.

Clements Brown is committing and ha<; committed tortious acts in concert

with other parties (including John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman,
.IoLec Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA, Hawley Troxell, Quarles Brady, and others)
and/or pursuant to a common design or civil conspiracy with such other parti!:!s.
69.

Clements Brown knew that the conduct of other parties (including John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, Jor ,ec Duclos, Crop USA, Bryan
Freeman. Hawley Troxell, Quarles Brady and others) constituted breaches of duties
and/or gave substantial assistance and/or encouragement to such other parties in
breaching said duties. Clements Brown knew that it was purportedly using the l10nllally
lawful act of practicing law to commit and/or substantially assist olhers in committing
unlawful acts.

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 26
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR mmCIAL NOTICE

70.

Clements Brown gave substantial assistance to other parties (including

John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA,
Bryan Freeman, Hawley Troxell, Quarles Brady, and others) in committing and/or
accomplishing tortious conduct and/or acts (including, without limitation, breaches of
fiduciary duties, fraud, constructive fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, tortious
interference, and other claims), and Clements Drown's conduct, separately considered,
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to AlA Services. AlA Insurance, and/or Reed
Taylor.
71.

Clements Brown conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of other parties in

the commission of the torts andlor caused of action alleged in this Complaint (including
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos. CropUSA,

Bryan Freeman, Hawley Troxell, Quarles Brady, and others) and/or constitutes the
conduct of a contributing tortfeasor, and such conduct has damaged AlA Services, AlA
Insurance, and Reed Taylor.
72.

Clements Brown's conduct constitutes the commission of civil conspiracy

in the commission of the lorts and/or causes of action alleged in this Complaint,
including, without limitation, the conspiracy

to jointly represent parties to commit torts as

further evidenced by Joint Defense Agreements.
73.

The paragraphs in this Section are incorporated by reference into each

cause of action below as necessary to support aiding and abetting and/or civiil:onspiracy
of the torts and/or causes of action set forth below and/or contemplated in this Complaint.
III
III
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HI. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS-CONVERSION
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
74.

Reed Taylor has, and has had during certain relevant time, a valid and

perfected security interest in the commissions and related receivables of ALA Services
and ALA Insurance and aU proceeds relating to such security interests. Rel!d Taylor also
has a security interest in all of the stock of ArA Insurance and the stock of all of A[A
Services' other subsidiaries, including The Universe and all distributions and proceeds
relating to such security interests (i.e., the $1.2 Million Lewis-Clark Mortgage).
Clements Brown had full knowledge of Reed Taylor's security interests in the foregoing
property and such other property reasonably contemplated by the Redemption
Agreements.
75.

By way of Reed Taylor's security interest in AlA Insurance's

commissions, his security interest in AlA Insurance's stock, and his asserted contractual
right to the possession and control of AlA (nsurance on February 22, 2007, atl of ALA
Insurance's revenues, assets, and income should be under the possession and control of
Reed Taylor. including, without limitation, the $1.2 MiJIion Mortgage, settlement
proceeds in the approximate amount of $800,000, all funds and assets transferred or
utilized in any way by CropUSA. and every dollar of revenue generated by AlA
rnsurance from all sources sinee February 22, 2007.

76.

Reed is entitled to possession and control of all of the property to which he

has a contractual right, including, without limitation, the property indicated above and all
other property contemplated in this Complaint through his security interest in the
commissions and related receivables and the proceeds related thereto, security interests in
the stock of all of AlA Services' subsidiaries and the distributions and proceeds related
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thereto, and through the security and related rights set forth in the Redemption
Agreements.
77.

All of Reed Taylor's security interests and possession rights can be traced

lhrough various sources to identity all funds and assets that Clements Brown has
unlawfully taken or assisted others in taking.

CIl!ments Bro\\.'11 has taken control of

property, which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession and control, including without
I imitation, all funds received for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs in Taylor v. AlA

Services, et al. and attorneys' fees and costs paid for other purported services. Clements
Brown has exercised dominion and control over assets (including the $1.2 Million
Mortgage) and/or funds (any funds received from AlA Services or A[A Insurance) in
which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession with full knowledge of Reed Taylor's
possessory rights and security interests.
78.

Clements Brown has received substantial payments believed to exceed

$100,000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which such funds Clements Brown
had no lawful right to possess or retain, funds that Reed Taylor had the legal right

(0

possess, and such funds were received in violation of the law, Rules of Professional
Conduct Clements Brown's duty of care. Clements Brown also accepted payment of
funds purportedly owed to it, which such funds and the $1.2 Million Mortgage (to the
extent that any funds were derived from the Mortgage) Reed Taylor was legally entitled
to possess. Clements Brown has also accepted the payment of services for attorneys' Ices
and costs rendered for John Taylor, which w~re paid by the money and/or assets
unlawfully derived from AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance, which such money andlor
assets Reed Taylor held valid security interests and/or were derived from proceeds from
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such security interests.
79.

Clements Brown's conduct constitutes the willful interference with

property and/or funds belonging to Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance;
and/or which such property and/or funds should be under the possession andlor control of
AlA Services, AlA Insurance and/or Reed Taylor, as the person entitled to such money

and property as a creditor and pledgee. Clements Brown intentionally deprived Reed
Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance of possession of such property and/or funds.
Despite demands, Clements Brown has refused to return such propertyand/or funds, and
has unlawfully retained the property and/or funds.
80.

As a direct andlor proximate cause of Clements Brown's acts and/or

omissions (which constitute conversion), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to
be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment.

8!.

Clements Brown has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with other

parties in the conversion of property that Reed Taylor is legally entitled to possess andlor
property to which AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance are entitled to possess (including,
without limitation, funds paid to Clements Brown, funds paid to John Taylor and other
interested parties, the pledging of the $1.2 Million Mortgage to CropUSA, and the $1.5
Million unlawfully transferred to CropUSA).

As a direct andlor proximate result of

Clements Brown's aiding and abetting and/or civil conspiracy relating to the conversion
of assets andlor funds that Reed Taylor. AlA Services, andlor AlA Insurance are legally
entitled to possess, Reed Taylor, AlA Insurance, and/or AlA Services have been
damaged in the amount to be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment.

III
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IV. SECOND CAUSES OF ACTIONS-TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services andlor AlA lnsurancc's Causes of Actions)
82.

Reed Taylor is a party to the Redemption Agreements. Clements Brown

had full knowledge of the Redemption Agreements.

Clements Brown intentionally

interfered with R.eed Taylor's contractual rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements
causing breaches of the Redemption Agreements.

Clements Brown's intentional

interference, includes, but is not limited to, tortiously interfering with Reed Taylor's
contractual rights to vote the shares of AlA Insurance, rights to possession of the
commission collateral, right to be a member of the board of AlA Services, right to be an
officer and director of AlA Insurance, right to possession and control of AlA Insurance,
other rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements, and rights set forth in the
Subordination Agreement with Donna Taylor. Also included in this cause of action arc
tortious interference claims based upon Clements Brown, John Taylor, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of AlA Services
and/or AlA Insurance.
83.

Clements Brown has also aidcd and abetted andlor conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, loLee Duclos. Bryan Freeman,
Crop USA andlor other parties in the tortious interference of Reed Taylor's contractual
rights. Clements Brown's acts and/or omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting
and/or civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of Reed Taylor's
contractual rights.
84.

As a direct andlor proximate result of Clements Brown's acts and/or

omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to be
determined allhe time of trial or on sununary judgment.
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85.

AlA Services is a party to John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement.

Clements Brown has full knowledge of the Executive Officer's Agreement. Clements
Brown has intentionally interfered with AlA Services' contractual rights set forth in the
Executive Officer's Agreement causing breaches to the Executive OLlicer's Agreement.
Clements Brown's intentional interference, includes, but is not limited to, tortiously
interfering with AlA Services' contractual rights prevent John Taylor from transferring
AlA Insurance's employees to CropUSA, rights to prevent John Taylor from competing
against AlA Services or AlA Insurance through CropUSA, and rights to control John
Taylor's compensation. All of these allegations have been repeatedly alleged by Reed
Taylor throughout the course of Taylor v. AlA Services, ef af. Also included in this cause
of action are tortious interference claims based upon Clements Brown, John Taylor,
Connie T-aylor. James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of
AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance.
86.

Clements Brown has 'also aided and abetted and/or conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA and/or other parties in the tortious interference of AfA Services' contractual
rights. Clements Brown's acts and/or omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting
and/or civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of AlA Services'
contractual rights.
87.

As a direct and/or proximate result of Clements I3rown's acts and/of

omissions. AlA Services has been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to
be detennined at the time of trial or on summary judgment.
V. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS-FRAUD AND/OR CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions)

fIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT· 32
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

88.

Clements Brown owed special duties to Reed Taylor, AlA Services andlor

AlA Insurance as described throughout this Complaint.

89.

Clements Brown owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor

of AlA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance, a
stock plcdgee in which Clements Brown knew had lawfully voted the shares of AlA
Insurance, the only authorized officer and director of AlA Insurance, the holder of a
security interest in aU of the commissions and related receivables of AlA Services and
AlA Insurance, the holder of 8: security interest in all of the shares of all of AlA Services'

other subsidiaries and aU distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Million
Mortgage and $800,000 settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AlA
Services, and the only party entitled to the remaining assets of AlA St:rvices and AlA
[nsurdllce.
90.

rnsurance

Clements Brown owed and owes duties to AlA Services and AlA
to properly represent the best interests of the corporations and to not allow

interested parties (including, without limitation, John Taylor) from taking actions that are
not in the best interests of the corporations, including, without limitation, unauthorized
andlor conflicted persons directing litigation, misappropriation and tortious transfer of
assets and funds to interc!sted parties to the delriment of ALA Services and/or AlA
Insurance, to advise the Court and disinterested shareholders of the actions of John
Taylor and other interested panies, and to not issue opinion Ictters to auditor!' andlor
other parties to assist in the commission of tortious conduct.

Clements Brown has

breached its duties and acted unlawfully (and aU improper andlor unlawful acts set forth
andlor contemplated in this Complaint), and its conduct constitutes constructive fraud tor
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which AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance are entitled to recover damages in the amount
to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
91.

Clements Brown has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck. Michael Caslullan, IoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA andlor olher parties in the commission of fraud and/or constructive fraud and
to otherwise defraud Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA fnsurance.

As a direct

and/or proximate result of Clements Brown's acts, Reed Taylor, AlA Services andlor
AIA Insurance have been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial or on
summary judgment.

VI. FQURTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-MALPRACTICE
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
92.

Clements Brown owed Reed Taylor a special attorney-client relationship

for all of the reasons sct forth in this Complaint (including, without limitation, the
aIlegations contained in Reed Taylor's breach of fiduciary duty cause of action). From
time to time, Clements Brown has also possessed funds andlor property which it should
have protected and safeguarded for Reed Taylor, but failed to do so. All of the foregoing
results in the existence of duties on the part of Clements Brown owed to Reed Taylor~ or
at the minimum, a special duty to ensure assets and funds are protected for the benefit of
Reed Taylor in the event that he takes control and possession of AlA Insurance pursuant
10 his contrdctual rights (which such event could have happened at any time during

Clements Brown's purported representation of AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance).
Also included in these special duties is to not obtain a restraining order or injunction
knowing that the funds, assets aud services of AlA Insurance were being misappropriated
and/or unlawfully transferred.
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93.

Clements Brown's past purported clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries

perfonning similar functions for a non-client, Reed Taylor. Clements Brown knew that
its appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AlA Services
and/or ALA Insurance to take action to prevent and/or rectify the breaches of tiduciary
duties owed by AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance to Reed Taylor when such breaches
were crimes and/or fraud and/or Clements Brown assisted and/or are assisting in the
breaches. Reed Taylor was not able to protect his rights because of Clements Brown's
actions and Clements Brown's obligations to AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance would
not be significantly impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect
sums owed by others and recover damages tor the improper tortious conduct of others
(including, without limitation, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael
Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan freeman, and CropUSA).

94.

Clements Brown breached its duties (including, without limitation, the

duty of the standard of care) owed by it to Reed Taylor. As a direct and/or proximate
result of Clements Brown's failure to pcrfonn the duties owed to Reed Taylor, he was
damaged in the amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment
95.

Clements Brown owed AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance an attorney:-

client relationship for purportedly representing AlA Service and/or AlA Insurance and
duties pertaining to the corporations being former clients, which results in the existence
of duties on the part of Clements Brown owed to AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance.

96.

Clements Brown owed AlA Services, AlA Insurance Md/or Reed Taylor a

duty of care to provide, including, but not limited to, reasonable, prudent, ethical,
unconflictcd, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation in keeping with
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the standard of care in lhc legal profession and as owed to the corpomtions (referred to
herein and above as "duty of care"). Clements Brown breached its duty of care as a result
of its acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the corpomtions and Reed Taylor. to the
detriment of Reed Taylor.
97.

Clements Brown breached its fiduciary duties owed to AlA Services, AlA

Insurance, and/or Reed Taylor, including. without limitation. the duties of care and
loyalty.
98.

Clements Brown's acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of

Clements Brown's fiduciary duties, and such conduct have damaged the corporations and
Reed Taylor, in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
99.

Clements Brown breached the duty of the standard of care owed by it to

AfA Services andlor AlA Insurance. As a direct and/or proximate result of Clements
Brown's failure to perform the duties owed to AfA Services and/or AlA Insurance in
connection v,ith the legal services purportedly provided by Clements Brown, AlA
Services andlor AlA Insurance were damaged in the amount to be pro yen at trial or on
summary judgment.

VII. FIFTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-VIOLATIONS OFTHE r.C.P.A.
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
100.

Reed Taylor. AlA Services and AlA Insurance are all persons as defined

by I.e. § 48-602. Clements Brown's purported practice of law constitutes services as
defined by I.C. § 48-601. Reed Taylor, AlA Services and AlA rnsurance have either
purchased services directly from Clements Brown, are known beneficiaries of services
provided by Clements Brown, andlor its attorneys are members of the Idaho State Bar
through which AlA Services, AlA rnsurance andlor Reed Taylor has contracted
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services through trade and commerce.
101.

By way of the attorneys ofCleinents Brovvn's obligations to the Court and

as members of the Idaho State Bar, they owe duties to their purported clients,
beneficiaries of their services, and the adverse parties in litigation to comply with the
Rules of Professional Conduct and the laws.

Clements Brown has served only the

interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, James Beck, loLee Duclos,
CropUSA and other interested parties-who Clements Brown has not honestly
represented to the Court and Clements Brown's beneficiary and/or adversary that
Clements Brown was not complying with its obligations under the Rules of Professional
Conduct or the law, to the detriment of Reed Taylor. AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance.
Clements Brown's unlawful and inappropriate acts have a direct impact on consumers
and the integrity of the legal system, and further constitute unfair methods and practices
and violations of I.C. § 48-60 I, et seq.
102.

Clements Brown has falsely represented that it had approval from the

Idaho State Oar and approval from authorized constituents Lo represent AfA Services
and/or AlA Insurance, when in fact it did not have such authority in violation of I.C. §
48-603(5). Clements Brown has falsely represented that its services have been provided
to a particular standard when in fact its services have not met the appropriate standards
(including the standard of care) in violation or I.C. § 48-603(7), Clements Brown has
HlIscly disparaged the services of Reed Taylor"s counsel in violation of I.e. § 48-603(8).
Clements Brown has falsely represented that services were not nceded (i.e .• not making
claims against lohn Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, Crop USA
and others, when it knew such claims were warranted) in violation of LC. § 48-603(16).

FlRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 37
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

7317

Clements Brown has engaged in acts and/or practices that have been misleading to Reed
Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance in violation of I.e. § 48·603(17). Based upon
all of the allegations in this Complaint, Ckments Brown has also violated other
applicable provisions orLC. § 48-603 and/or I.C. § 48·601, et seq.
103.

Reed Taylor has purchased services and has lost property and/or money

and has been damaged by the methods. practices and/or acts of Clements Brown declared
unlawful by I.C. § 48-601. el seq.
104.

AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance has purchased services and have lost

property and/or money and has been damaged by the methods, practices and/or acts of
Clements Brown declared unlawful by I.C. § 48-601, el seq. AlA Services and/or AlA
Insurance is requesting that all contracts for purported services provided by Clements
Brown be declared void and that all funds and/or assets paid under such contmcts be
returned to AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance.
105.

Clements Bro...vn knew or should have known that its conduct was

perpetrated directly and/or imlin.:ctly against Reed Taylor in violation of I.e. § 48-608,
including, without limitation, for being an elderly person who has losl more than 25% of
his monthly income by way of Clements Brown's unlawful acts.
106.

Clements Brown's acts constitute violations of the Idaho Consumer

Protection Act, specifically, I.e. § 48-601, el seq. Reed Taylor. 1\11\ Services and/or
AlA Insurance are entitled to damages, treble damages. punitive damages, allomey's tees

and costs and/or such other requested relief as a resull ot' Clcmcnrs Brown's violations
and as available under

I.e.

§ 48-601, ct .rcq.

Clements Brown's violations or the

unlawful acts of attorneys (including attorneys as adversaries) are not any of the
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exceptions to

I.e. § 48-601, et seq. as set forth in I.e. § 48-605.

VIII. SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Action)
107.

Clements Brown owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor

of AlA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of ATA Insurance, a
stock pledgee in which Clements Brown knew had lawfully voted the shares of AlA
Insurance, the only authorized officer and director of ArA lnsurance, the holder of a
security interest in all of the commissions and related receivables of ALA Services and
AlA Insurance, the holder of a security interest in all of the shares of all of AlA

Servicc~'

other subsidiaries and all distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Million
Mortgage and $800,000 settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AlA
Services, and the only party entitled to the remaining assets of AlA Services and AlA
Insurance. Based upon aU of the foregoing and Clements Brown's possession of funds
and assets of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance from time to time, Clements Brown
owed a special fiduciary duty to safeguard the assets and funds of AlA Services and AlA
Insurance.
108.

Clements Brown breached its fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor. As a

direct and/or proximate result of Clements Brown' s breached fiduciary duties, Reed
Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial or on summary
judgment.
109.

Clements Brown, John Taylor, COIDlie Taylor, James Beck, loLee Duclos

and Bryan Freeman owed and/or owe tiduciary duties to AlA Services and/or AlA
[nsurance and to Reed Taylor as the only significant secured creditor of the insolvent
AlA Services and as the pledgee of all the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance (and the
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person who voted the shares). Clements Brown has substantially assisted other parties in
breaching the Bylaws of AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance. John Taylor owed andlor
owes fiduciary duties to Reed Taylor by ....ray of being Reed Taylor's brother.

The

fiduciary duties owed and breached include, but are not limited to, the duty of loyalty,
duty of care and duty to deal in good taith.

110.

Clements Brown had full knowledge of all of the fiduciary duties owed to

Reed Taylor. AfA Services and/or AlA Insurance. The fiduciary duties owed to Reed
Taylor, AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance include (but are not limited to), the
obligation to safeguard AlA Services and AlA Insurance's assets and business
relationships and to recover funds and assets unlawfully transferred from AlA Services or
AlA Insurance.

11 L

Clements Brown, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, 10Lee Duclos

and Bryan Freeman breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AlA Services
and/or AlA Insurance; and Clements Brown knew that the foregoing parties' conduct
constituted the breach of fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AlA Services andlor AlA
Insurance.

These breached fiduciary duties are ongoing and Clements Brown has

substantially assisted and/or encouraged the foregoing parties in the commission of
breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AlA Services andlor AIA
Insurance. Clements Brown also continues to substantially assist and/or encourage the

foregoing parties in breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AlA Services
and/or AlA Insurance.
112.

Clements Brown's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AlA

Services and/or AlA [nsurance in an amoUJ~t to be' proven at trial or on summary
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judgment by aiding and abetting andlor sub~1.antially assisting others (including John
Taylor and CropUSA) through a civil conspiracy in: the commission of breaches of
fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, ALA Services andior ALA Insurance.

IX. SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACfION-EXCESSIVE COMPENSATIONIWASTE
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
1 t3.

Clements Brown has known that AlA Services is insolvent and ALA

Insurance is pledged to Reed Taylor as collateraL Clements Brown has known that AlA
Insurance is a wholly owned subsidiary of the insolvent AlA Services. Clements Brown
has known that AlA Insurance's business is in the final years of existence and that its
commissions are dwindling as new health policies have not been issued for years.
114.

Clements Brown has aided and abetted andlor conspired with John Taylor,

Connie Taylor, James Beck, and others to pay excessive compensation for salaries and
fees for purportedly being officers andlor directors of AlA Services and ALA Insurance.
Clements Brown has aided and abetted and/or conspired with John Taylor, Connie
Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman and others to waste the remaining assets of AlA
Services and/or AlA Insurance.

All the while Clements Brown has known of Reed

Taylor'S rights ami AlA Services' insolvency. Clements Brown had full knowledge that
John Taylor and other dircctors and otlicers' compensation was required to be set by the
lawful board of directors of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance, but substantially
assisted John Taylor and others in obtaining inappropriate compensation.

115.

Clements Brown'~ acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AlA

Services andlor AlA Insurance in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary
judgment by aiding and abetting andlor substantially assisting others (including, without
limitation, John Taylor, Connie Taylor and James Beck) through a civil conspiracy in the
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payment of excessive compensation.

X. DEMAND FOR JURV TRIAL
l.

Reed Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve (12) on all

claims and damages so triable.

XI. PRA VER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Rced Taylor prays f'Or the following rei icf:
L

For a judgment against Clements

Bro~

jointly and severally, for

$6,000,000 in damages ($2,000,000 in actual damages and $4,000,000 in treble
damages), the exact amount of which will be proven at trial and/or on summary
judgment, plus an award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;
2.

For a judgmcnt against Clements Brown, jointly and severally, for treble

damages of $4,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial pursuant to

I.e.

§ 48-

608(2);

3.

For a judgment requiring the disgorgement of the payments of all

attorneys' fees and costs paid to Clements Brown by AlA Services andlor ALA Insurance;
4.

For judgment against Clements Brown, jointly and severally, for

additional damages as provided under I.C. § 48-608~
5.

For such other relicf as may be available to Reed Taylor pursuant to I.C. §

48-60 I, at seq. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary
injullction to restrain Clements Brown from undertaking further representation;

6.

For an award of attorneys fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to

[daho Law. including. without limitation. I.C. § 48...(508, LC. § 12-120 andlor I.e. § 12-

121; and
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7.

For such other reI ief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this _ _ day of October, 2008.

CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
By: _ _ _._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Reed Taylor

VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) 5S.

COl;'NTY OF NEZ PERCE )
I, Reed J. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath. deposes and says:
I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled action. r have read the contents of this First
Amended Complaint, know the contents of this First Amended Complaint. and believe
that the facts in this First Amended Complaint are true and accurate to the best of my
knowledge and belief

Reed J. Taylor

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _ _ day of October, 2008.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at:
My commission expires: ________
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ___ day of October, 2008, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of Reed Taylor's First Amended Complaint to the
following:

- HAND DELIVERY
_ _ U.S.MAlL
_ _ OVER.t~IGHT MAIL

_ _ FAX TRANSMISSION

John J. Janis
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis, Chtd.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise,lD 83701-2582

_ _ EMAIL (.pdf attachment)

MICHAEL S. BISSELL
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
Attorneys for Appellant Reed Taylor
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV-08-01763
Appellant,

v.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

MICHAEL E. MCNICHOLS, an individual;
CLEMENTS. BROWN & MCNICHOLS,
P A., an Idaho professional corporation; JANE
DOES I-V, unknown individuals;
Res

ndents.

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, MICHAEL E.
MCNICHOLS AND CLEMENTS, BROWN & MCNICHOLS AND
THE PARTIES' ATTORNEY JOHN J. JANNIS, HEPWORTH,
LEZAMIZ, & JANIS, CHTD., P.O. BOX 2582, BOISE, ID 83701;
AND

TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
L

The above named Appellant Reed .J. T ayIol appeals against the above-

named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Order granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and denying Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint

NonCE OF APPEAL - I
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entered in the above entitled action on the 23 M day of December, 2008, the Honorable

Jeff M. Brodie presiding.
2,

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Judgments/Orders described in paragraph I above are appealable Orders under and
pursuant to Rules 4 and l1(a)(1), tA.R.

3.

A preliminary statement of issues on appeal, which the Appellant intends

to assert in this appeal are as follows (several of which are issues of first impression);
provided, the following list of issues is not exhaustive and Respondents should expect
others:
a. Did plaintiff state causes of action against attorneys for fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation,
and/or tortious interference and/or causes of actions pertaining to
aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the
commission of any of any of the foregoing causes of action. 7
b. Does the Litigation Privilege exist in Idaho and, if so, does it bar
claims against attorneys for fraud, constructive fraud, breaches of
fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation. and tortious
interference and/or causes of action pertaining to aiding and
abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the commission of
any of the foregoing causes of action?
C.

Does a plaintiff state a cause of action against an attorney for
conversion and other causes of action by alleging that the attorney
accepted payment for attorney's fees and costs from funds the
attorney knew or should have known were funds in which the
plaintiff held a valid and perfected security interest?

d. Does a stock pledgee, who is also a secured creditor of the
revenues and all of the stock of the corporation, have standing to
pursue direct causes of actions against parties for claims owned by
the corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
derivative causes of action on behalf of the corporation?

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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e. Does a creditor of an insolvent corporation. who is also a secured
creditor of the revenues of the corporation. have standing to assert
direct causes of action against parties for claims owned by the
corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
derivative causes of actions on behalf of the corporation?

f

Are allegations that an attorney has exceeded hislher scope of
representation sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim based upon the Litigation Privilege?

g. Can an attorney represent corporate clients with diverging interests
when the representation was approved by persons with
director/officer conflicts of interest?
h. Does Idaho's Consumer Protect Act bar a person from asserting
claims against an attorney. when the plaintiff does not have privity
of contract with the attorney, for violations of Idaho's Consumer
Protection Act?

i.

In considering a motion to dismiss under LR.C.P. 12(b)(6), is it
permissible for the district court to take judicial notice of an
entirely different case in toto and/or to consider documents which
are not in the record for that case?

j.

Can a stock pledgee of all of the stock and revenues of a pledged
corporation assert direct and/or derivative causes of actions for
malpractice against an attorney?

k. Can a secured creditor, who is also the most significant creditor of
an insolvent corporation, assert direct and/or derivative claims for
malpractice against an attorney?
L Can the district court judge, who is the same judge for two related
actions, consider privileged documents in granting a motion to
dismiss under !Rep 12(b)(6) without requiring production of the
documents to the other party?
ffi.

If a party provides privileged documents to an expert and the
expert provides testimony through an affidavit relying on the
privileged documents for the experts testimony, has the attorneyclient privilege been waived and must the documents be produced
to the opposing party upon a motion to compel?
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n. If fdaho adopts the Litigation Privilege defense for an attorney, can
the defense be asserted to dismiss an action pursuant to LRC.P.
12(b)(6) for actions taken by the attorney which the attorney
asserts were under the scope of representation, when such scope of
representation was purportedly agreed to by representatives from
the corporation client, when the attorney knows or should have
known that: (1) the representatives of the corporation have
conflicts of interest; (2) the board of directors of the corporation
client have conflicts of interest; (3) the corporation has not held an
annual shareholder meeting in years; (4) the purported scope of
representation was not in the best interests of at least two
corporation clients with diverging interests; and (5) the scope of
representation was not in the best interests of each of the attorney's
three different clients.
o. Does an attorney owe a non-client any fiduciary duties, special
duties. and/ot third-party beneficiary obligations when the attorney
knows or should have known (including, without limitation): (1)
that all of the shares and revenues of the corporation client the
attorney is purportedly representing are pledged as collateral to the
non-client and another client is in default of the obligations which
trigger remedies pertaining to such security interests; (2) the nonclient has voted the shares appointing himself as the sole officer
and director of the corporation client, the corporation client is
being wrongfully managed by persons breaching fiduciary duties
and not safeguarding assets; (3) the assets and funds are
insufficient to pay; (4) that millions of dollars in assets and funds
may have been wrongfully transferred from the corporation client
by the very individuals directing the litigation (5) the parent
corporation of the pledged corporation is also being represented by
the attorney and the same non-client is owed millions of dollars by
the parent corporation client who is highly insolvent?
p. Does a plaintiff have a constitutional right (whether under the
United States Constitution or the State of Idaho '5 Constitution) to
obtain documents, prosecute causes of action and/or pursue causes
of action to protect and/or recover assets which are subject to a
security interest andlor pursue causes of actions action attorneys
relating to anyone or mOle the foregoing?

4.

There has not been an Order sealing all or any portion of this record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is not requested.
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6.

Appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's

record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R.:

a. This Notice of Appeal;
b. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss;
c. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss;

d. Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to

Dismiss~

e. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint (including
the attached proposed First Amended Complaint);
f.

Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
Amend Complaint; and

g. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint.
7.

I certify that:
a. A copy of this notice of appeal has not been served on a reporter
because a transcript has not been requested.
b. The clerk of the district court has not been paid any fee for
preparing a transcript because a transcript has not been requested.
c

The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been
paid.

d. The appellate filing fee has been paid.
e. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20
DATED this 30lh day of January, 2009.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC

BY:~~
V

Michael S. Bi~lIate
Attorneys fOf
Reed Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30111 day of January, 2009, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of Appellant's Notice of Appeal to the following:
~_HANDDELIVERY

X

U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
- - FAX TRANSMISSION
>< EMAIL (.pdf attachment)

JohnJ. Janis
Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis, Chtd.
P.O. Box 2582
Boise,ID 83701-2582

Michael S. Bissell
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J, TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.:

CVtl8 -01765

Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
v.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
GAR YD. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;

Category: A.t.
Fee: $88.00

Defendants.
Reed 1. Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAMPBELL, BISSELL &
KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all applicable facts alleged below are incorporated by
reference into each cause of action as necessary to support each such cause of action):

I. PARTIES
I.

Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County,

Idaho. Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor is an elderly person as defined in I.C. § 48-608.

COMPLA1NT - 1
INTERVENOR'gREQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP ("Hawley Troxell") is an

2,

Idaho limited liability partnership in the business of practicing law. Hawley Troxell is
vicariously liable for the acts of the individual Defendants.
3,

Defendant Gary D. Babbitt is an individual residing in the state of Idaho

and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell.

4.

Defendant D. John Ashby is an individual residing in the state of Idaho

and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell.
5.

Defendant Patrick V. Collins is an individual residing in the state of Idaho

and is an attorney practicing law in the state ofldaho with and for Hawley Troxell,

6.

Defendant Richard A. Riley is an individual residing in the state of Idaho

and is an attorney in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley Troxell.

7.

Jane Does I-X are unknown individuals who are and/or were attorneys that

paJiicipated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above known defendants
with and for Hawley Troxell.

II. JURISDICTION, VENUE AND CLAIMS
8.

The Defendants transacted business through the practice of law in Nez

Perce County, Idaho, and have an expectation of being 'named as defendants in Nez Perce
County, Idaho.

The Defendants committed tortious acts and/or assisted in the

commission of tortious acts in Nez Perce County, Idaho. The Defendants' tortious acts
and/or assistance have inflicted damages upon a resident of Nez Perce County, Idaho.

9.

Damages in this action exceed $10,000.

therefore, appropriate in Nez Perce County District Court.

COMPI ,A TNT, - ?
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Jurisdiction and venue are,

10.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Complaint is not a derivative action. Plaintiff

Reed J. Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AlA Insurance, Inc., the only
shareholder of AlA Insurance, Inc. by way of holding all of its shares as collateral, and
the largest creditor of AlA Services Corporation (Reed J. Taylor is owed over $8,500,000
and AlA Services Corporation is insolvent).

AlA Services Corporation and AlA

Insurance, Inc,'s value and net assets are insufficient to pay the over $8,500,000, plus
interest and attorneys' fees and costs, owed to Reed J. Taylor. Therefore, Plaintiff Reed
J. Taylor is entitled to bring certain claims directly against the Defendants for certain
damages,

III. FACTS
1 I.

At all material times, Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor was owed over $6,000,000

by AlA Services Corporation through a promissory note dated August 1, 1995. Plaintiff
Reed J, Taylor is presently owed over $8,500,000 by AlA Services Corporation. At all
material times, the Defendants had full knowledge of AlA Services Corporation's debt
and contractual obligations owed to Reed 1. Taylor.
J 2,

ALA Services Corporation was in default of the $6,000,000 promissory

note when it failed to pay the note when it matured on August 1, 2005.

Although

unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured on August 1, 2005, demand
for payment was properly served upon AlA Services Corporation by Plaintiff Reed 1.
Taylor on December 12, 2006, a copy of which was also provided to Defendant Richard
A. Riley pursuant to the notice provisions of the agreements. AlA Services Corporation
was insolvent in 2001, and has continued to be insolvent from said date.
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13.

Since 1996, as security for the oVer $8,500,000 owed by AlA Services

Corporation, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all
of the stock of ALA Insurance, Inc. and all of the commissions and related receivables of
ALA Insurance, Inc. and ALA Services Corporation.

Pursuant to the Amended and

Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated July 1; 1996, Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor had the
contractual right upon default of AlA Services Corporation to vote the stock of AlA
Insurance, Inc., and take operational control of ALA Insurance, Inc.

Plaintiff Reed J.

Taylor's right to vote the stock of ALA Insurance was also perfected through ALA
Services Corporation's irrevocable power of attorney granted to Reed J. Taylor that was
coupled with an interest as required by I.C § 30-1-722.
14.

On February 22, 2007, Reed T Taylor voted the stock of ALA Insurance,

Inc. and attempted to take control of it pursuant to his contractual rights as provided
under the law, the contract documents, and I.C. § 30-1-722.

However, the interested

directors of AlA Insurance, Inc. (including R. John Taylor) by and through the
Defendants intentionally assisted in breaching the terms of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement and refused to acknowledge Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor'S valid vote
of the stock of AlA Insurance, Tnc. and refused to surrender control as required. The
Defendants further engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting interested parties
(including R. John Taylor) in obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining order and
preliminary injunction against Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor, when the Defendants knew there
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so' was an intentional violation and
tortious interference with Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and
funds of ALA Insurance, Inc. were being misappropriated and/or not safeguarded.

ns:Rilif{?~:S tl:QUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

IS.

Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor has a pending civil action against AlA Services

Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor, and
others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches
of fiduciary duties and other claims under Nez Perce County Case No. CV -07-00208
("Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et at. "), and therein Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor
obtained an order of partial summary judgment for AlA Services Corporation's default of
the $6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement. By way of this partial summary judgment and/or his prior vote
of the stock, Reed J. Taylor would and should be in actual control of AlA Insurance, Inc.
but for the actions and R. John Taylor, which Defendants, with full knowledge of Reed J.
Taylor's rights, facilitated and aided and abetted to the detriment of AlA Services
Corporation, ALA Insurance, Inc. and Reed J. Taylor.
16.

With the Defendants full knowledge, Reed 1. Taylor's claims asserted in

Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et 01. included claims for breaches of fiduciary duty,
conspiracy, fraudulent conveyance, and fraud perpetrated by R. John Taylor and others
(including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.), including but not limited to claims that R.
John Taylor had wrongfully transferred over $1,500,000 of AIA Insurance, Inc.'s cash to
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., for no consideration and had transferred
approximately $700,000 of the assets of AlA Insurance, Inc. to Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. for no consideration.

R. John Taylor was at all material times also an

interested director, officer and shareholder of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. Also
included in the civil action were other claims that R. John Taylor and others had engaged

in self-dealing and/or fraudulent transactions with AlA Services Corporation and/or AlA
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Insurance, Inc. to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor, and for the
personal benefit of R. John Taylor and other interested parties (including Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc.).
17.

In 2007, Defendants appeared in the civil action, Taylor v. AlA Services

Corporation, et al., and assumed legal representation of two distinct clients, AlA
Services Corporation, a corporation, and AlA Insurance, Inc., a corporation, and also
represented the interests of R. John Taylor, an individual, and other interested parties
(including Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman).

At all material times

John Taylor was an interested CEO and director of AlA Services Corporation and ALA
Insurance, Inc. and an interested majority shareholder of AlA Services Corporation. The
civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of
fiduciary duty perpetrated by R. John Taylor and others against AlA Services
Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., and such acts having damaged and continuing to
cause damages to the corporations, their shareholders and creditors. In violation of the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, the Defendants undertook to
represent the three named clients AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., each having irreconcilable conflicts of interest with
the other.
18.

Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor's attorney, Roderick C. Bond, advised the

Defendants in May 2007, that it was not appropriate for the Defendants to represent AlA
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., and/or to take direction from R. John
Taylor because of various conflicts of interest and the fact that R. John Taylor was an
interested party.
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Roderick C. Bond, the Defendants also appeared and represented Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc., which was created additional conflicts of interest, resulted in a breach of
the Defendants' fiduciary duties (including the duty of loyalty) owed to AlA Services
Corporation and ALA Insurance, Inc., and was a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and their duty of care.
19.

The Defendants inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a loint

Defense Agreement(s) knowing that AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc.,
Crop USA Insurance, Inc., R. lohn Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in

Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et at. had clear irreconcilable conflicting and
diverging interests in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and duty of care, and
to the detriment AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and Reed 1. Taylor. In

Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et at., a Joint Defense Agreements was not
pennissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, conspiracy, aiding and
abetting, and other causes of action, was entered into without obtaining informed consent
from disinterested representatives of the corporations, and the loint Defense Agreement
was also independently not appropriate or pennitted when certain parties to a joint
defense agreement should be asserting claims against other parties to the agreement. The
Joint Defense Agreement(s) in question have assisted in others (including R. lohn Taylor
and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud, fraudulent
conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims,
while also assisting the Defendants in inappropriately obtaining payment of fees and
costs in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care.
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20.

The Defendants assisted AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc.,

Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. Jolm Taylor, and others in entering into various
inappropriate agreements and transactions which were in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct and their duty of care, were not in the best interests of the
corporations, not authorized by disinterested parties, constituted fraud and/or the
inappropriate transfer of assets and funds belonging to AlA Services Corporation andlor
AlA Insurance, Inc., were not arms-length transactions, andlor were done so without
requiring AlA Services Corporation, ALA Insurance, Inc. andlor Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. to retain separate independent counsel that were retained by separate
independent uninterested parties.
21.

As attorneys for AlA Services Corporation, an entity, the Defendants

owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care,
and under the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the
assets and businesses of the corporation, and since AlA Services Corporation was
insolvent, to its creditors including Reed J. Taylor.

As attorney for AlA Services

Corporation, and in light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their entity client not to assume
representation of the interests of R. John Taylor, individually andlor through a Joint
Defense Agreement, or with any other interested parties.
22.

As attorneys for AlA Insurance, Inc., an entity, the Defendants owed

duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care and the
law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of the
Corporation's stock, Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and
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assume control and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares but
whose rights were breached and rejected by interested directors and others who were in
control of the corporation including R. John Taylor. As attorneys for AlA Insurance, Inc.
and in light of the claims made against R. John Taylor and others by the Plaintiff Reed 1.
Taylor, the Defendants owed a duty to their entity client not to assume representation of
the interests of R. John Taylor, individually and/or through any Joint Defense Agreement,
and/or of other interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., Connie
Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman).
23.

As attorneys representing the interests of R. John Taylor through a Joint

Defense Agreement, the Defendants owed their duties first and foremost to AlA Services
Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct, duty of care and/or the law. As attorneys for R. John Taylor by and through
taking directions and/or accepting decisions made by him knowing that he was interested
and should have claims asserted against him, and in light of the claims against R. John
Taylor by the Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor, the Defendant's owed a duty to their corporate
clients not to assume representation of the interests of R. John Taylor, Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc. or other interested parties. The Defendants failed to notify or
obtain appropriate informed consents or approvals from appropriate parties or
disinterested shareholders in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the
Defendants' duty of care, and the Bylaws and Articles of Formation of the corporations,
all to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor. The Defendants inappropriately participated in a
Joint Defense Agreement.
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24.

As present and/or fonner attomeys' for AlA Services Corporation and/or

AlA Insurance, Inc. (individually or through any Joint Defense Agreement) the
Defendants owed duties of loyalty to the corporations and could not represent R. John
Taylor or Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et at.
or represent or assist R. John Taylor in Donna Taylor v. R. John Taylor because the
Defendants' loyalty belongs exclusively to AlA Services Corporation and/or AlA
Insurance, Inc.

Furthermore, the Defendants could in no way represent Crop USA

Insurance Agency, Inc. or participate in any joint defense of Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. or other interested parties (such as R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James
Beck, and/or Michael Cashman) as AlA Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc.
should have been asserting claims against Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., each other,
and other interested and uninterested parties.
25.

Defendants represented, and continue to represent, the interests of R. John

Taylor (individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement) and with full knowledge
that R. lohn Taylor is an interested party and director of AlA Services Corporation and
AlA Insurance, Inc. and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the
course of litigation involving the Defendants' clients, AlA Services Corporation and AlA
Insurance, Inc., while also inappropriately representing Crop USA Insurance Agency,
Inc. to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor.
26.

During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, the Defendants

have coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP, the law firm that has
represented ALA Services and AlA Services Corporation before and throughout litigation,
and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A., the law firm that formerly represented AlA

Service Corporation and AIA Insurance, Inc. in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, ef al.
During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, R. John Taylor and others
have further engaged in inappropriate and/or wrongful transactions involving themselves,
AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.,
which transactions have occurred with Defendants knowledge and/or assistance, and to
the detriment of AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and Plaintiff Reed J.
Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee.
27.

Defendants are liable to Reed J. Taylor for an amount to be proven at trial

because the Defendants have provided substantial assistance and/or aided and abetted R.
John Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc., and/or other interested parties in acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances,
conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches of fiduciary duties.

The acts of fraud,

fraudulent conveyances, civil conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of fiduciary duties
include, but are not limited to: 1) While purporting to represent AlA Insurance, Inc. and
AlA Services Corporation, the Defendants assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion of Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's
contractual rights to control and operate AlA Insurance, Inc., which has proximately
caused damages to Reed J. Taylor;

2) While purporting to represent AlA Services

Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc., the Defendants inappropriately assisted and/or
aided and abetted R. John Taylor and other interested parties to engage in tortious
transactions involving R. John Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc.,
and/or Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which such transactions have been to the
detriment of ALA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and Reed J. Taylor, and
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proximately caused damages to Reed 1. Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3)
While representing R. John Taylor, individually or through a Joint Defense Agreement,
the Defendants have had full knowledge that their client is an interested party and
director of ALA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc., and is personally conducting and controlling the course of litigation
involving the Defendants' former clients, AlA Services Corporation and ALA Insurance,
Inc., and Defendants have assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John Taylor and others
(including, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and has coordinated and participated with
the Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady in R. John Taylor's engaging in tortious
transactions involving himself, AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and crop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which transactions have been to the detriment of AlA
Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. and proximately caused damages to Reed
J. Taylor as a creditor and stock pledgee.
28.

In connection with the Defendants' inappropriate representation and/or

joint defense of R. John Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, ALA Insurance, Inc., Crop
USA Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties (including Connie Taylor,
James Beck, and Michael Cashman) the Defendants accepted payments of attorneys fees
and costs believed to exceed $500,000 in violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct, their duty of care, and as participating and/or assisting in inappropriate
corporate acts and the aiding and abetting of others.
29.

Over the course of the litigation in Reed J Taylor v. AlA Services

Corporation, et al., Reed 1. Taylor'S attorney in that action, Roderick C. Bond of Smith,
Cannon & Bond PLLC, advised the Defendants on numerous occasions that their conduct
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violated Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, was inappropriate, and
constituted the aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested parties (including
R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.), among other potential legal
claims against them.

In early 2007, Mr. Bond advised the Defendants that their

inappropriate actions would result in claims being filed against them by Reed 1. Taylor.
Mr. Bond reiterated these warnings orally and in writing on numerous occasions. Despite
Mr. Bond's warnings, the Defendants conduct persisted thereby further damaging Reed 1.
Taylor.

The Defendants disregard of Mr. Bond's warnings can only be constmed as

intentional improper acts to assist R. John Taylor and other interested parties to the
detriment of Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor.
30.

The Defendants wrongfully assisted R. John Taylor and other interested

parties in operating Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. with the funds, assets, employees,
trade secrets and other things of value inappropriately obtained from AlA Services
Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc., and by assisting R. John Taylor and other
interested parties (including Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in preventing claims
from being asserted and prosecuted against them. The Defendants wrongfully assisted
andlor failed to prevent interested parties (induding R. John Taylor) in transferring the
long-term employees of AlA Insurance, Inc. to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., while
at the same time representing to the Court in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation that the
corporations were being operated properly andlor failing to advise the Court of the
inappropriate acts and transactions. All the while the Defendants were aware of andlor
assisted in the inappropriate payment of salaries, benefits, compensation, and director
fees of $20,000 per year when AlA Services Corporation was insolvent.
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31.

Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made personally and through his

attorney Roderick C. Bond) that the Defendants take action to protect the assets and
funds of AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. and recover funds and assets
from R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and other interested and
uninterested parties for the benefit of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor, the Defendants
refused to act in accordance with the Rules of Profession Conduct, their duty of care, and
the law. Despite Reed 1. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C.
Bond) that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be considered and/or
protected because of the wrongful acts of R. John Taylor and other interested parties, the
Defendants refused to act and failed to fully and properly disclose all pertinent facts to
the disinterested shareholders and request their votes.
32. - In various motions, responses arid affidavits submitted to the court in
Taylor v. AIA Services Corporation, et aI., the Defendants made arguments that did not

benefit AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., or Reed J.

Taylor,

inappropriately made other arguments preventing valid claims from being asserted
against R. John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other
interested and uninterested parties, and failed to take action against responsible parties
(including R. John Taylor, Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., Connie Taylor, James
Beck, Michael Cashman, Lancelot Investors Fund, and others).

In the instance of

Michael Cashman, the Defendants successfully argued to the Court in Taylor v. AlA
Services Corporation, et al. that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual

when the Defendants should have been taking action against Mr. Cashman and others.
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33.

Despite Reed 1. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick C.

Bond) that disinterested directors and/or parties must direct the litigation on behalf of the
corporations, the Defendants refused and permitted and/or assisted R. John Taylor and
other interested parties to direct the litigation to the detriment of the corporations and
Reed 1. Taylor. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through his attorney Roderick

C. Bond) that action be taken to terminate AlA Insurance, Inc. 's improper guarantee of a
$15,000,000 line-of-credit for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., the Defendants refused
to act, failed to inform or fully disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the
existence of such inappropriate loan guarantees, and threatened to take legal action
against Reed 1. Taylor if he tried to rescind or terminate the improper guarantee (since
Defendant Gary D. Babbitt's threat, the balance of the loan has increased by over
$5,500,000 to over $10,500,000). I
34.

The Defendants' conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional

Conduct and their duty of care, which require the Defendants to disgorge all attorneys'
fees and costs paid to them in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et al. and for other
related and/or unrelated legal services. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands (made through
his attorney Roderick C. Bond) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and
their duty of care, the Defendants refused to do so.
35.

Through the acts of the Defendants, the value of ALA Insurance, Inc. and

the assets of AlA Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. have plummeted in
value, the corporations' value and assets have been impaired, and/or the assets and funds
have been transferred to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.

Through the acts of the

I The $15,000,000 loan subject to the guarantee is believed to be in technical default. Damages for any loss
from the guarantee would accrue upon the time of lhe loss or threatened litigation by the lender and,
accord ingly, would be additional damages asserted against the Defendants at that ti me.

Defendants, ownership of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. was vested and has
remained vested in interested parties (including R. John Taylor), while the major creditor
Reed J. Taylor and minority shareholders were left with nothing.

Despite Reed J.

Taylor's demands (through his attorney Roderick C. Bond) that action should also be
taken for the interests of the innocent minority shareholders and creditors, the Defendants
have refused to take action and inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including
R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael Cashman).
36.

Despite the Defendants having made several legal arguments that lacked

merit, lacked good faith and/or were not grounded in facts, the Defendants provided a
settlement offer to Reed J. Taylor in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation. et aI., which
included a provision that he release all claims against the Defendants as a condition of the
settlement. The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct and Defendants' duty of care.

The Defendants also refused to make any

provisions for disinterested minority shareholders of AlA Services Corporation as
requested by Reed J. Taylor.
37.

The Defendants have assisted in the inappropriate acts of R. John Taylor

and other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed 1. Taylor and Donna 1.
Taylor, Reed J. Taylor's former wife and the holder of all outstanding Preferred A Shares
of ALA Services Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, Donna J. Taylor is required to be a
member of the board of directors of AlA Services Corporation. Like Reed J. Taylor, the
Defendants have assisted R. John Taylor and other interested parties in preventing Reed
J. Taylor and Donna 1. Taylor from being members of the board of directors of ALA
Services Corporation, which has further far reaching ramifications and results in
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additional damages against the Defendants.
3 8.

With full knowledge of AlA Services Corporation's obligati ons to ensure

that Reed 1. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor are members of AlA Services Corporation ' s
board until they were paid in full, the Defendants proceeded to attend and participate in
inappropriate board meetings and/or take inappropriate action based upon board meetings
held by interested directors without Reed J. Taylor or Donna J. Taylor being present and
without providing them the opportunity to be present, which further results in all such
meetings and decisions being null and void, and the Defendants being liable for the
associated damages.
39.

The

Defendants

represented

AlA

Services

Corporation

and

AlA

Insurance, Inc. in litigation with the state of Idaho. The litigation was funded by AlA
Insurance, Inc. by and through commission in which Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor held a
security interest of which the Defendants had full knowledge.

The litigation was

resolved, however, instead of titling the $1 ,200,000 Mortgage that was received as
settlement in the name of AlA Insurance, Inc., the Defendants titled the mortgage only in
the name of AlA Services Corporation in an inappropriate scheme to keep the mortgage
from AlA Insurance, Inc. and Reed 1. Taylor.

The Defendants then inappropriately

represented AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. by drafting documents to assist in the inappropriate pledge of the
$1,200,000 Mortgage to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to facilitate the payment of
the Defendants' services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of
care, and the law. The Defendants assisted and/or failed to prevent and/or notify
disinterested parties or the Court that AlA Services Corporation had inappropriately
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pledged its sole remaining other significant asset, the $1,200,000 mortgage, to Crop USA
insurance Agency, Inc. to facilitate the payment of $500,000 for the Defendants' services
in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, their duty of care, and the law.
40.
III

The Defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material facts to the Court

Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et at. to the detriment of Reed J. Taylor.

In

several instances, the Defendants persuaded the Court to take action that was not in the
best interests of the corporations or Reed 1. Taylor, to the detriment of the corporations
and Reed J. Taylor (including consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when
the Defendants knew that the corporations were not being operated properly or their
assets safeguarded).
41.

The Defendants have inappropriately assisted R. John Taylor and other

interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or services provided
and bornc by ALA Insurance, Inc. and/or AlA Services Corporation for the benefit of
Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., R. John Taylor and other interested parties. Upon
infonnation and belief, the Defendants have assisted in issuing inappropriate opinion
letters to auditors of ALA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc. and/or Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc. to assist R. John Taylor and other interested parties in transferring
and utilizing the assets, employees, labor, funds and resources of ALA Insurance, Inc.
and/or AlA Services Corporation for the benefit of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc
while providing no or little consideration in return.
42.

The Defendants had full knowledge of R. John Taylor's Executive

Officer's Agreement, which, upon infonnation and belief, was drafted by Defendant
Richard A. Riley. Regardless, Defendant Richard A. Riley had fuJI knowledge of the
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existence and terms of R. John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement with ALA
Services Corporation.

Even though R. John Taylor has breached the tenus of his

employment contract with ALA Services Corporation by competing against ALA Services
Corporation through Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. (and violating the corporate
opportunity doctrine), by soliciting employees of AlA Insurance, Inc., and other
inappropriate actions, the Defendants have intentionally refused to act in the best interests
of ALA Services Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., their shareholders, and/or Reed J.
Taylor, to the detriment of Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor.
43.

The Defendants assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining

funds, assets and property to Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. to defraud AlA Services
Corporation's creditor Reed J. Taylor (including, without limitation, over $95,000 owed
by Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to AlA Insurance, Inc., assistance in transferring
shares of the Pacific Empire Radio Corporation to R. John Taylor, and failing to collect
the over $300,000 owed by R. John Taylor) by not reporting such acts to disinterested
parties or other appropriate parties as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct and
their duty of care.
44.

In April 2007, the Defendants penuitted and/or assisted interested parties

in holding a joint board meeting of AlA Services Corporation and ALA Insurance, Inc.
with full knowledge that Reed 1. Taylor and Donna J. Taylor were being intentionally
denied their right to be on the board of AlA Services Corporation and participating in
such meetings (Donna Taylor has subordinated her right to payment in favor of Reed J.
Taylor). At the meeting held in April 2007, the Defendants penuitted and/or assisted R.
John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor and James Beck to the boards of AlA Services
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Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. knowing that they were interested parties who AlA
Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. should be pursuing claims against, that
they inappropriately held shares in Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., that they were
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws. The Defendants inappropriately
permitted and/or assisted two interested parties, Connie Taylor and James Beck, to
approve and/or consent to a Joint Retainer and Joint Defense Agreement with Hawley
Troxell and others, which also facilitated the inappropriate joint legal representations of
interested parties with conflicting irreconcilable interests and the payment of attorneys'
fees and costs to various attorneys in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and
their duty of care.
45.

Despite demands to the contrary, the Defendants continued to take

instrllctions and/or directives from the unauthorized boards (or R. John Taylor) of AlA
Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. knowing that the boards are not properly
seated and are comprised of interested parties (including R. John Taylor) with significant
claims that should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, their duty of care, and/or the law.

IV. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS
46.

The Defendants have damaged Reed 1. Taylor by aiding and abetting

and/or assisting others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.)
in the commission of tortious acts.
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47.

The Defendants committed tortious acts in concert with others (including

R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or pursuant to a common
design or civil conspiracy with others (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc.).
48.

The Defendants knew that the conduct of others (including R. John Taylor

and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) constituted breach of duties and gave substantial
assistance and/or encouragement to others (including R. Jolm Taylor and Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc.) in breaching said duties.

The Defendants' conduct also

constitutes the assistance of interested parties (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc.) with the tortious interference of AlA Services Corporation and
Reed J. Taylor's contractual rights, which such contractual rights the Defendants had
intimate knowledge.
49.

The Defendants gave substantial assistance to others (including R. John

Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) in committing and/or accomplishing
tortious conduct and/or acts, and the Defendants' conduct, separately considered,
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to the corporations and/or Reed 1. Taylor.
50.

The Defendants conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of others

(including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.) and/or constitutes the
conduct of a contributing tortfeasors, and such conduct has damaged Plaintiff Reed 1.
Taylor in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.

V. SECOND CAUSES OF ACTIONS
51.

Reed 1. Taylor holds and has held a valid and perfected security interest in

all of the commissions and related receivables of AlA Services Corporation and AlA
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Insurance, Inc.
52.

All of the shares of AlA Insurance, Inc. were pledged to Reed J. Taylor as

collateral for the over $8,500,000 owed to him by AlA Services Corporation. By way of
this pledge and his prior vote of the stock in February 2007, Reed 1. Taylor is entitled to
possession and control of all of the assets of ALA Insurance, Inc.
53.

The Defendants were fully aware of Reed 1. Taylor's rights to property in

which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as collateral. In fact, Defendant
Richard A. Riley represented AlA Services Corporation in the redemption of Reed J.
Taylor's shares and the drafting of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
and other applicable agreements. Defendants were responsible for issuing opinion letters
relating to the transaction, which include various applicable representations and
warranties. Defendants are now asserting arguments counter to the representations made
in the opinion letter drafted by Defendants by and through Defendant Richard A. Riley.
Defendants also assisted in the commission of torts by R. John Taylor, Crop USA
Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties by representing the corporations in
various inappropriate transactions.
54.

The Defendants have received substantial payments believed to exceed

$500,000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which such payments the
Defendants had no lawful right to possess or retain and were received in violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care.
55.

The Defendants also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of

AlA Services Corporation (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant
claims against the interested parties (including R. John Taylor and Crop USA Insurance
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Agency, Inc.) and the significant misappropriation of the corporations' assets, but
provided legal services on behalf of the interested parties and accepted payment from
AlA Services Corporation and AlA Insurance, Inc. In connection with the payment of
attorneys' fees and costs to other named parties in Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et

ai., the Defendants failed to obtain the necessary approvals from Reed J. Taylor or other
disinterested parties to the detriment of the corporations and Reed J. Taylor.

The

Defendants also assisted in the inappropriate titling and pledging of a $1.2 Million
Mortgage owned by AlA Services Corporation to facilitate the payment of funds to them.
The Defendants have also accepted the payment of services for attorneys' fees and costs
rendered for Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc., which were paid by the money and/or
assets of AlA Services Corporation and/or ALA Insurance, Inc.
56.

The Defendants' conduct constitutes the willful interference with property

and money belonging to AlA Services Corporation, ALA Insurance, Inc. and/or Reed J.
Taylor and/or which such property and money should be under the possession and/or
control of Reed J. Taylor, as the person entitled to such money and property as a creditor
and pledgee. The Defendants deprived Reed J. Taylor possession of such property and
money. Despite Reed J. Taylor's demands, the Defendants have refused to return such
property and money.
57.

The Defendants' conduct constitutes conversion and such conduct has

damaged Reed J. Taylor in an amount to proven at trial or on summary judgment.

VI. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS
58.

The Defendants' conduct has been unconscionable. The have engaged in

acts, conduct, and representations that were false, misleading, deceptive· and/or a
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violation of I.C. § 48-601, et seq. The Defendants' acts, omission, representations and
conduct constitute unfair and/or deceptive acts and/or practices in trade pertaining to the
practice oflaw pursuant to I.C. § 48-601, et seq.
59.

The Defendants' actions have resulted in the loss of over 25% of Reed J.

Taylor's retirement funds and/or such other harm as set forth under I.C. § 48-608(2)(a).
As such, Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor is entitled damages, which such amount is also subject
to treble damages pursuant to I.C. § 48-608.
VII. FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS
60.

AlA Services Corporation is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor in light of its

insolvency and the fact that it owes Reed 1. Taylor over $8,500,000. At the very least,
AlA Insurance, Inc. is a trustee of Reed J. Taylor because all of its shares are pledged to
Reed 1. Taylor and he voted the shares in February 2007 naming himself the sole director
and officer of ALA Insurance, Inc.
61.

The Defendants' clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries performing

similar functions for a non-client, Reed J. Taylor.

The Defendants knew that their

appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AlA Services
Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. to take action to prevent and/or rectify the
breaches of fiduciary duties owed by AlA Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance,
Inc. to Reed J. Taylor when such breaches were crimes and/or fraud and/or the
Defendants assisted and/or are assisting in the breaches. Reed J. Taylor was not able to
protect his rights because of the Defendants' actions and the Defendants' obligations to
AlA Services Corporation and/or AlA Insurance, Inc. would not be significantly
impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect sums owed by others
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and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others (including R. John
Taylor and Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc.).
62.

The Defendants owed AlA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc.

and/or Reed J. Taylor a duty of care to provide, including, but not limited to, reasonable,
prudent, ethical, unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation
in keeping with the standard of care in the legal profession and as owed to the
corporations (referred to herein and above as "duty of car~"). The Defendants breached
their duty of care as a result of their acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the
corporations and Reed 1. Taylor, to the detriment of Reed 1. Taylor.
63.

The Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services

Corporation, AlA Insurance, Inc., and/or Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor, including, without
limitation, the duties of care and loyalty.
64.

The Defendants' acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of

the Defendants' fiduciary duties, and such conduct has damaged the corporations and
Reed 1. Taylor, in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.

VIII. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
1.

Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than twelve

(12) on all claims and damages so triable.

IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor prays for the following relief:

l.

For a judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for $10,500,000

in damages ($3,500,000 in actual damages and $7,000,000 in treble damages), the exact
amount of which will be proven at trial and/or on summary judgment, plus an award of
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pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;
2.

For a judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for treble

damages of $7,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial pursuant to I.C. § 48608(2);
3.

For a jUdgment reqUlrmg the disgorgement of the payments of all

attorneys' fees and costs paid to the Defendants by AlA Services Corporation and/or AlA
Insurance, Inc.;
4.

For judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, for additional

damages as provided under I.C. § 48-608;
5.

For such other relief as may be available to Reed 1. Taylor pursuant to I.C.

§ 48-60 I, et seq. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary
injunction to restrain the Defendants from undertaking further representation;
6.

For an award of Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor's attorneys fees and costs

incurred in this action pursuant to Idaho Law, including, without limitation, I.C. § 48608, I.C. § 12-120 and/or I.C. § 12-121; and
7.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED

ti

this~

.

day of August, 2008.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL &

IRBY PLLC

Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VVAl 99201
Tel: (509) 455-71 00
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Alttomeys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICL\L DISTRICT OF THE
STAlTE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIffi COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TAlYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV08-01765
Plaintiff,

v.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

GMY D. BAlBBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
AlSHBY, an individual; PAlTRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A
RILEY, an individual; HAlVVLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAVVLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unlrnown individuals;
Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor ("Reed Taylor"), by and through his attorneys, Campbell,
Bissell & Kirby, PLLC, hereby responds to Defendants' (collectively "Hawley Troxell")
Motion to Dismiss.
. .... __ ............ _.................. _--- ......

.

I. INTRODUCTION
Reed Taylor's claims involve factual and legal claims that entitle him to damages
and that cannot be resolved through an LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion. Indeed, dismissal is not
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appropriate because of the single factual issue of whether Hawley Troxell ever had
authority to represent AIA Insurance or AlA Services.

Similarly, Reed Taylor's

appropriate and warranted direct claims against Hawley Troxell defeat the Motion to
Dismiss as he is the only person truly entitled to pursue the claims. Moreover, and
notwithstanding Hawley Troxell's lack of authority to act on behalf of AIA Insurance and
AlA Services, it exceeded the scope of any purported legal representation, and as such it
is liable for the claims and corresponding damages requested in Reed Taylor's
Complaint, which are more than adequately pled under Idaho notice pleading standard. 1

n.FACTUALBACKGROUND
Reed Taylor is the pledgee of all of the shares of AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA
Insurance"), the only shareholder of AIA Insurance holding all of its shares, a secured
creditor, and the largest creditor of AIA Services Corporation ("AIA Services"). See
Complaint, p. 3, , 10.

AIA Services is significantly insolvent and its assets are

insufficient to pay the over $8,500,000 owed to Reed Taylor. Id. Consequently, Reed
Taylor is bringing claims personal to him and claims derivatively held by him, all directly
against Hawley Troxell for certain damages, i.e, he is pursuing all claims directly against
Hawley Troxell. See Complaint
Since 1996, Reed Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all of
the stock of AIA Insurance and all of the commissions and related receivables of AIA
Insurance. See Complaint, p. 4, 1 13.
On February 22,2007, Reed Taylor voted the shares of AIA Insurance pursuant to
his contractual rights and as authorized under Idaho law. See Complaint, p. 4, , 14.
1 Even if the Court finds that Reed Taylor should not be permitted to bring certain claims directly against
Hawley Troxell, the issue is effectively moot as Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor will bring the same claims
against Hawley Troxell derivatively on behalf of AlA Services and AlA Insurance.
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In violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Hawley Troxell undertook the
representation of AlA Services, AIA Insurance and CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc.
("CropUSA"), each having irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the other.
Complaint, p. 6,

~

See

17. Hawley Troxell's purported representation of CropUSA resulted

in the breach of their fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services and AlA Insurance. See
Complaint, p. 7, 1 18.
Hawley Troxell owed duties to Reed Taylor as a creditor pledgee of AlA
Insurance, who voted the shares of AIA Insurance.

See Complaint, pp. 8-9,

1 22.

Hawley Troxell failed to notify or obtain appropriate informed consents or approvals
from appropriate parties in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
Complaint, p. 9,

1 23.

See

Hawley Troxell was advised on numerous occasions that its

conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and constituted the aiding and
abetting of others. See Complaint, p. 13, 129. Hawley Troxell's disregard of warnings
can only be construed as intentional improper acts, all of whlch were to the detriment of
Reed Taylor. Id.
Defendants have assisted in the inappropriate acts of R. John Taylor and other
interested parties in stopping ail payments to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor.

See

Complaint, p. 16,137. They also assisted R. John Taylor and others in preventing Reed
Taylor from being a member of the board of directors of AIA Services. Id. Moreover,
and with knowledge of Reed Taylor'S right to be on the board of AIA Services,
Defendants participated in board meetings, with such meetings and board decisions being
null and void. See Complaint, p. 17,138.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
I~.rug~fJDR1'OI:W8MI~61'IQ:E

INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Defendants assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining funds, assets, and
property to defraud Reed Taylor. See Complaint, p. 19, ,. 43. Defendants owed duties
under the law to Reed Taylor to preserve and protect the assets and businesses of AIA
Services since it was insolvent See Complaint, p. 8, ,. 21.
Defendants took instructions and/or directives from unauthorized boards of AIA
Services and AIA Insurance knowing that the boards are not properly seated in violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct See Complaint, p. 20, ,. 45.
Defendants inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint Defense
Agreement knowing that AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA, R. John Taylor, and
the other individual defendants had irreconcilable conflicts of interest and that the
agreement assisted others to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances,
civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims.

See

Complaint, p. 7, ,. 19.
Defendants have assisted and/or aided and abetted R. John Taylor and others
(including Crop USA) in acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, civil
conspiracy, tortious interference, breaches of fiduciary duties and inappropriate
transactions thereby proximately causing damages to Reed Taylor as a creditor and stock
pledgee. See Complaint, p. 11-12, , 27.

ID. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
A. Hawley Troxell Cannot Meet Idaho's Stringent 1200(6) Standard.
1.

The Complaint Properly Alleges Valid Causes Of Action.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court looks only at the
pleadings, and all inferences are viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Young v. City
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of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002). "The issue is not whether the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to
support the claims." Id at 104. "Every reasonable intendment will be made to sustain a
complaint against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Idaho Comm In on

Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215, 217,506 P.2d 112 (1973). Idaho has adopted
a system of notice pleading.

Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 13 PJd 857

(2000). A pleading need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief..." Id., quoting Durstler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230,
697 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1985). Under a notice pleading, "a party is no longer slavishly
bound to stating particular theories in its pleadings."

Cook, 135 Idaho at 33.

All

pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. LR.C.P.8(t).
Motions to dismiss under LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) are viewed with disfavor because of
the waste of time in case of reversal, and because the primary objective of the law is to
obtain a determination of claims on the merits. Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400,
404, 353 P.2d 782 (1960). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claims which would entitle him to relief. Id.
Reed Taylor agrees with Hawley Troxell's assertions that a motion to dismiss is
addressed solely to the sufficiency of the complaint and that all inferences from the facts
alleged in the complaint must be drawn in his favor. Hawley Troxell also correctly points
out that the issues for the Court include whether Reed Taylor has alleged sufficient facts
to support his claims, which, if true, would entitle him to relief and whether he is entitled
to offer evidence to support the claims. See Hawley Troxell's Motion, p. 4. Applying
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these standards, Reed Taylor'S Complaint clearly states claims upon which relief can be
granted, i.e., alleges facts - together with all favorable inferences therefrom - that
support cognizable claims under Idaho law.
In a nutshell, Reed Taylor claims that Hawley Troxell conspired and aided and
abetted in the breach of fiduciary duties, conspiracy, fraud, and tortious interference.
Reed Taylor claims that Hawley Troxell conspired with and aided and abetted John
Taylor andior CropUSA in protecting John Taylor's interests to the detriment of the
interests of Hawley Troxell's other clients, thereby damaging Reed Taylor. In addition,
Hawley Troxell directly interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights in assuming to
represent AIA Insurance without authority as well as conspiring with and aiding and
abetting John Taylor andior CropUSA in the interfering with Reed Taylor'S contractual
rights. In addition, Hawley Troxell is directly liable for the conversion of property in
which Reed Taylor possessed a valid interest as well as conspiring with and aiding and
abetting John Taylor to do the same.
Here, Reed Taylor's Complaint provides sufficient notice to Hawley Troxell of
the claims asserted against it Hawley Troxell has failed to meet the heavy burden
required to obtain a dismissal of claims pursuant to I.RC.P. 12(b)(6), and Hawley
Troxell's Motion to Dismiss should be denied in full. 2
2.

Regardless Of How Novel One Or More Of Reed Taylor's Causes Of
Action May Be Under Idaho Law, They Are Valid Causes Of ActiODB.

"Thycourt should be especially reluctant to dismissonthe_pleadingwhere ..the
asserted theory of liabilitY is novel or unusual since it is important that such legal theories

Although Idaho Jaw only requires notice pleading, the Court should pennit Reed Taylor to file an
amended complaint to the extent that the Court may believe that the Complaint fails to sufficiently plead a
cause of action.
2
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be explored and assayed in the light of actual facts, not a pleader's supposition." Stewart
v. Arrington Canst. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 531, 446 P .2d 895 (1968), citing Shull v. Pilot Life

Ins. Co., 313 F .2d 445, 447 (5 th Cir. 1963) (emphasis added).
Regardless of whether Idaho law has adopted the legal authority of any of the
claims being pursued by Reed Taylor, he should be permitted to plead and pursue all of
his claims.

3.

The Proper Test Of The Validity Of Reed Taylor's Complaint Is
Through A Motion For Summary Judgment After Discovery Has
Been Conducted.

"The motion to dismiss serves its most useful purpose where from the pleadings
and documented proof available no controverted fact issue remains and only questions of
law are to be decided." Stewart v. Arrington Canst. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 531, 446 P.2d 895

(1968) (citing Shull v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 313 F .2d 445, 447 (5 th Cir. 1963)). "The
validity of a complaint is more properly tested by the summary judgment procedure of
.I.R.C.P. 56." Stewart, 92 Idaho at 531; Duffin v.Idaho Improvement Ass 'n, 126 Idaho
1002,1013,895 P.2d 1195, 1206 (1995).
To the extent that any of Reed Taylor's claims involve factual issues (which they
all do, to the extent Hawley Troxell wants the claims dismissed), such claims should be
resolved at trial or on summary judgment All of Reed Taylor'S claims survive an attack
based uponI.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

4.

H The Court Finds That Reed Taylor's Complaint Is Deficient In Any
Respect, Reed Taylor Should Be Permitted To File An Amended
Complaint.

If a court finds that a complaint fails to state a claim, then the court can permit the
party to file an amended complaint to cure any defects. Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho
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609, 611, 533 P.2d 730 (1975) (the Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint, but allowed

him 15 days leave to file an amended complaint). Thus, to the extent that the Court may
fmd that Reed Taylor's Complaint may contain any defects, Reed Taylor should be
permitted to file an amended complaint curing such defects.

B. Reed Taylor Has Standing To Pursue Claims Against Hawley Troxell,
And Such Claims Are Not Subject To Any Scope Of Representation
Defenses Or Litigation Privilege
The issue of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the
party wishes to have adjudicated, which may be based upon threatened harm as well as
past injury.

Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232 (2006).

"An

attorney can be liable to a nonclient, even an adversary in litigation, for fraud or deceit.
Duty is not at issue, because wrong is intentional conduct." 1 Legal Malpractice § 6:7
(2008) (internal citations omitted) (empbasis added); see also e.g., Banco Popular North

America v. Gandi, 876 A.2d 253 (N.Y. 2005) (recognizing there could be a valid cause of
action for a conspiracy to defraud a creditor by helping a client transfer assets).
"[A] lawyer is subject to liability to a ... nonclient when a nonlawyer would be in
similar circumstances." See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 56 (2008).
This basis concept of lawyer liability is discussed in numerous Comments in § 56:
If activities of a nonlawyer in the same circumstances would render the
nonlawyer civilly liable or afford the nonlawyer a defense to liability, the
same activities by a lawyer in the same circumstances generally render the
lawyer liable ...
See Restate.II.1t!Ilt (Third) OILll,WOove.1Jliug Li;lW. § 56 (2D08), comment b.
When a lawyer advises or assists a client in acts that subject the client to
civil liability to others, those others may seek to hold the lawyer liable
along with or instead of the client. Whether a lawyer is liable depends on
the elements of liability under the law upon which the claim of liability is
predicated and may therefore turn on such facts as how the lawyer's acts
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
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contributed to the plaintiff's harm, what the lawyer lmew or believed as to
the relevant facts and law, the lawyer'S intent, and how culpable the
client's conduct is under the law.
See Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. § 56 (2008), Comment c. "A law firm

is subject to civil liability for injury legally caused to a person by any wrongful act or
omission of any principal or employee of the firm ... " See Restatement (Third) of Law
Governing Law § 58 (2008) ("When finn principals are personally liable vicariously,
they are jointly and severally liable." See Comment g.)
Here, Reed Taylor's Complaint asserts valid causes of action against Hawley
Troxell for conspiracy, fraud, breaches of fiduciary duties, tortious interference, and
unfair and deceptive acts in trade (and aiding and abetting of the foregoing).

As

discussed in further detail below, these claims are all independent of Reed Taylor's rigbts
to bring derivative claims directly against Hawley Troxell, i.e., Reed Taylor is not
required to sue derivatively on bebalf of AIA Insurance and AlA Services, but may bring
direct claims because of the significant factual and legal circumstances discussed below.

These collective claims are all excluded from the any assertion of litigation privilege.
See Hawley Troxell's Motion, pp. 29-32.

C. Reed Taylor Has Standing To Directly Bring Certain Derivative Claims
Against Hawley Troxell.
1.

Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Stock Pledgee.

A stock pledgee has standing to bring direct claims against third parties. See e.g.,

.. Qus.laft[)flV, (Jys.taHPlJ.. 47 Wn, App, 272, 278, 734P.2d 949,953 CWn.App. 1987);
Empire Life Ins. Co. ofAmerica v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972); Ritchie v.

McMullen, 79 F. 522 (6th Cir. 1897); see also 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2032 (2008)
("A pledgee of corporate stock has an interest therein that entitles him or her to be heard
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in court of equity concerning the preservation and protection of the assets and property of
the corporation."). "The pledgee may file suit in equity to preserve the stock and to
protect his or her interests, to the same extent, at least, as the pledgor ... The pledgee is
also interested in the preservation of the corporate property and in preventing it from
passing out of the hands of the corporation ... " See 12A Fletcher Cye. Corp. § 5651
(2008) (emphasis added).
Here, Reed Taylor has standing to pursue claims directly against Hawley Troxell
because he is the sale pledgee of all of the shares in AIA Insurance. Hawley Troxell's
actions are damaging AIA Insurance, impairing the value of AIA Insurance, diverting
AIA Insurance's assets, and inappropriately assisting and aiding and abetting John Taylor
and others to loot AIA Insurance. All of the foregoing acts have resulted in money and
assets being inappropriately diverted out of AIA Insurance and claims not being pursued
against Hawley Troxell, John Taylor and others for the recovery of AIA Insurance's
funds, assets and damages. As the sale pledgee of all of AIA Insurance's shares, Reed
Taylor has standing to pursue the claims directly against Hawley Troxell.

2. In Addition To His Rights AB A Pledgee, Reed Taylor Has Standing
Because He Stands In The Shoes Of AlA Insurance's Sole
Shareholder.
'The pledgee may file suit. .. to protect his or her interests, to the same extent, at
least, as the pledgor..." See 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5651 (2008) (emphasis added).
Generally, shareholders must pursue claims derivatively, i.e., on behalf of the
corporation.

However, a well-recognized exception to this general rule is that a

shareholder in a closely held corporation may file a direct action without bringing the

claims derivatively in the name of the corporation. See e.g., Steelman v. MallOlY, 110
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,

Idaho 510, 512-13, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986) ("Since ... directors in this small closely held
corporation, had a fiduciary duty to Steelman, as minority shareholder, we cannot agree
with appellants' contention that this case should have been dismissed because it is a
'direct action' rather than a shareholder's derivative suit") (emphasis added); see also
Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280
(Utah 1998) (a direct action may be brought when based upon a "contract to which
[plaintiff] is a party, or on a right belonging severally to [plaintiff], or on a fraud affecting
[plaintiff] directly ... ") (quoting 13 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations § 5911 (1970)); Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W. 2d 793 (N.D. 1991);
Johnson v. Gilbert, 127 Ariz. 410,412, 621 P.2d 916, 918 (Ariz. App. 1980) overruled
on other grounds (" ... plaintiff had standing, both derivatively and directly, to sue on the
alleged contract and for an accounting."); Schumaker v. Schumaker, 469 N.W.2d 793,
798 (N.D. 1991).
Since a pledgee has the rights of a shareholder, the pledgee has the shareholder's
standing to pUIsue direct claims:
A shareholder may sue directly for harm to himself or herself that is
separate and distinct from that suffered by the corporation .

... Under some authority, the analysis for determining whether a
stockholder's action should be classified as direct or derivative turns on
the determination of who suffered the alleged harm, the corporation or the
suing stockholder individually, and who would receive the benefit of
recovery or other remedy. Most courts hold, however, that a shareholder
may have standing to bring an action arising from an injury to the
Gorporation if the injury is the result oithe violation of duty owed directly
to the shareholder, or if the shareholder sustains an injury that is peculiar
to him or her alone', and does not fall alike upon other stockholders, even
. if the corporation was similarly harmed .
... When a shareholder's complaint states a cause of action that is both
direct and derivative, the shareholder may proceed with the direct action.
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... Some jurisdictions, however, permit a shareholder in a close
corporation to proceed directly rather than derivatively under some
circumstances. In such a jurisdiction, the decision whether to allow a
party to proceed with a direct suit in lieu of a derivative action is entrusted
to the court's discretion.
In determining when a shareholder of a close corporation may proceed
with a direct action, rather than a derivative action, courts consider
whether a direct action will: (l) unfairly expose the corporation or the
defendants to a multiplicity of actions; (2) materially prejudice the
interests of the corporation's creditors; or (3) interfere with the fair
distribution of recovery among all interested persons.

See 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 485 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
The distinction between individual and derivative actions has been explained as
follows:
[1]t is generally held that a stockholder may maintain an action in his own
right for an injury directly affecting him, although the corporation also
may have a cause of action growing out of the same wrong, where it
appears that the injury to the stockholder resulted from the vi01ation of
some special duty owed to the stockholder by the wrongdoer and having
its origin in circumstances independent of the plaintiff's status as a
shareholder.

McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 233, 61 P.3d 585 (2002) quoting 19 Am. Jur. 2d
Corporations § 2249 (1986). In other words:

An action brought by a shareholder is derivative if the gravamen of the
complaint is the injury to the corporation or to the whole body of its stock
or property and not injury to the plaintiffs individual interest as a
shareholder.

McCann, 138 Idaho at 233 quoting 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2250 (1986); see also
St?eI111Cll'l v. MClllQry. 110 Jdaho.510. 512-13, 716P.2d 1282 (1986). The definition of
"gravamen" is "[t]he substantial point or essence of a claim, grievance, or complaint."
Black's (Seventh Edition) Law Dictionary, p. 708 (1999).
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Here, Reed Taylor's claims are based upon the fact that the money and assets of
AIA Insurance are being tortiously misappropriated, converted and looted to his
detriment. He is the only shareholder of AlA Insurance as the pledgee of all of its
outstanding shares, he holds a security interest in all of the commissions of AlA
Insurance, he is a creditor owed over $8,500,000, and he is the only bona-fide party
entitled to recover and possess all of the moneys recovered through his direct claims. In
short he is entitled to all of the assets and funds of AlA Services and AlA Insurance.
Moreover, AlA Insurance is not bringing any claims against the responsible parties,
including Hawley Troxell. There is no better example of a case warranting direct claims.
These reasons, along with the others set forth in this Response, makes Reed Taylor
essentially the only person entitled to bring the claims.

3.

Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Secured Creditor Of AIA Services.

When an unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs, a secured creditor has
standing to bring claims against third parties for conversion and other remedies. See e.g.,

First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 856-57, 664
P.2d 281

eel App. 1983); us. v. McCleskey lvlills, Inc., 409 F.2d 1216 eGa 1969).

rights of a secured creditor are extensive:
In some circumstances, however, an unauthorized sale or other disposition
of collateral may constitute conversion as to the secured party. In most
cases w~en a debtor makes an unauthorized disposition of collateral, the
security interest survives disposition of the collateral. In these cases, the
secured party may repossess the collateral from the transferee or, in an
i:lppr:()p:rji:lt~ c;!:l$.(;,maintamClJli:lctiQu for conversion ..... The secured party
may claim both any proceeds and the original collateral but, of course,
may only have one satisfaction ....
Where a sale of collateral is, with respect to the secured party, a
conversion of the collateral, there is a conversion on the part of the one
who sells, as well as on the part of the one who purchases, or to whom
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The

property is transferred, or a third party who exercises dominion over the
collateral or its proceeds ...
See 79 C.J.S. Secured Transactions § 157 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis

added).
Here, Reed Taylor holds a perfected security interests in AIA Services and AIA
Insurance's commissions and related receivables and all of the stock of AlA Insurance.
In holding a security interest in all of AIA Insurance, Reed Taylor's security interest and
corresponding rights are paramount to all others, and his security interest in all of the
commissions of AlA Services is no less significant as they are the company's sale source
of revenue.
4.

Reed Taylor Has Standing To Pursue His Claims As The Creditor Of
AIA Services.

A creditor of an insolvent corporation has standing to bring direct claims. See
e.g., Board of Trustees of Teamsters v. Foodtown, Inc.} 296 F.3d 164, 170 (3rd Cir.
2002); Asarco LLC v. Americas Min. Corp., 382 B.R. 49 (S.D. Tex 2007) (making claim
against directors for breach of fiduciary duty).
Here, Reed Taylor's position as a creditor owed over $8,500,000 and who has a
partial summary judgment against AIA Services gives him standing to pursue direct
claims, and even more entitled to standing in light of the fact that he is also a secured
creditor and pledgee. Nevertheless, Hawley Troxell argues that Reed Taylor has no
standing, as a creditor, to pursue claims against Hawley Troxell or AIA Services'
directors

fo~b~ach of fid~ci~ d~ti~~.:3 Se~H~~leYT;~~ell;~M~ti~~. pp.il-13; s~~

However, even if accepted as true and found to be fully applicable to this case, Hawley Troxell's
argument does not apply to the rights Reed Taylor has as a pledgee (sbarebolder) and secured creditor, the
issues raised will be moot when Reed Taylor also files derivative claims against Hawley Troxell. For this

3
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also North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewolla,
930 A.2d 92 (DeLSupr. 2007) (creditor may not pursue direct claims for breaches of
fiduciary duties when a corporation is in the zone of insolvency); Production Resources

Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc. 863 A.2d 772 (DeL Ch. 2004) (recognizing that a
creditor is owed fiduciary duties when a corporation is in the zone of insolvency).
However, Gheewalla and Production Resources are not applicable to the facts and legal
issues in this case. 4
First, it should be noted that AIA Services is not in the zone of insolvency. AlA
Services is beyond insolvent and its assets are estimated to be over $6 Million less than
the over $8,500,000 owed to Reed Taylor. AIA Services does not even have sufficient
assets to pay Reed Taylor's attorneys' fees in Taylor v. AM Services, et aZ. Second, Reed
Taylor is a secured creditor, unlike the apparent general creditors in Gheewalla and

Production Resources. Third, Reed Taylor is entitled to be on the board of AIA Services,
and this contractual right has been thwarted with the assistance of Hawley Troxell.
Fourth, Neither Hawley Troxell, John Taylor or the other interested individuals are
pursuing any claims on behalf of AlA Services because they all know the roads to claims
lead directly back to John Taylor, Hawley Troxell, CropUSA, and the others. Fifth, the
defense of AIA Services is obviously being conducted for no legitimate basis other than
to protect John Taylor, Hawley Troxell (e.g., its various unlawful opinion letters to the
auditors of AlA Insurance and CropUSA assisting in unlawfully transferring millions of
dollars of assets and other things of value from AlA Insurance), and the other individuals.
reason alone, Reed Taylor should be pennitted to bring the claims directly to conserve resources,
rarticularly since he is the only person entitled to any funds recovered.
Hawley Troxell does not challenge Reed Taylor's standing to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims
directly against Hawley Troxell and the others as the pledgee/shareholder of AIA Insurance. Nevertheless,
Reed Taylor provides authority supporting such direct claims in this Response.
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5.

Reed Taylor Has Standing As The Only Authorized Director And
Officer Of AlA Insurance.

A director or officer may bring claims against other parties in a quasi-derivative
action. Law of Corp. Off's. & Dirs.: Rts., Duties & Liabs. § 9:27 (2008) (citing New
York law); see also Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 512-13, 716 P.2d 1282 (1986)
(recognizing a director's rights to bring a direct action in lieu of a derivative action
(although the director was also a shareholder)). Reed Taylor is the only authorized
officer and director of AlA Insurance, and, consequently, he has standing to pursue
claims directly as he is the only party entitled to the funds.

6.

As Both The Director And Sole Shareholder Of AlA Insurance, Reed

Taylor Has Standing To Make Direct Claims Against Hawley Troxell.
Under Idaho law, a shareholder and director of a closely held corporation has
standing to bring direct claims. Steelman v. Mallory, 110 Idaho 510, 716 P.2d 1282

(1986); see also 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5651 (2008) ("The pledgee may file suit in
equity to preserve the stock and to protect his or her interests, to the same extent, at least,
as the pledgor ... The pledgee is also interested in the preservation of the corporate
property

ana in preventing

it from passing out of the hands of the corporation ... ")

(emphasis· added). Here, Reed Taylor is the only authorized officer and director of AlA
Insurance and its only shareholder as the pledgee of all its outstanding shares. Reed
Taylor is entitled to bring direct claims against Hawley Troxell.

7.

Reed Taylor Has Standing As A Third Party Beneficiary.

A party has standing to bring direct claims when he or she is a third party
beneficiary:
Thus, a shareholder may have a personal cause of action against a third
person to recover damages for breach of contract, even though a corporate
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
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cause of action and the shareholder's cause of action result from the same
wrongful acts, such as for mismanagement of the corporate business and
diversion of assets in breach of an express contract with the shareholder. ..
... The shareholder's individual claim based upon a contract between the
corporation and another may be brought as a third-party beneficiary
action, despite lack of privity between the plaintiff shareholder and the
defendant, provided the shareholder as an intended beneficiary of the
contract. ..
12B Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5921 (2008) (internal citations omitted) citing Vogel v. Reed
Supply Co., 277 N.C. 119, 126, 177 S.B. 2.d 273, 278 (N.C. 1970) (third-party

beneficiaries not in privy of contract may bring an action in their own name to "enforce a
contract made for their benefit...") (other citations omitted). There are other instances in
which a third-party has standing to pursue claims against an attorney:
'" [A]n attorney may owe a duty to a party who is not his or her client, but
who is a third-party beneficiary to an agreement between the attorney and
his or her client Accordingly, third party liability of an attorney arising
from representation of a client may be found to exist where the attorney is
responsible for 'damage caused by his or her negligence to a person
intended to be benefited by his or her performance irrespective of any lack
of privity. Privity between an attorney and a non-client is not necessary
for a duty to attach where the attorney had reason to foresee the specific
harm which occurred ...
. .. Thus, although a legal malpractice claim may accrue only to the
attorney's client, an attorney may be liable for damages to a third party
because of events arising out of his or her representation of a client if the
attorney's acts are fraudulent or tortious and result in injury to that third
person.
An attorney for a trustee is liable for breach of fiduciary duty to the thirdparty beneficiaries of the trust when the attorney has placed his or her selfinterest about that of the trustee.

7 Am. Jur.2d Attorneys at Law§234 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
Here, AlA Services promised Reed Taylor to not impair the value of AlA
Insurance and to vest the voting rights to its shares in AlA Insurance to Reed Taylor upon
a default, with the full knowledge of Hawley Troxell and Richard Riley (who was
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
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attorney for AIA Services in the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares). AIA Services is
insolvent and Reed Taylor is the only beneficiary entitled to its remaining assets. As
such, Reed Taylor is a third-party beneficiary of any services purportedly provided by
Hawley Troxell, who in turn was required to represent the best interests of AIA Insurance
and AIA Services-but failed to do so. Moreover, Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor a
duty, by and through Richard Riley, to not renege on the terms of an opinion letter
provided to Reed Taylor. Finally, Hawley Troxell also owed special duties to Reed
Taylor by way of him being the pledgee of AIA Insurance's shares and the sole officer
and director of the company.

The cumulative effect of all of the above establishes that

Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor duties. 5

8.

Assuming Reed Taylor Does Not Have Standing Under Any One Of
The Above Reasons, He Should Have Standing As A Result Of All Of
The Above Collective Reasons.

The gravamen of Reed Taylor's Complaint is that Hawley Troxell has been aiding
and abetting John Taylor and others in committing torts against Reed Taylor and
depriving him of money and property to which he is rightfully entitled. Hawley Troxell's
actions have occurred knowing that duties are owed to Reed Taylor, as a pledgee,
director, officer, creditor and secured party. There is no other bona-fide shareholder or
creditors entitled to the remaining assets, funds, and claims owned by AIA Services and
AIA Insurance. The little remaining assets are being unlawfully utilized to cover up the
acts of John Taylor, Hawley Troxell, CropUSA and other individuals. Moreover, Reed
-"

Taylor is a creditor owed over $9,000,000, he has a security interest in the commissions
5 Even if Done of the single factual issues creates a third-party beneficiary entitlement for Reed Taylor, a
special exception should apply based upon Reed Taylor being a secured creditor of AIA Services and AlA
Insurance, a creditor owed over $8,500,000 by an 'insolvent AlA Services incapable of ever satisfying the
debt, the pledgee of AlA Insurance, the sole officer and director of AlA Insurance, and the only
shareholder of AIA Insurance by way of being the pledgee of all of its outstanding shares.
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of AJA Services and AIA Insurance, he is the only authorized representative of AIA
Insurance, he is required to be on the board of AIA Services, he has priority over all of
the assets of AlA Services and AIA Insurance, he has a security interest in all of the AlA
Insurance's shares, and, as Hawley Troxell admits, AIA Services is insolvent.

D. Hawley Troxell's Acts, Omissions, And Torts Are Outside Of Any Scope
Of Purported Legal Representation Because They Were Never
Authorized To Undertake The Purported Representations.
"A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization
acting through its duly authorized constituents." RPC 1.13(a).
When a managing officer has been validly removed, he has no authority to
institute legal proceedings in the name of the corporation.

American Center for

Education, Inc. v. Cavnar, 145 Cal.Rptr. 736, (1978) (citing Templeman v. Grant, 75
Colo. 519, 534-35, 227 P. 555 (Colo. 1924) ("It is also true that neither the plaintiff
Templeman nor the former directors ... had any right or authority to assume to be officers
of the ... corporation, or to institute legal proceedings in the court... in the name of the
corporation.")); U.S. v. Wolf, 352 F.Supp.2d 1195 (W.D. Okla. 2004) (the court is not
bound to defer to the parties' representations as to their authority to hire counsel);
Safeway Ins. Co. v. Spinale, 641 N.E.2d 834 (Ill.App. 1994) (holding that the
unauthorized filing of a lawsuit constituted a cause of action and subjected the attorneys
to exemplary damages). No person has the right to appear as another's attorney without
the other's authority. Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law § 159 (1997); Colmex, Inc. v. HarriS,

WL 2487991 (Wn. App. 2008). An attorney who enters an unauthorized appearance for
a party is liable to the party for any damage sustained. 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law §
219 (1997). Absent authority to retain an attorney, no attorney-client relationship can be
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established. In re Conservatorship o/Nelson, 587 N.W.2d 649 (Minn.App.1999).
Here, all of Hawley Troxell's acts exceed the scope of any purported
representation because they were never authorized to represent AlA Insurance, never
properly authorized. to represent AlA Services, and because of the irreconcilable and
unwaivable conflicts of interest they intentionally manufactured in simultaneously
purportedly representing AlA Insurance, AlA Services, and CropUSA, R. John Taylor,
and others.
1.

Hawley Troxell Has No Authority To Represent AlA Insurance, And,
Therefore, Hawley Troxell Has No Scope Of Representation.

Reed Taylor is the only authorized director and officer of AlA Insurance. Under
the legal authority cited above, Hawley Troxell is not authorized to represent AIA
Insurance, and is, therefore, liable to Reed for the same reasons and to the same extent as
any other person or entity for Reed Taylor's claims.
On December 12, 2006, AIA Services received a notice of default from Reed
Taylor, a copy of which was provided to Defendant Richard Riley. See Complaint, p. 3,
, 3.

On February 22, 2007, Reed Taylor voted the stock of AlA Insurance.

See

Complaint, p. 4, ,14, pp. 8-9, '22. Reed Taylor should be in control of AIA Insurance,
and would be but for the tortious acts of Hawley Troxell and others. See Complaint, p. 5,
,15. Notwithstanding Hawley Troxell's unauthorized representation, it took instructions
and/or directives from the unauthorized board of AIA Insurance, namely John Taylor.
See Complaint, p. 20,,45.

John Taylor purports to control AIA Insurance and Hawley Troxell purports to
represent AIA Insurance, however, neither is authorized to do so. Reed Taylor is the only
authorized officer and director of AIA Insurance and the only person entitled and
PLAlNTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
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authorized to control it Significantly, AlA Insurance, by way of Reed Taylor being the
only authorized director or officer of the company, may not have John Taylor or others
retain and direct counsel. 5 Therefore, Hawley Troxell's representation of AlA Insurance
is not authorized and not protected under the law. Consequently, the acts of Hawley
Troxell on behalf of AlA Insurance are as individuals and not as attorneys within the
scope of an attorney-client relationship. They have not protections under the law.
Hawley Troxell is directly interfering with Reed Taylor's contractual rights to
control AlA Insurance, his right to be a member of the board of AlA Services, his rights
to commissions and the $1.2 Million Mortgage collateral to which he is entitled to
possess, and his rights to realize upon his collateral by and through its unauthorized
representation and its representation of CropUSA.
Hawley Troxell is also directly aiding and abetting John Taylor and other
interested individuals in breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, conspiracy, fraud and
tortious interference. Significant damages to Reed Taylor are being caused by these
actions, including impairing the value of AlA Insurance, the company that he is
contractually entitled to control. In sum, the commission revenues of AlA Insurance and
$1.2 Million Mortgage in which Reed Taylor has a direct security interest or a security
interest by way of the property being proceeds of collateral securing his debt are being
directly converted by John Taylor, Hawley Troxell, and others.
Because Hawley Troxell has no authority to represent AlA Insurance, its
assertions that it are merely rendering advice within the scope of an attorney-client
relationship relative to AIA Insurance cannot be used as basis to assert that Reed Taylor's
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. At a minimum, the
6

See Sections C-l and C-2 above. which are incorporated by reference into this section.
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issues of whether Hawley Troxell has authority to represent AIA Insurance and whether
Hawley Troxell has a legal privilege predicated upon an attorney-client relationship
present factual issues which (it is respectfully submitted) cannot be decided by the Court
0:0. an LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion, which is addressed solely to the sufficiency of the Reed

Taylor's Complaint

2.

Hawley Troxell Has No Authority To Represent AlA Services Because
It Was Never Retained By The Duly Authorized Representative Of
AlA Services.

Under the legal authority cited above, Hawley Troxell is not authorized to
represent AIA Services and is, therefore, liable in the same manner and to the same
extent as any other person or entity for Reed Taylor's claims. Reed Taylor and Donna
Taylor are required to be members of the board of AIA Services. See Complaint, p. 16, 1
37. Moreover, Hawley Troxell has unlawfully taken instructions and/or directives from
the unauthorized board of AIA Services and without obtaining the necessary approvals.
See Complaint, p. 20, 145.

3.

Because Of The Irreconcilable And Unwaivable Conflicts Of Interest,
Hawley Troxell's Purported Representation Exceeds The Scope Of
Representation.

A consent to dual representation required by RPC 1.7 mandates that "the consent
shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who
is to be represented, or by the shareholders." RPC l.13(g). Any conflict of interest in
representing a majority shareholder and corporation in litigation brought by a minority
shareholder was not waived, where only the majority shareholder approved the conflict
waiver.

Williams v. Stanford, 977 So.2d 722, 730 (Fla. 2008). "[S]ome conflicts are

nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such an
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agreement or proyjde representation on the basis of the client's consent.

When

representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to
each client." RPC 1.7, Comment 14.
Reed Taylor would have been required to give any consent to represent AIA
Insurance Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor, andlor disinterested innocent shareholders
would have similarly been required to provide consent for AlA Services. By undertaking
to represent multiple clients with conflicting interests and by receiving and accepting
directions from John Taylor whose interests conflicted with their clients' conflicting
interests, Hawley Troxell inevitably implicated itself in the claims for damages made by
Reed Taylor.
The basic allegations in Reed Taylor's Complaint encompass the following facts:
It is claimed (and the court has found) that AlA Services is indebted to Reed Taylor by

contract. The relationship between Reed Taylor and AlA Services is not merely creditor
and debtor. AlA Services is insolvent and therefore owes fiduciary duties to its creditors
under Idaho law (which means that AIA Semces should be operated exclusively for the
benefit of creditors).

Furthermore, the status of Reed Taylor is not a mere general

creditor. Reed Taylor is a secured creditor (which is one of the most pertinent facts of
this case relative to the liabilities for interference with Reed Taylor's contractual
relationship and for conversion). Reed Taylor has a security interest in all of the stock of
AIA Insurance and all of the commission revenue and related proceeds of AIA Insurance
and AIA Services. Reed Taylor has the right to control AlA Insurance and has in fact
voted the shares of AlA Insurance as he is contractually entitled to do. Furthermore, the
Court has granted partial summary judgment to plaintiff finding AlA Services in default.
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Reed Taylor has the right to control AlA Insurance and should be controlling AIA
Insurance, but has been denied his contractual rights by the actions of John Taylor and
the three corporations represented by Hawley Troxell, with the assistance of Hawley
Troxell.
Hawley Troxell currently represents CropUSA and AlA Services, and purportedly
represents AIA Insurance as well. An interested director, John Taylor, who is a director
common to AIA Services and CropUSA and purports to be a director of AlA Insurance,
controls and makes the decisions for all the corporations with respect to litigation
involving plaintiff and the corporations.

John Taylor himself is a defendant in the

litigation and is the object of claims of breach of fiduciary duties owed to the three
corporations and to Reed Taylor, directly. Hawley Troxell receives and accepts litigation
instructions from John Taylor. Each of Hawley Troxell's corporate clients has distinct
and diverging interests based upon claims being litigated, diverging interests so strong
that numerous torts such as fraud, fraudulent conveyance, conspiracy and conversion are
implicated.

John Taylor's interests are distinct and diverge from the interests of the

corporations based upon claims being litigated. These distinct and diverging interests
essentially result from: 1) the claim that AlA Services is iridebted to Reed Taylor by
contract; 2) the claim that Reed Taylor is contractually entitled to control AIA Insurance
and has contractual rights to full possession of the revenue commissions; 3) the claim that
CropUSA is liable to AIA Services and AIA Insurance because of fraudulent
conveyances, fraud and other torts; and 4) the claims that John Taylor is liable to AlA
Services, AlA Insurance and CropUSA for breaches of fiduciary duties, fraud, fraudulent
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conveyance, excessive compensation and other torts. It is also claimed that John Taylor
is liable to Reed Taylor because of breaches of fiduciary duties owed directly to him.
The allegation against Hawley Troxell are for conspiracy and/or aiding and
abetting in the breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, fraudulent conveyance and conspiracy;
for interference with Reed Taylor's contractual relationships; and for conversion, and are
underscored by the following facts:
AIA Services, an insolvent corporation, should be operated exclusively for the
benefit of creditors, specifically Reed Taylor.

The interests of AIA Services are to

maximize the recovery of assets for its creditors and pursue claims against others who
may be liable the corporation. AIA Services should have separate counsel receiving and
accepting instructions from independent directors.

An attorney representing AIA

Services should not be taking directions from an interested director like John Taylor
against whom claims are being made. It is in the best interests of AIA Services and AIA
Insurance to pursue claims against John Taylor. It is in the best interests of AlA Services
and AIA Insurance to pursue claims against others, including CropUSA, which it is
alleged is liable to AIA Services. Indeed, it is in the best interests of AIA Services and
AIA Insurance to pursue claims against Hawley Troxell. In addition, the interests of John
Taylor and CropUSA are naturally adverse to the interests of AIA Services.

It is

inconceivable to expect John Taylor to manage his personal assets for the benefit of AIA
Services and its creditors, Reed Taylor. It is inconceivable to expect CropUSA to be
operated for the benefit of the creditors of AIA Services. It is impossible for attorneys, in
this case Hawley Troxell, to purportedly represent the interests of AIA Services
exclusively for the benefit the corporation and its creditors while at the same time
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representing the interests of CropUSA and taking directions for both clients from an
interested director like John Taylor. The interests are irreconcilable and ul1waivable and
constitute Hawley Troxell's breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the corporations.

In a situation such as described above, Hawley Troxell cannot avoid representing
one client to the disadvantage of another client, i.e., the interests of one must necessarily
predominate over the other. Hawley Troxell then must impermissibly divide its loyalty

to a client and act outside the scope of an attorney-client relationship, and then shift its
duty of loyalty back to itself to prevent claims from being asserted against it while
maintaining a steady stream of ill-gotten income from the impossible and unlawful
purported representations.

4.

Even IT Hawley Troxell Was Authorized To Represent AIA Services
And AlA Insurance, Its Acts Are Outside Of The Scope Of
Representation Because They Were Not In The Best Interests Of The
Organizations.

"[A]n attorney may not hide behind a client's instructions in order to perpetrate a
fraud against a third party." The Florida Bar v. Feige, 596 So.2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1992).
RPC 1. 13(b) expressly states that a lawyer is required to proceed in the bests interests of
the corporation:

If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act
or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation
of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and this is likely to result
in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization...
RPC 1.13(b) (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Law. §
96 (2008) (virtually identical language to RPC 1.13(b)).
Here, the only interests Hawley Troxell has served are those of itself, John Taylor
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and other interested parties. With the assistance of Hawley Troxell, John Taylor and the
other parties who should be on the receiving end of claims by AIA Services and AlA
Insurance, are ensuring that Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor.are no longer being paid any
amounts due them. Meanwhile, the funds continue to flow out of the corporations to
CropUSA, John Taylor, Hawley Troxell and other interested and responsible parties.

5.

Any Purported Agreement For Hawley Troxell To Provide Legal
Services Is Void And Unenforceable.

Contracts that violate ethical rules violate public policy and are unenforceable.
Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 251 Mich.App. 187, 650 N.W.2d 364,370 (Mich. 2002).

Once representation has commenced, a lawyer shall withdraw from the representation of
a client if "the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct
or the law." RPC 1.16(a)(a). A lawyer may not engage in a representation that serves his
or her.self interests and limits the representation of one or more clients. RPC 1.7(a)(2);
see also Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 403 (C.A.D.C. 1996) (simultaneously

representing multiple parties in violation of the rules of ethics constitutes a breach of
fiduciary duty).
As a result of anyone or more of the ethical violations set forth above, Hawley
Troxell is not truly authorized to represent any of the entities, let alone the person Hawley
Troxell truly represents, John Taylor. Thus, Hawley Troxell cannot utilize the immunity
defense for any of their acts and/or omissions and resulting torts.

E. Assuming Hawley Troxell Is Authorized To Represent AlA Services And
AlA Insurance, It Is Liable For An Claims Arising Out Of Actions
Exceeding The Scope Of Its Purported Representation.
Attorneys are liable for acts and torts committed outside the scope of their
representation because the law does not provide absolute immunity. See Alpert v. Crain,
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Caton & James P.e., 178 S.W. 3d 398 (Tex. 2005) (attorney liable for fraud committed
outside the scope of representation); Kimmel v. Go land, 793 P.2d 524, 530 (Cal. 1990)
(attorneys may be liable for aiding and abetting violation of privacy act or other illegal or
tortious conduct).
Hawley Troxell correctly notes that attorneys normally have the luxury of
asserting litigation privilege.

See Hawley Troxell's Motion, pp. 29-32.

The only

problem with Hawley Troxell's argument is that this is not the normal case. Hawley
Troxell's primary argument is flawed and the same or similar flaws repeatedly appear
throughout its Motion to Dismiss. Implicit in its analysis is the erroneous contention that
the facts alleged by Reed Taylor are: 1) limited to the advice rendered by Hawley Troxell
to a client; and 2) conceded to be performed within the scope of the attorney-client
relationship.

For example, in its Motion to Dismiss, Hawley Troxell refers to non-

liability for an attorney's "giving advice" (p. 7); to no liability where the attorney "did no
more than provide legal advice" (pp. 8-9); to no liability for "merely by giving advice"
(p. 15); and to non-liability for an attorney acting for the client within the scope of the
attorney-client relationship (pp. 9,. 15 & 17).

On pages 10-11 of Hawley Troxell's

Motion, it advances the following summary conclusion:
The plaintiff's claims against HTEH for purportedly aiding and abetting
its clients' action relate only to advice rendered and positions taken in the
course of zealous representation and, as such, must be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action.
This bare conclusion of Hawley Troxell ignores the facts alleged in Reed Taylor's
Complaint including all of the required inferences contained in the Complaint Reed
Taylor's Complaint is plainly not limited to factual allegations pertaining to Hawley
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Troxell merely giving legal advice to a client, but alleges acts committed by Hawley
Troxell that are clearly outside the proper scope of an attorney-client relationship.
Hawley Troxell understandably desires to "uncomplicate" this case by citation to
case authorities involving cases with less complex and inapplicable facts (Le. cases where
the sued attorney represents only one client and is not burdened by a conflict of interest
because the attorney has undertaken to represent more than one client or when an
attorney has not actually committed a tort). This case, however, is compounded because
Hawley Troxell undertook to represent three corporate clients with each client having
distinct and diverging interests, while 'taking instructions from John Taylor (a person not
authorized to act on behalf of AIA Services and AlA Insurance). Furthermore, Hawley
Troxell incorrectly received and accepted litigation instructions from interested (as
opposed to independent) directors common to all three corporate clients. Moreover, the
interested directors themselves should be the subject of pending claims of breach of
fiduciary duties to the three corporate clients, but they are not because of the self interests
of John Taylor, Hawley Troxell and the other responsible individuals.
Hawley Troxell, while disregarding constant warnings from Reed Taylor's
counsel, knowingly stepped into a situation complicated by irreconcilable conflicts of
interest and fraught with individuals committing torts. As will be discussed below, an
attorney with a conflict of interest goes outside the scope 'of an attorney-client
relationship with respect to one client when the attorney acts for the benefit of another
client and/or person to the detriment of the first client (assuming the attorney has
authority to act). Likewise, the attorney provides more than mere legal advice when the
attorney so acts.

In summary, it is respectfully submitted that Hawley Troxell's
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simplistic analysis of the causes of action asserted in Reed Taylor's Complaint should be
evaluated by the Court in light of the pervasive conflicts of interest presented by the facts
of this case which facts appear in Reed Taylor's Complaint. Reed Taylor is entitled to
have all inferences from the facts considered in his favor.
There are issues of fact pertaining to whether Hawiey Troxell had any authorized
attorney-client relationship with AIA Insurance or AIA Services. At a minimum, there
are issues of fact pertaining to the scope of Hawley Troxell's purported representation
and the extent to which they exceeded any purported scope of representation. Moreover,
Hawley Troxell has not, and cannot, provide any authority holding that a law firm's
scope of representation of one client or more clients (AlA Insurance and/or AIA
Services) includes defending another client (CropUSA) from claims that should be
asserted by the other clients to recover millions of dollars that were fraudulently
transferred with the law fum's assistance.

In short, Hawley Troxell's acts and

subsequent torts exceed any permissible scope of representation.
F. Hawley Troxell Owes Reed Taylor Special Duties As A Secured Creditor,
Stock Pledgee, And Creditor Of The Insolvent AlA Services.

Under Idaho law, when a corporation becomes insolvent, its assets are held in
trust for the benefit of the corporation's creditors. See e.g., Smith v. Great Basin Grain

Co., 98 Idaho 266, 651 P.2d 1299 (1977). Attorneys may not engage in legal
representations that affect the attorney's responsibilities to third parties. RPC 1.7(a)(2) .
.When a corporation is insolvent, attorneys also have special obligations to creditors:
[W]e hold that if an attorney represents both a dissolved or insolvent
corporation and a director or officer of that firm, and if the attorney
controls corporate assets, then the attorney must protect the financial
rights of creditors to these assets, where he or she knows or should know
that the director or officer intends to interfere with creditor's claims
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through an improper distribution of these assets.

Willner's Fuel Distributors, Inc. v. Noreen, 882 P.2d 399, 406 (Alaska 1994) (like the
attorney in this action, Hawley Troxell was at one time in possession of the $1.2 Million
Mortgage and funds derived from AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance). The lack of an
attorney-client relationship does not preclude a finding of a fiduciary duty, which is an
issue of fact for the jury. In re D.C. Equipment, Inc. v. Peshtigo National Bank, 112 B.R.
855, 857 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (holding that an issue of fact as to whether corporate
debtor's counsel owed fiduciary duty to debtor's sole shareholder precluded summary
judgment).
Here, Reed Taylor holds a valid and perfected security interest in all of AlA
Insurance and AIA Services' commissions and related receivables. Reed Taylor has a
valid security interest in the shares of AlA Insurance. Reed Taylor is a creditor owed
over $8,500,000 by the insolvent AIA Services, thereby making him the beneficiary of
the funds and assets held in trust by AIA Services and its subsidiary AIA Insurance.
Moreover, he is the pledgee of all of the shares in AlA Insurance and the only authorized
director and officer.

Meanwhile, Hawley Troxell is simultaneously representing the

interests of John Taylor and others, with full knowledge of the insolvency of AlA
Services and its trust fund obligations to Reed Taylor. There can be no better example of
a situation in which corporate assets should be protected or better set of facts to support a
lawyer's duties owed to a non-client.

Thus, Reed Taylor's claims are all valid and

warranted under the special factual circumstances of this case as he is the beneficiary and
secured creditor Gfthe remaining assets and funds of the insolvent AlA Services.
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G. Reed Taylor Has Pled Sufficient Facts To Support All Of His Causes Of
Action.
Without providing any specific examples and by citing cases that are either
inapplicable (or that actually support Reed Taylor), Hawley Troxell asserts that Reed
Taylor's Complaint is factually deficient and fails to plead facts sufficient to justify
damages. See Hawley Troxell's Motion, p. 5. However, like Hawley Troxell's other
arguments, the assertions are baseless and lack merit
For example, Reed Taylor's Complaint specifically states "all applicable facts
alleged below are incorporated by reference into each cause of action as necessary to
support each cause of action." See Complaint, p. 1. Thus, every fact alleged in Reed
Taylor's Complaint applies as necessary to support each cause of action. As discussed in
detail below, the facts and causes of action are all more than sufficiently pled.

H. Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled That Hawley Troxell Has Aided And
Abetted In Various Torts.
1.

Contrary To Hawley Troxell's Argument, Idaho Has Numerous
Aiding And Abetting Cases And Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled
The Cause Of Action And They Are Not Barred By Any Privilege.

Idaho has a plethora of cases on aiding and abetting. The following listed Idaho
cases (in reverse chronological order) have clearly established the principles of law
governing conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims. In Todd v. Sullivan Canst. LLC,
191 P.3d 196,203 (2008) (Idaho Report Cite Unavailable) (emphasis added), the Idaho
Supreme Court addressed aiding and abetting:
As we stated in Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 682, 34 P.2d 957, 963 (1934):
The law seems to be well settled that, where several people
actively participate in any manner in the commission of a tort, not
only the actual actor or assailant is liable but all others who aid,
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abet, counselor encourage the wrongdoer by words, gestures,
looks or signs are equally liable with him to the injured person.
In Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 342, 986 P.2d 996 (1999). the
Idaho Supreme Court reiterated:
A person is subject to liability if he or she does a tortious act in concert
with the other or pursuant to a common design with him. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 876(a) (1977).
The Idaho Supreme Court has even addressed the minimal jury instructions necessary to
fmd that a defendant aided and abetted:
... the jury was instructed that:
If you find that a defendant who did not personally perform a
wrongful act nonetheless did pursue a common plan or design to
commit that act with the actor by commanding, instigating,
advising, aiding, abetting or encouraging the actor by words,
gestures, looks or otherwise; then the conduct of the actor
physically committing the wrongdoing was also the conduct of that
defendant. If either is liable then both are equally liable.

Highland Enterprises, 133 Idaho at 348. In Price v. Aztec Ltd, Inc., 108 Idaho 674, 67778, 701 P.2d 294 (Idaho App. 1985), the Idaho Court of Appeal addressed aiding and
abetting:
Secondly, it is well established in Idaho that a person may be liable as a
contributing tort-feasor, joint tort-feasor or cotrespasser for harm resulting
to a third person from the tortious conduct of another. Smith v. Thompson,
103 Idaho 909,655 P.2d 116 (Ct.App.1982). See, e.g., Lorang v. Hays, 69
Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Bailey v. Idaho Irrigation Co. Ltd., 39
Idaho 354,227 P. 1055 (1924). Further, it has been held "all persons who
command, instigate, encourage, advise, countenance, co-operate in, aid or
abet the commission of a trespass by another, are cotrespassers with the
person committing the trespass ...." Bailey v. Idaho Irrigation Co. Ltd., 39
Idaho at 358, 227 P. at 1056.
When the tortious conduct is the cause of a single and indivisible harm,
each contributing tort-feasor is liable to the same extent and in the same
manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves; i.e., they are
jointly and severally liable. Smith v. Thompson, supra See generally
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RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS § 875, 876 (1977); and cases
collected at 74 AM.JUR.2d Torts § 66 (1974). Each tort-feasor is liable for
the whole damage at the option of the injured party. Spencer v. Spencer,
91 Idaho 880, 434 P.2d 98 (1967). The rule of joint and several liability
also prevails where tort-feasors act in concert in the execution of the
common purpose. The tort liability of persons acting in concert IS
expressed in RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS § 876 (1979):
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of
another, one is subject to liability ifhe ...
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to
conduct himself, ....

In the Restatement's comments on clause b it is said that if the
encouragement or assistance referred to is a substantial factor in causing
the resulting tort, then the one giving it is himself a tort-feasor and is
responsible for the consequences of the other's act.

In Smith v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 909, 911, 655 P.2d 116 (Idaho App.1982)., the Idaho
Court of Appeals noted:
It is well established in Idaho that a person may be liable as a contributing
tortfeasor, joint tortfeasor, or "cotrespasser," for harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of anather. See, e.g., Lorang v. Hays, 69
Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Bailey v. Idaho. Irr. Co., Ltd., 39 Idaho
354, 227 P. 1055 (1924). "All persons who command, instigate,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid ar abet the commission
af a trespass by anather are catrespassers with the person cammitting the
trespass." Bailey v. Idaho Irr. Co., Ltd., 39 Idaho at 358,227 P. at 1056.
Furthermore, when the tortious conduct is the cause of a single and
indivisible harm, each contributing tartfeasor is liable to the same extent
and in the same manner as if they had perfanned the wrangful act
themselves; i.e., they are jointly and severally liable. See Lorang v. Hays,
supra; Bailey v. Idaho lIT. Co., Ltd., supra; see generally Restatement
(Secand) of Tarts §§ 875, 876 (1977); and cases collected at 74 AmJur.2d
ToIiS§ 66 (1974).
As noted in all of the Idaho cases cited above, Reed Taylar has sufficiently pled
aiding and abetting causes of action against Hawley Troxell. For example, Reed Taylor
specifically alleges the following in his Camplaint:
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Defendants are liable to Reed 1. Taylor for an ammmt to be proven at trial
because the Defendants have provided substantial assistance and/or aided
and abetted R. John Taylor, AIA Services Corporation, AIA Insurance,
CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc., and other interested parties in acts of
fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, civil conspiracy, and breaches
of fiduciary duties.
See Complaint, p. 11,

1 27

(emphasis added). In Reed Taylor's Complaint, he also

exhaustively pleads various forms of the cause of action of aiding and abetting, along
with numerous facts. See Complaint, pp. 20-21, ,,46-50; see also e.g., Complaint, p. 4,
,14; p. 5",15-16; p. 6,,17; pp. 6-7,,18; p. 7,119; p. 9,'23, pp. 10-11,,26; pp. 1112,'27; p. 12,,28; p. l3"

30, pp. 15-16,135; p. 16,137; p. 17,

l'

38-39; p. 18,'41.

All of the above facts are incorporated by reference into Reed Taylor's causes of
action for aiding and abetting. See Complaint, pp. 1 and 20-21. Not only does Reed
Taylor succinctly and specifically plead aiding and abetting, but he pleads the various
causes of action with numerous fact patterns and claims.
2.

Hawley Troxell Is Liable For Aiding And Abetting In The CommiIdon
Of Numerous Torts And Such Claims Are Not Barred By The
Litigation Privilege.

Like normal tortfeasors, attorneys may be liable to others under various legal
theories, including aiding and abetting, conspiracy and other torts. Hearst v. Hearst, 50
A.D. 3d 959 (N.Y. 2008) (factual issues precluded summary judgment on conversion and
aiding and abetting of fraud claim against lawyer); In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150
(D. Colo. 2007); Traub v. Washington, 591 S.E. 2d 382 (Ga App. 2003); Adena, Inc. v.
Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (B.D.Pa. 2001); Cacciola v. NeUhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133 (Mass.

App. Ct. 2000); In re Atlantic Financial Management, Inc. Securities Litigation v. Paine
Webber, Jackson & Cw·tis, et al., 658 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1986) (valid cause of

action for aiding and abetting securities fraud based upon conflicts of interest).
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A highly illustrative and demonstrative case is 111 re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL
2669150 (D. Colo. 2007). In that case, the federal district court reversed the bankruptcy
court's order granting a motion to dismiss. A bankruptcy trustee for the estate of a
corporate debtor sued a law firm for tortious conduct involving certain fmancial
transactions between the debtor and corporate insiders, mcluding one Howard Leach and
"entities under his control," all referred to in the facts of the case as "Leach." The facts
reveal a series of various transactions which are quite complex but ultimately involve
Leach obtaIDing primary liens on debtor's assets when debtor was insolvent. The court
notes that "of critical importance" to the trustee's claims is the fact that the law firm
(referred to in the case as "ODC") acted as counsel for both debtor and Leach durmg the
transactions which the court characterizes as "dual representation" attendant with
conflicts of mterest and divided loyalties between the debtor and Leach. The district
court stated:
The bankruptcy court summarized the basis for Trustee's claims agaillst ODe as
follows:
[GDC], while owing professional duties to [Debtor] acted to
protect the interests of another client, Leach, contrary to the
interests of [Debtor]. Accordillg to [Trustee], [ODC] undertook to
structure the Bridge Loans so that Leach, Blue Chip, and Akamai
would receive security interests and/or payments from [Debtor]
that were either fraudulent or preferential.

In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150 '" 3. The district court reviewed the allegations of
the trustee's complaint relative to claims for conspiracy and aiding and abetting in the
breach of fiduciary duties 7 and held that the complaint stated claims. The court stated:

7 The district court noted that "Colorado state law dictates that when a corporntion becomes insolvent, the
corporation's creditors are owed a common law duty by the directors and officers of the corporation." 2007
WL2669150 at * 14.
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... I find Trustee sufficiently alleged the followmg claims on behalf of the
corporation's creditors: (1) ODC engaged in a civil conspiracy with Leach,
Blue Chip, Akamai, and members of Debtor's management to commit
fraudulent transfers that breached fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors;
and (2) ODC aided and abetted Debtor's officers and directors in
breaching their fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors. Thus, I find the
bankruptcy judge's determination that Trustee's allegation only supported
. "claims of the debtor against a third party" was in error. [Footnote No.3]
[Footnote No.3]. Strangely, another portion of the bankruptcy judge's
opinion supports my finding here. The judge noted: "[T]he basis for all of
[Trustee's] claims is that [Debtor] committed wrongful acts, i.e., violation
of fiduciary duties it had to its creditors and shareholders or securities
fraud, and that [Debtor] was either caused to commit such violations or
was assisted in committing such violations by [ODC]."

In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150

* 9.

The district court quotes the allegations of the trustee's complaint at length which
allegations are pertinent and instructive for comparing to the allegations of the plaintiffs
complaint in this case.

The district court's opinion summarizes the claims and then

provides quotations from the trustee's complaint:
Claim three alleges that "[ODC] engaged in a civil conspiracy to commit
fraudulent transfers in breach of its fiduciary duty by agreements with
Leach, the Leach Trust, Blue Chip, Blue Chip's counsel, Akamai,
members of [Debtor's] management including Roger Moody and Robert
Ogden, and other Bridge lenders." ... Claim four alleges that GDC aided
and abetted Debtor's officers and directors in breaching their fiduciary
duties by participating in or approving fraudulent transfers.
[T]he followmg allegations [are] contained in [the] amended complaint:

11

135 At all times after December 5, 2000, Blue Chip, Leach and
[Debtor's] management were mown by [ODC] to have fiduciary
duties to unsecured creditors of [Debtor] which prohibited self. dealing and preferences for insiders and required them to preserve
the assets in trust for such creditors.

11

137 Self-dealing insiders of [Debtor] including Blue Chip,
Leach, [and] Ogden were unable to ratify or waive [GDC's]
conflict which was undisclosed to other shareholders and general
creditors.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 37
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

7)]93

11

143 GDC's fiduciary duties to [Debtor] encompassed duties
which [Debtor] and its management owed to general creditors at all
times after December 1, 2000 to avoid self-dealing and insider
preferences.
~

155 The civil conspiracy in which [GDC] participated was
attended by circumstances of fraud of willful and reckless
disregard of the rights of [Debtor], unsecured creditors and smaller
shareholders.

~

157 The officers and directors of [Debtor] breached their own
fiduciary duties to unsecured creditors and/or smaller shareholders
in [Debtor] by participating in or approving [GDes breach of
fiduciary duties].
~ 160 GDC's conduct

in aiding and abetting those breaches were
attended by circumstances of fraud or willful and reckless
disregard of the rights of the debtor, unsecured creditors. the
Trustee and smaller shareholders.

In re MS55, Inc., 2007 WL 2669150 * 9.

In this' case, for the same reasons as in In re MS55. Inc., Reed Taylor's factual

allegations against Hawley Troxell State claims upon which relief can be granted.
Defendants, by undertaking to represent multiple clients with conflicting interests, and by
receiving and accepting directions from John Taylor whose interests conflicted with their
other clients' conflicting interests, inevitably implicated themselves in the claims for
damages made by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor properly states claims against Hawley
Troxell for conspiracy and aiding and abetting John Taylor and/or CropUSA in breaching
fiduciary duties by acting to protect John Taylor's and/or CropUSA's interests to the
......... detriment of the interests of Hawley Troxell's other clients, AlA Services and AlA
Insurance, and to the detriment of Reed Taylor directly. Reed Taylor's claims against
defendants with respect to interference with his contractual relationships and conversion
have the same foundation.
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Another instructive case is Adena, Inc. v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (B.D. Pa.
2001). In that case, a closely-held corporation and two shareholders sued a former
majority shareholder ("Malecki') and his law finn ("Cohn") alleging among other claims
breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting in the breach offiduciary duty. The law
firm moved to dismiss which motion was denied by the courl The facts indicate that

Malecki, as corporate director and officer, diverted corporate funds to another business
"which he owned and operated for his own personal pecuniary gain." In addition,
Malecki used corporate "facilities and personnel to further" his other business. The law
firm had undertaken to provide representation to both Malecki, personally, and the

corporation and the facts of the case detail a number of personal and corporate
transactions for which the law finn provided representation. The court stated the law
firms' position on the applicable law as follows: "[T]he Cohn Defendants contend that ..
. an attorney is not liable for aiding and abetting a corporate officers breach of fiduciary
duty merely by the provision of advice to the corporation absent direct and knowing
participation in the breach itself; ..."

Adena, Inc., 162 F. Supp.2d at 356. The court

addressed the issue, stated the law, and held as follows:
To establish a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, a
plaintiff must show: (1) a breach of fiduciary duty owed to another; (2)
knowledge of the breach by the aider or abettor; and (3) substantial
assistance or encouragement by the aider or abettor in effecting that
breach. (Citations omitted). The court in Schuylkill Skyport Inn [v. llich,
1996 WL 502280 (E.D.Pa.1996] did not require the direct and knowing
participation that the Defendants contend is required. Rather, the court
allowed the claim to proceed based upon a showing of "substantial
assistance or encouragement" Moreover, even if such a heightened
involvement were required, the Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the Cohn
Defendants were indeed knowing and active participants in Malecki's
breach. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim of aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty against the Cohn Defendants.
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Adena, Inc., 162 F.Supp.2d at 357-358.
It would certainly appear from the preceding that Pennsylvania law is consistent
with the law of Idaho as set forth in the cases cited above and follows the Second
Restatement of Torts § 876 (which is followed by Idaho and is cited several times). It is
to be emphasized that at the crux of the cause of action against the Cohn Defendants in

Adena, Inc. v. Cohn was the dual representation of clients and the divided loyalties that
inevitably occur. The Cohn Defendants subjected themselves to claims of liability for
conspiracy and aiding and abetting of various torts by undertaking to represent more than
one client and then substantially assisting the client in breaChing fiduciary duties owed to
the other client
Likewise, in this case Reed Taylor properly and sufficiently states claims against
Hawley Troxell for conspiracy and aiding and abetting John Taylor and/or CropUSA in
breaching fiduciary duties by protecting John Taylor's and/or CropUSA's interests to the
detriment of the interests of Hawley Troxell's other purported clients, AIA Services and
AIA Insurance, thereby damaging Reed Taylor.
Another illustrative case of divided loyalties, conflicts of interest and claims of
aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty is Cacciola v. NeUhaus, 733 N.E.2d
133 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). That case arose out of a partnership of four brothers. The
estate of one of the fraternal partners (Salvatore) filed suit against the partnership
attorney. The partnership attorney had also undertaken to represent one of the three other
brothers (Edward), individually, when Edward purchased the partnership share of another
brother (Anthony). This transaction was alleged to have disadvantaged the partnership
(which could have acquired Anthony's share for the partnership as a whole) to the
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advantage of Edward, individually.

The appellate court reversed the trial court's

dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint Citing the Second Restatement of Torts § 876, the
court specifically addressed a cause of action against an attorney for aiding and abetting
the breach of a fiduciary duty in a conflict of interest context:
Indeed the defendant may also be liable for aiding and abetting Edward's
breach of his fiduciary duty to Salvatore. As his partner, Edward owed
Salvatore a duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty," (citations omitted),
the more so because of the familial relationship. (Citations omitted).
<[L]iability arises when a person [actively] participates in a fiduciary'S
breach of duty ... such that he .. , could not reasonably be held to have
acted in good faith.' (Citation omitted). Compare Kurker v. Hill, 44
Mass.App.Ct. 184, 189-190, 689 N.E.2d 833 (1998) (discussing
Restatement [Second] of Torts § 876[b] [1977] and claim of civil
conspiracy in context of rule 12[b][6] motion). Here, the plaintiff alleges
that the defendant not only wrongly advised Edward he had no duty to
Salvatore with regard to the purchase of Anthony's interest in the
partnership, but acted as Edward's lawyer in a transaction that conflicted
with his duty to the par1nership, and then refused to give Salvatore the
information he requested after the sale had occurred. (Emphasis added).
Cacciola, 733 N.E. 2d at 139 (emphasis added).

To reiterate, in this case Reed Taylor's Complaint States claims against Hawley
Troxell for conspiracy and aiding and abetting John Taylor and/or CropUSA in breaching
fiduciary duties by acting to protect John Taylor's and/or CropUSA's interests to the
detriment of the interests of Hawley Troxell's other purported clients, AlA Services and
AlA Insurance, thereby damaging Reed Taylor. Likewise, Reed Taylor's claims against
Hawley Troxell with respect to interference with his contractual relationships and
conversion have the same factual basis.

3.

The Cases Cited By Hawley Troxell Are Inapplicable Or
Distinguishable.

Hawley Troxell attempts to portray the facts in this case as though nothing
abnormal has transpired. See Hawley Troxell's Motion, pp. 8-10. However, the cases
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cited by Hawley Troxell either have little to no similarities with this case or are not
properly cited at all. See e.g., Mann v. GTCR Golder Raztner, L.L.C., 351 B.R. 685

CD.Ariz. 2006) (the law fIrm was not liable by way of its act of hiring a crisis manager for
a corporation in good faith, who later misappropriated the corporation's assets without
the assistance of the law fum); Durham v. Guest, 142 N.M. 817, 171 P.3d 756 (2007)
(law firm following Allstate Insurance's internal protocol was not liable for aiding and
abetting, since there were no allegations of wrongful acts by the law firm); Morin v.

Trupin, 711 F.Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (law frrm was not liable for stating its client's
position); Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1991) (attorney not liable for not
disclosing facts to a minority shareholder because he did not knowingly assist in
securities violations); Kahala Royal Corporation v. Goosill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 113
Hawaii 251, 151 P.3d 732 (2007) (attorneys not liable for imposing unreasonable
restrictions for reviewing documents).

I.

Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled Breach Of Fiduciary Duties And
Aiding And Abetting Breach Of Fiduciary Duties.

The pleading requirements necessary to state a cause of action against a lawyer
for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties is the same as against any other
person or entity. See e.g., In re Senior Cottages of America, LLC, 482 F.3d 997, 1007
(8th Cir. 2007); Adena, Inc. v. Cohn, 162 F. Supp.2d 351 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Cacciola v.

NeUhaus, 733 N.E.2d 133 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). In addition, evidence that an attorney
has. violated rules of ethics pertaining to dual representation is sufficient to support a
claim that an attorney violated common-law fIduciary duty ofloyalty. Hendry v. Pelland,

73 F.3d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1996). A shareholder's allegations that a law firm's conflict of
interest representing two corporations is sufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary
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duty against the law finn. Reis v. Barley, Snyder, Serifl & Cohen LLC, 484 F. Supp.2d
337 (B.D. Pa 2007).
Reed Taylor's claims against Hawley Troxell include aidi;ng and abetting in John
Taylor and other individuals' breaches of fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, along
with independent breaches of fiduciary duties personal to the corporations. See e.g.,
Complaint, pp. 7-8, 11,20-21, and 24-25. The claims in this matter are those personal to
Reed Taylor and those inflicted upon AIA Services and AlA Insurance, for which Reed
Taylor is entitled to bring directly against Hawley Troxell in lieu of a derivative action.

J. Reed Taylor Has Snfficiently Pled Conversion And Aiding And Abetting
Conversion.
1.

Reed Taylor Has Pled Conversion As A Cause Of Action.

When an unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs, a secured creditor has
standing to bring claims against third parties for conversion and other remedies. See e.g.,

First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 856-57, 664
P.2d 281 (et. App. 1983); Us. v. McCleskey Mills, Inc., 409 F.2d 1216 (Ga 1969). The

rights of a secured creditor are extensive:
In some circumstances, however, an unauthorized sale or other disposition
of collateral may constitute conversion as to the secured party. In most
cases when a debtor makes an unauthorized disposition of collateral. the
security interest survives disposition of the collateral. In these cases, the
secured party may repossess the collateral from the transferee or, in an
appropriate case, maintain an action for conversion. The secured party
may daim both any proceeds and the original collateral but, of course,
may only have one satisfaction ....
Where a sale of collateral is, with respect to the secured party, a
conversion of the collateral, there is a conversion on the part of the one
who sells, as well as on the part of the one who purchases, or to whom
property is transferred, or a third party who exercises dominion over the
collateral or its proceeds ...
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See 79 C.l.S. Secured Transactions § 157 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added); see also Luzar v. Western Sur. Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984); Lussier

v. Mall Van Development, Inc., 667 P.2d 804,814 (Hawaii App. 1983); Nelson v. Jones,
38 Idaho 664, 224 P. 435,438 (1924); Western Fm'm Service, Inc. v. Olsen, 151 Wn.2d
645, 90 P.3d 1053 (2004) (when a debtor transfers collateral subject to a perfected
security interest, the secured party may commence an action against the purchaser for
conversion).
Here, Reed Taylor has security interest in the commissions of AIA Services and
AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor also has all of the shares of AIA Insurance pledged to him
and holds a security interest in those shares. Moreover, Reed Taylor also has a security
interest in the proceeds of all commissions and the distributions from AlA Services' other
subsidiaries, namely, the $1.2 Million Mortgage improperly pledged to CropUSA.

2.

As A Secured Creditor, Reed Taylor Is Not Required To Own The
Commissions And $1.2 Million Mortgage As They Are Pledged To
Him As Collateral.

One who wrongfully withholds personal property from another who is entitled to
it under a security agreement may be liable for conversion. In re Bailey, 197 F.3d 997,
1000 (9th Cir. 1999); Case Corp. v. Gehrke, 91 P.3d 362, 365 (Ariz. App. 2004) ("A
secured party has the right to take possession of the collateral upon default, and so has
sufficient possessory interest to bring a conversion action ... money can be the subject of
conversion"); Western Farm Service, Inc. v. Olsen, 151 Wn.2d 645, 90 P.3d 1053 (2004).
Reed Taylor has, since 1996, held a security interest in all of the commissions of
AIA Services and AlA Insurance and the stock of AIA Insurance. See Complaint, p. 4, ,
13; pp. 21-23",51-57. The $1.2 Million mortgage was also obtained as proceeds from
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the same commissions and was unlawfully titled and pledged with the assistance of
Hawley Troxell. See Complaint, p. 17-18,

~

39. When AIA Services defaulted, Reed

Taylor was entitled to possession of the collateral, namely the $1.2 Million Mortgage and
all the commissions of AIA Services and AIA Insurance (which comprise virtually every
dollar of their revenue, save the minimal amount of rent received from tenants of the
building rented by AIA Insurance, which is also subject to Reed Taylor'S security interest
in AlA Insurance's shares and his rightful control of the company).

However, the

property has not been relinquished to Reed Taylor as required, and hundreds of thousands
of dollars have been wrongfully transferred to Hawley Troxell and others. 8 In other
words, those amounts have been "converted" and Reed Taylor is rightfully seeking return
of them.

3.

Hawley Troxell Has Asserted Wrongful Dominion Over Reed
Taylor-'s Property.

Under the same authority cited above, Hawley Troxell has taken and/or accepted
funds from sources it knew were subject to a valid security interest in favor of Reed
Taylor. Hawley Troxell mistakenly believes that the Idaho Code can strip away a valid
and perfected security interest to pay attorneys fees to the very attorneys who have been
assisting in perpetuating the fraud and corporate malfeasance over the years. See Hawley
Troxell's Motion, pp. 19-20. However, the authority cited by Hawley Troxell has no
application to Reed Taylor's valid and perfected security interests.

4.

Reed Taylor's Claimed Property Is Identifiable As A Specific Chattel.

As set forth above, Reed Taylor has a security interest in virtually everything
As indicated in Reed Taylor's Complaint, Hawley Troxell has been aiding and abetting John Taylor and
others for years in the commission of various torts, including, fraudulent conveyances (e.g., $1.5 MiJ1ion to
CropUSA), fraud, conspiracy, and other torts-aJI to benefit themselves, John Taylor and other responsible
individuals, and all to the direct detriment of Reed Taylor.

8
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ovmed by the corporations, all of wlllch are clearly identifiable by and through bank
statements, money transfers, and loan proceeds (i.e., money laundering through the
unlawful loan from CropUSA whereby Hawley Troxell assisted in the transaction and
provided the purported legal services for all of the conflicting and diverging interests).

K Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled Conspiracy And Aiding And Abetting
Conspiracy.
1.

Hawley Troxell Has Engaged In Civil Conspiracy.

Idaho law is well settled on claims for civil conspiracy and the minimal pleading
requirements. Argonaut Insurance Company v. White, 86 Idaho 374,379,386 P.2d 964
(1963) ("In the instant case it is alleged that injury resulted from acts done in pursuance
of the conspiracy" and the "order dismissing the complaint is reversed"); Lorang v. Hays,
69 Idaho 440, 449, 209 P.2d 733 (1949) ("a concerted series of action on the part of
wrongdoers, which culminates in producing the injury complained of... pursuant to a
conspiracy."); Kloppenburg v. Mays, 60 Idaho 19, 88 P.2d 513 (1939) (an agreement
becomes a conspiracy when its purpose is to do something that is unlawful or some
lawful thing in an unlawful manner).
Attorneys are also subject to liability for claims of civil conspiracy. See e.g.,
TraZ/b v. Washington, 591 S.E. 2d 382, 387 (Ga App. 2003); Banco Popular North
America v. Gandi, 876 A.2d 253 (N.Y. 2005) (recognizing a cause of action for a
conspiracy). In one treatise, civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting are distinguished:
Civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting are varieties of concerted-action
liability. The prime distinction between civil conspiracy and aiding and
abetting is that a conspiracy involves an agreement to participate in a
wrongful activity or to commit a tortious act, while aiding and abetting
focuses on whether a defendant knowingly gives' substantial assistance' to
someone who performs wrongful conduct, not on whether the defendant
agrees to join the wrongful conduct.
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See 15A CJ.S. Conspiracy § 3 (2008) (emphasis added).
Like aiding and abetting. Hawley Troxell attempts to confuse Reed Taylor's
conspiracy claim by citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions.
discussed above. Idaho law is well settled on conspiracy claims.

However. as
Reed Taylor's

Complaint alleges causes of action against Hawley Troxell for conspiracy, which are both
personal to Reed Taylor and which he is pursuing in place of the corporations for his
benefit. The agreement Hawley Troxell entered into involves the alleged "Joint Defense
Agreement," "Joint Retainer Agreement" and their purported direct and indirect improper
representation of John Taylor and other individuals for the purpose of interfering with
Reed Taylor's contractual rights and unlawfully protecting the interests of John Taylor,
thereby preventing claims from being asserted against Hawley Troxell and covering up
years .of inappropriate representation and opinion letters.

Moreover, the conspiracy

involves 'covering up and perpetuating fraud, conversion, and other claims, as set forth in
Reed Taylor'S Complaint See e.g., Complaint, pp. 7-8

n 19-20; p. 21 n 47-49.

Similarly, while practicing law is generally a lawful activity, practicing law
becomes illegal when done so in an illegal manner, as set forth in Reed Taylor's
Complaint. ThuS, although entering into a joint defense agreement is generally
permissible, the same joint defense agreement can also be improperly used to illegally or
unlawfully practice law.

2.

Contrary To Hawley Troxell's Assertions, Reed Taylor Has
Sufficiently Pled Conspiracy.

Hawley Troxell challenges Reed Taylor'S conspiracy claim on various theories.

1

relating to an attorney being protected by merely giving advice to a client. See Hawley
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Troxell's Motion pp. 14-15. As with Hawley Troxell's other arguments, the authority it
relies upon deals with traditional cases with facts and legal issues significantly
distinguishable. However, as discussed above, Hawley Troxell's acts do not merely
involve providing legal advice. Indeed, Hawley Troxell was not, and is not, authorized to
represent AIA Services or AIA Insurance, and all of its acts are actionable.
Notwithstanding this fact, Hawley Troxell has exceeded any purported scope of
representation and engaged in conspiring with John Taylor, CropUSA and others to
commit various torts and retain property in which Reed Taylor holds a valid and
perfected security interest. 9
L. Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled Tortious Interference And Aiding And
Abetting Tortious Interference.
1.

Reed Taylor Has Pled Tortious Interference With A Contract.

A prima facie case of the tort [of interfering with a contract] is established where
the plaintiff adduces proof of the following elements:
(a) Existence of a contract, (b) knowledge of the contract on the part of the
defendant, (c) intentional interference causing a breach of the contract, and
(d) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach.
Jensen v. Westberg, 115 Idaho 1021, 1028, 772 P.2d 228 (1988). Reed Taylor concedes

that the above elements are required to make a prima facie case for tortious interference
with a contract They are not required to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to LR.C.P.
12(b)(6). Nevertheless, Reed Taylor has one again sufficiently pled the cause of action,
contrary to Hawley Troxell's assertions. See Hawley Troxell's Motion, pp. 15-17. As
with all of Reed Taylor's causes of action, he incorporates by reference each fact in the
Surprisingly, Hawley Troxell even admits that it assisted in the improper titling and pledging of the $1.5
Million Mortgage to CropUSA-the same mortgage that was acquired with funds in which Reed Taylor
had a security interest and the estate of The Universe, another subsidiary of AlA Services whose shares and
all distributions thereto were pledged to Reed Taylor. See Hawley TroxelJ's Answer, p. 8,139.

9
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Complaint necessary to support each cause of action. See Complaint, p. 1.
With respect to the first and second elements, Reed Taylor pleads the existence of
contracts. See e.g., Complaint, p. 3, 11 11-12; p. 4, 1'13-14; p. 17,138; p. 21,

'lI 48.

Surprisingly,. Hawley Troxell even admits to baving knowledge of Amended Stock
Pledge Agreement 10 See Hawley Troxelrs Answer, p. 4, ,. 13. Thus, the first and second
elements are not only pled, but satisfied for purposes of the Amended Stock Pledge
Agreement With respect to the third element, Reed Taylor bas also specifically pled
intentionally interferences. See e.g., Complaint, p. 4, .. 14; p. 5, .. 15; p. 9, 'lI 23; p. 16, 'II
37; p. 17; .. 38; p. 21, 'II 48. Finally, Reed Taylor bas pled the final element of damages.

See e.g., Complaint, p. 17, , 38; p.11, 127(1); p. 12, '128; pp. 25-26. Thus, Reed Taylor
bas pled all four elements of tortious interference with a contract (as to him and the
corporations).

2.

Hawley' Troxen Has Tortiously Interfered With Reed Taylor's
Contractual Rights By And Through Its Purported Representation
And Improper Assistance Of John Taylor And CropUSA.

Employees and agents are third-parties when acting outside of their scope of
authority. See e.g., Houser v. City of Redmond, 91 Wn.2d 36,586 P.2d 482, 484 (Wa.
1978). As the purported (and unauthorized) agent for CropUSA, AIA Services and AlA
Insurance, Hawley Troxell has tortiously interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights
with AlA Services and AIA Insurance by exceeding all scope of representation and
without proper authorization. By representing CropUSA (and John Taylor), Hawley
Troxell has intentionally interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights. Moreover,
Hawley Troxell has also intentionally interfered with Reed Taylor's contractual rights .

10

Hawley Troxell does not admit to baving knowledge of the $6M Note. Restructure Agreement, Amended

Security Agreement or any other agreements.
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through its unauthorized representation of AlA Services and AlA Insurance. Finally, and
not exhaustively, Hawley Troxell has interfered with Reed Taylor's rights to be a board
member of AlA Services, interfered with his rights to possession of commission
collateral, and interfered with his rights involving the $1.2 Million Mortgage, among
various others. In sum, Hawley Troxell is essentially unlawfully and inappropriately only
representing John Taylor and his constituents.

M. Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled Fraud And Aiding And Abetting
Fraud.
Generally, a plaintiff must plead the following nine elements in order to state a
claim for fraud:
(1) a statement or representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality;
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that
there be reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement;
(7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury.

Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007) (holding that
misrepresentations and discrepancies in corporate financial statements precluded
summary judgment in buyer's action for fraud). II
However, Idaho Courts have long recognized "constructive fraud" as an
alternative cause of action to common law "fraud" and that "constructive fraud" does not
require a plaintiff to plead the nine elements of cornmon law "fraud." See e.g., Smith v.

Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d 1299 (1977); McGhee v. McGhee, 82
Idaho 367, 371, 353 P.2d 760 (1960) (recognizing constructive fraud as an alternative
cause of action to fraud and that the requirement of pleading and proving all nine
elements of fraud "is not the case"); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 61, 415 P.2d 698
11 The causes of action in Reed Taylor's Complaint are based upon constructive fraud. However, Reed
Taylor will also plead traditional frauds claims in hls Amended Complaint for other specific act, including
those that have occurred since Reed Taylor :filed hls initial Complaint.
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(1966)(a promise to build a house to certain standards constitutes "constructive fraud"
when the builder failed to do so).
Moreover, a cause of action under "constructive fraud" is ruscussed in significant
detail in numerous treatises (which are frequently followed and cited by the Idaho
Supreme Court):
Constructive fraud is a breach of duty which, irrespective of moral guilt,
the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive, to violate
confidence, or to injure public interests.
Constructive fraud is fraud that arises by operation of law from conduct,
which if sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage. It
is a breach of legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral guilt
of the fraud feasor, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to
deceive others, to violate public or private confidence, or to injure public
interests. The legal duty may arise from a statute, a contract, or a trust.
To establish constructive fraud, it is necessary only to prove acts of fraud.
Neither actual rushonesty of purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential
element. Thus, a party whose actions constitute constructive fraud might
still have acted in good faith ...
37 C.J.S. Fraud § 5 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (emphasis added).
Constructive fraud is defined as an act done or omitted that amounts to
positive fraud, or is construed as a fraud by the court because of its
detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence,
even though the act is not done or omitted with an actual design to
perpetrate positive fraud or injury upon other persons. Otherwise stated,
"constructive fraud" arises by operation of law from a course of conduct
which, if sanctioned by law, would secure an unconscionable advantage,
irrespective of the existence or evidence of actual intent to defraud.
Constructive fraud, sometimes called legal fraud, is nevertheless fraud,
although it rests upon presumption and rests less upon furtive intent than
does moral or actual fraud. It is presumed from the relation of the parties
to a transaction or from the circumstances under which it takes place.
Constructive fraud arises on a breach of duty by one in a confidential or
fiduciary relationship to another that induces justifiable reliance by the
other to his or her prejUdice.
The conscience is not necessarily affected by it. Indeed, it has been said
that constructive fraud generally involves a mere mistake of fact. It
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requires neither actual dishonesty nor intent to deceive. being a breach of
legal or equitable duty that. irrespective of the moral guilt of the
wrongdoer, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive
others, to injure public interests, or to violate public or private confidence.
In its generic sense, constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions, and
concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or
Hence, the terms
confidence that results in damage to another.
"constructive fraud" and «legal fraud" both connote that in certain
circumstances one may be charged with the consequences of his words
and acts as though he has spoken or acted fraudulently, although, properly
speaking, his conduct does not merit this opprobrium.
If there is any distinction to be found between the terms "constructive"
and "legal" as applied to fraud, it probably amounts to this: Breach of a
fiduciary relationship or of a contract uberrimae fidei is usually called
"constructive fraud," whereas the term "legal fraud" is generally used to
characterize a misrepresentation made without knowledge of its falsity.
Constructive fraud may result from reckless and heedless representations,
although they are not made with a deliberate intent to deceive.
37 Am. Jr. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 9 (2007) (internal foot notes omitted) (emphasis
added). Similarly, attorneys are liable for the aiding and abetting of constructive fraud.
See Hearst v. Hearst, 50 AD. 3d 959, 857 N.Y.S. 596 (N.Y. 2008).

Hawley Troxell has assisted John Taylor and others in the commission of fraud,
including constructive fraud, which simply requires a duty and funds being
inappropriately diverted or utilized. Reed Taylor has sufficiently pled these claims.
N. Reed Taylor Has Sufficiently Pled Claims For Malpractice.

For all of the reasons identified in this Response, Reed Taylor has standing to
pursue any beneficiary claims and direct claims against Hawley Troxell for malpractice
claims owned by AlA Insurance and AlA Services.

12

Nevertheless, Hawley Troxell cites

12 Reed Taylor concedes that his independent malpractice claims asserted against Hawley Troxell are thinly
supported by the third-party beneficiary and related authority cited above. However, the undersigned was
also unable to find a single case in which a creditor was owed millions of dollars by a highly insolvent
corporation, a creditor had a security interest in funds being converted and improperly utilized by the
defendant law fum, and the other significant facts in this case. That being said, Reed Taylor is still entitled
to bring direct claims against Hawley Troxell in lieu of derivative claims as be is the only person entitled to
receive any damages from the numerous harms.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS - 52
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

significant authority on malpractice claims and the requirement for privity. See Hawley
Troxell's Motion, p. 23-27.

Reed Taylor concedes that any claims against Hawley

Troxell for malpractice arising from its purported representation of AIA Services would
only be warranted by way of the extreme facts in this case (facts not seen in other cases).
However, this is not true with AIA Insurance because of Reed Taylor's special standing
as a pledgee, director, officer and secured creditor of AIA Insurance's shares and assets.

o.

Reed Taylor Has Alleged Valid Claims Under The Unfair Trade
Practices Act.

Hawley Troxell moves to dismiss Reed Taylor's claim as if the incredible facts
supporting the claims alleged by Reed Taylor did not exist.

See Hawley Troxell's

Motion to Dismiss, pp. 21-23. However, like Hawley Troxell's other arguments, Reed
Taylor has alleged valid claims and the facts to support such claims.13

1. Reed Taylor Has Alleged A Valid Claim Against Hawley Troxell For
Unfair Trade Practices.
Courts do not afford attorneys blanket immunity from claims brought by opposing
parties under the unfair trade practices acts. See e.g., Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager,
288 Conn. 69, 95-96, 95 A.2d 1, 20-21 (Conn. 2008); Burns ex reI Office of Public

Guardian v. Hale and Dorr LLP, 445 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.Ct. Mass. 2006) (allegations by a
guardian for disabled minor against law fum and trust manager demonstrated
recklessness necessary to establish claim under unfair trade act); St. Paul Fire and

Marine Ins. Co. v. Ellis & Ellis, 262 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2001); Campos v. Brooksbank, 120
F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Ct. N.M. 2000) (attorney's misleading conduct violated unfair
practices act); see also Burnap v. Linnartz, 38 S.W.3d 612, 619-20.

In Chapman

13 Hawley Troxell's arguments only pertain to the issue of contractual privity. Legal representation does
not necessarily involve a contract
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Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 95 A.2d 1, 20-21 (Conn. 2008) citing Mozzochi v. Beck, 204
Conn. 490, 529 A.2d 171 (Conn. 1987) (other internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added).the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a judgment against a debtor's attorney
under the Unfair Trade Practices Act:
[TJhis court's refusal to permit litigants to raise claims against opposing
counsel under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act cannot be
construed, as the defendant suggests, as affording blanket immunity to
attorneys for tortious acts they commit against third parties while
representing clients. Rather, the evidence shows that the defendant
negotiated, and directed his client to execute, a note and mortgage relating
to property that the defendant knew the client did not own...
Here, Reed Taylor's cause of action survives as an exception to the general rule
that a contract is necessary. The facts in this case are far more extreme than any of the
cases cited above and are easily distinguished from any cases cited by Hawley Troxell.

2. Reed Taylor Has Alleged A Valid Direct Claim For UDlair Trade
Practices Against Hawley Troxell
Under the same legal authority and argument above and Idaho's Unfair Trade
Practices Act, Reed Taylor is entitled to bring claims directly against Hawley Troxell for
its violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act involving its purported representation of
AIA Insurance and AIA Services, i.e., Reed Taylor should be permitted to bring AIA
Services and AIA Insurance's claims directly against Hawley Troxell by way of being a
stock pledgee, secured creditor, creditor of an insolvent corporation, the only authorized
officer and director of AlA Insurance, and the only person/creditor entitled to any
recovered damages. All of the actions taken by Hawley Troxell have directly damaged
Reed Taylor in a distinct and special manner. None of Hawley Troxell's actions were
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authorized. Moreover, Reed Taylor's direct claims will prevent duplicative litigation and
there are no other bona-fide parties entitled to the assets or claims of the companies. 14

P. Although Reed Taylor's Complaint States Valid Causes Of Action, He
Requests Leave To File An Amended Complaint To Clarify Facts And
Causes Of Action.
The twin purposes behind the court rule governing amendments to pleadings are
to allow claims to be determined on the merits rather than on technica1iti~s, and to make
pleadings serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the
facts at issue. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 P 2d 1197
(1999). If a complaint is capable of being amended to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, a refusal to grant permission to amend would deprive a plaintiff of a
substantial right Markstaller v. Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129, 135, 326 P.2d 994 (1958).
As long as the proposed amendment states a valid claim, a court may not consider the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the proposed claim. Christensen Family Trust v.

Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 872, 993 P.2d 1197 (1999) Citing Dzdfin v. Idaho
Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1013, 895 P2d 1195, 1206 (1995) (emphasis
added). "Great liberty should be shown in allowing amendments to pleadings in
furtherance of justice between parties." Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 149, 350 P.2d 348
(1960).
Here, Reed Taylor's Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support all of his causes
of action against Hawley Troxell. Nevertheless, Reed Taylor requests leave to file an
amended complaint to clarify facts and causes of action against Hawley Troxell, cure any

14 In the unlikely event that Reed Taylor is able to recover sufficient funds and assets to satisfy his
$9,000,000 debt, he will ensure that any other funds are first paid to Donna Taylor, the priority shareholder.
and deposit the remaining funds in the Court's registry for other innocent shareholders.
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alleged deficiencies, and add additional causes of action and facts. IS
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Hawley Troxell's Motion to Dismiss should be
denied in full.

DATED

Iv!

tbi~

day of October, 2008.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KlRBY PLLC

Data\I3lS\J322\n:sporu1c.m1n dismiss.FlNAL.doc

15 A motion to amend and supplement complaint will be filed before the hearing and a draft version of the
proposed amended complaint will be filed at that time. The amended complaint will clarify facts, clarify
and add causes of action, and include additional facts ascertained since the Complaint was filed
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of October, 2008, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to the following:

ZL

James D. LaRue
Elam & Burke. PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83704

HAND DELIVERY
_ _ U.S. MAIL
_ _ OVERNIGHT MAIL
_ _ FAX TRANSMISSION
"2S EMAIL (.pdfattachment)
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MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 576-2 , , < . ' ",.-d," ~ ,::"~,,,::::.::,7~,~
CAMPBELL. BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC ~H~, 1Y' - '.' '
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TAYLOR, an individual;
Case No.: CV08-01765
Plaintiff,

v.
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRlCK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;

PLAINTIFF REED J. TAYLOR'S
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF
LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Defendants.
Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Reed Taylor") moves the Court for an Order to Amend
and Supplement his Complaint in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A

I. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON
This Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion. the attached Exhibit
A, and the Court's fIle.

PLAINTIFF REED 1. TAYLOR'S
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF
LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT· l
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ll. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT
"[A] party may amend a pleading only by leave of the court ... and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires ... " LRC.P. 15(a). Similarly, a party may move to
supplement a "pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have
happened since the date of the pJeading sough to be supplemented ... " I.R.C.P. 15(d).
"Great liberty should be shown in allowing amendments to pleadings in furtherance of
justice between parties." Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 149,350 P.2d 348 (1960).
Here, Reed Taylor is moving the Court to amend his Complaint in the form
attached hereto as Exhibit A. The purpose of the amendment is to: (1) clarify and
expand the claims and causes of action; and (2) add derivative claims.
Justice requires that Reed Taylor be permitted to file his Amended Complaint.

DATED this

lC'ty of October, 2008.
CAMPBELL, BISSE

& KIRBY PLLC

c el S. Bissell
ttomeys for Plaintiff

Daml13 J5\J322lmtn.nmcnd complninldoc
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CERTmCATE OF SERVICE

I :HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I~day of October, 2008, r caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document with attachment to the
following:
_ _ HAND DELIVERY
.,/' U.S.MAIL

OVERNIGHT MAIL
- - FAX TRANSMISSION
.,/' EMAIL (.pdf attachment)

James D. LaRue
Elam & Burke, PA

P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83704

PLAINTIFFREEDJ. TAYLOR'S
MOTIONANDMEMO~UMOF

LAW TO AMEND COMPLAINT - 3

71/"
INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, W A 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Reed Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, who is
bringing this action on behalf of himself and
on behalf of the creditors and/or shareholders
of AIA Services Corporation and AIA
Insurance, Inc.;

Case No.: CV08-01765
~TAMENDEDCO~~FOR

DAMAGES

JURy TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiff,

v.
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V.
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A.
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X,
unknown individuals;
Hawley Troxell.

I. FACTS
1.

Reed Taylor, by and through his attorneys of record, CAMPBELL,

BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC, alleges as follows (all allegations and claims asserted below
are incorporated by reference into each cause of action, remedy and/or requested relief to

EXHIBIT
FIRST AMENDED COMJ>LAINT - 1
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A

the extent neceSSlli'l' to support each such cause of action, remedy and/or requested
relief):
2.

Reed Taylor ("Reed Taylor") is a resident of Lewiston, Nez Perce County,

Idaho. Reed Taylor is bringing this action on behalf of himself individually and on
behalf of all shareholders and creditors of AlA Services Corporation ("AIA Services")
and AIA Insurance, Inc. ("AIA Insurance"). Reed Taylor is an elderly person as defined

in I.C. § 48-608.
3.

Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ("Hawley TroxeU") is an Idaho

limited liability partnership in the business of practicing law.

Hawley Troxell is

Yicariously liable for the acts of the indiYidual Hawley Troxell. Hawley Troxell has
purportedly acted as counsel for AIA Services, AlA Insurance and CropUSA Insurance
Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA").
4.

Defendant Gary D. Babbitt ("Babbitt") is an individual residing in the

state of Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley
Troxell.
5.

Defendant D. John Ashby ("Ashby") is an individual residin~ in the state

of Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley
Troxell.
6.

Defendant Patrick V. Collins ("Collins") is an individual residing in the

state of Idaho and is an attorney practicing law in the state of Idaho with and for Hawley
TroxelL
7.

Defendant Richard A. Riley ("Riley") is an individual residing in the state

ofIdabo and is an attorney in the state ofIdaho with and for Hawley Troxell.

FIRST AMENDED COlv1PLAINT - 2

INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

7'11!

8.

Jane Does IwX are unknown individuals who are and/or were attorneys that

participated in the tortious acts and conduct alleged against the above known Hawley
Troxell with and for Hawley Troxell who are also responsible for the claims and
damages. (All of the Defendants are collectively referred to as "Hawley Troxell" or "its"
or "Defendants").

9.

Hawley Troxell transacted business through the practice of law in Nez

Perce County, Idaho, and have an expectation of being named as defendants in Nez Perce
County, Idaho.

Hawley Troxell committed tortious acts, exceeded the scope of any

purported representation, andior assisted in the commission of tortious acts in Nez Perce
County, Idaho. Hawley Troxell's tortious acts andlor assistance have inflicted damages
upon a resident of Nez Perce County, Idaho.
10.

Damages in this action exceed $10,000.

Jurisdiction and venue are,

therefore, appropriate in Nez Perce County District Court. To the extent that there are any
conflicts or discrepancies alleged in this Complaint, they are to be construed as
alternative relief, claims, remedies and damages being sought against Hawley Troxell
(i.e., if Hawley Troxell had authority to represent AlA Services or AIA Insurance, then it
still committed certain torts and breached duties).

However, no allegations in this

Complaint should be construed as any admission by Reed Taylor or any of the
corporations that Hawley Troxell ever bad authority to represent AIA Services or AlA
Insurance.

11.

AIA Services is a closely held Idaho corporation. AIA Insurance is a

ciosely held Idaho corporation. The present purported officers and directors of AIA
Insurance and AIA Services (R. John Taylor "John Taylor", Connie Taylor, James Beck,

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT - 3
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IoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman) are interested parties by way of their tortious acts and
ownership of shares in CropUSA. Thus, a direct action for certain claims is appropriate
because, among other reasons set forth in this Complaint, any funds recovered should not
be placed in the hands of the foregoing parties.
12.

AIA Services has pledged all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance

that it owns to Reed Taylor pursuant to a $6 Million Promissory Note dated August I,
1995, the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement, the Amended and Restated
Security Agreement, the Restructure Redemption Agreement, and Series A Preferred
Shareholder Agreement (all of the foregoing, ancillary documents and related documents
are collectively referred to as the "Redemption Agreements").
13.

At all relevant times of the transactions and causes of action set forth in

this Complaint, Reed Taylor was the sole pledgee of all of AIA Insurance's outstanding
shares and the only secured creditors of AIA Services and AIA Insurance entitled to the
commissions and related receivables received by the corporations and all proceeds related
thereto. As a stock pledgee and the sole stock pledgee of AlA Insurance's shares, Reed
Taylor is entitled to bring derivative and/or direct claims as a shareholder since a pledgee
is entitled to all of the rights and protections of a shareholder, in addition to the individual
rights to protect coUateral. As the sole pledgee of all shares of AlA Insurance, Reed
Taylor is entitled to recover and possess all funds, damages and/or property recovered
from all direct and derivative causes of action.
14.

As a creditor of the insolvent AIA Services owed over $8,500,000 and a

secured creditor of the insolvent AlA Services, Reed Taylor is entitled to bring derivative
andlor direct claims against responsible parties in the place of, or on behalf of, AlA
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Services. Reed Taylor is the only person entitled to the recovery of funds, damages, and
the like because of being (a) the only creditor with a security interest in AlA Insurance;
(b) the only creditor with a security interest in all past, present and future commissions

and related receivables of AlA Services and AIA Insurance; (c) the only creditor with a
security interest in all of the shares of AIA Services' subsidiaries and all dividends and
distributions related to such shares, including, without limitation the $1.2 Million
Mortgage received from the estate of The Universe; (d) a long standing creditor with
substantial contractual rights, which such rights and amounts owed to Reed Taylor were
specifically detailed in the financial statements of AIA Services since 1995, thereby
placing other creditors on notice of his superior claims; (e) the only person with priority
over all assets, funds and claims of AlA Services by way of the Subordination Agreement
with Donna Taylor; and (f) the creditor who is owed over $8,500,000.
15.

To the extent that any bona-fide creditor or shareholders come forward

with any interests superior to Reed Taylor or to the extent that any dispute may arise
between Reed Taylor and other creditors, Reed Taylor will, without waiving any legal
rights or remedies as a pledgee, creditor and secured creditor, either (a) pay the
creditor(s) in his sole discretion; (b) seek a determination under the law of the priority or
rights to any payments or funds; (c) deposit the subject funds andlor property with the
Court for a determination of priority or rightful possession pursuant to an interpleader
action; or (d) take such other reasonable actions as necessary under the law.
16.

Although Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,

Connie Taylor and James Beck are inappropriately and fraudulently asserting that Reed
Taylor has no rights because his redemption was allegedly illegal (which Reed Taylor
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denies and the applicable law does not support) in an attempt to avoid the causes of
action, claims, remedies and damages being pursued against them for misappropriating
the assets, funds, services and opportunities of AlA Service andior AlA Insurance, Reed
Taylor will move the Court to deposit all funds and property recovered from Hawley
Troxell until the illegality issue has either been withdrawn, voluntarily dismissed, or a
determination has been made by the Court in Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. The evidence
will show that the redemption was not illegal and that Hawley Troxell and the other
parties (including John Taylor and JoLee Dudos' alleged intervention) are simply
attempting to find any way to delay andior thwart Reed Taylor'S valid rights and causes
of action, and fraudulently avoid all of their unlawful acts and years of misappropriation
of AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance's assets, funds, services andior opportunities.
17.

AIA Services' financial condition far exceeds the "zone of insolvency" as

Reed Taylor is owed over $9,000,000 and the present fair-market value of AIA Services'
assets are $6,000,000, less than the amount owed Reed Taylor. But for the unlawful
actions of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos,
Bryan Freeman and other parties to protect their own interests, AIA Services should be in
bankruptcy under close scrutiny of a trustee. Hawley Troxell has :fuJI knowledge of
intimate details of the inappropriate andlor unlawful transfer of millions of dollars of ALA
Services andior AIA Insurance's assets, funds and services to Crop USA, John Taylor and
other parties.
18.

On July 21, 2008, Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor served a derivative

demand letter upon the purported board of directors of AlA Services and AIA Insurance
to take various actions, including specified actions against Hawley Troxell. John Taylor,
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Michael Cashman, James Beck and all responsible parties for various tortious acts and
the recovery of misappropriated assets, funds, services and/or compensation.

Reed

Taylor has also made other written demands upon the purported boards of AlA Services
and AIA Insurance to take action. and no actions have been taken. Reed Taylor has also
made substantial non-frivolous claims against the responsible parties in Taylor v. AM

Services, et al., but no actions have been taken as a result of the claims or allegations.
However, the purported boards of AIA Services and AIA Insurance have failed to act and
have failed to conduct the corporations in a responsible manner consistent with the law.
19.

The purported relevant past and present board members and officers of

AlA Insurance and AIA Services have failed to conduct shareholder meetings, failed to
properly disclose facts and transactions to the shareholders, and have continued to do so
even after Complaints were filed and with the full knowledge of Hawley Troxell. The
past and present responsible board members and officers have never advised the
shareholders or creditors of the misappropriation of corporate assets, funds, opportunities,
services and claims which should be pursued.

20.

Because of the fact that the relevant past and present purported board

members of AIA Services and AIA Insurance have a vested interest in not pursing claims

against themselves or the attorneys that have unlawfully assisted them and have utterly
and completely failed to do so, Reed Taylor believes that he and Donna Taylor will be
the only parties to pursue the valid claims because the claims will never be pursued by

the parties currently purported to manage AIA Services and AIA Insurance. This action
is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the state of Idaho which it would
otherwise not have.
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21.

Although Reed Taylor is the only authorized director and officer of AIA

Insurance and that the actions of AIA Services' board of directors is not authorized, Reed
Taylor is pursuing claims under this Complaint as though the directors were not
authorized to act and, to the extent that the boards were authorized, then the actions were
unlawful, inappropriate and exceeded the scope of any agency act on behalf of AlA
Services and AIA Insurance.
22.

Hawley Troxell's acts, omissions, and torts alleged in this Complaint

exceed any purported attorney-client relationship and are not protected by any litigition
privilege or immunities.

Hawley Troxell's purported legal representation was never

authorized by the proper boards of AIA Services or AIA Insurance.

Any purported

waivers Hawley Troxell has obtained were not received by authorized andlor
disinterested representatives of AIA Services and AlA Insurance, and were not
authorized.

23.

To the extent that Hawley Troxell obtained any waivers or consents, its

purported legal representation exceeded the scope of any representation that was in the
best interests of AIA Services or AIA Insurance. By taking direction from John Taylor,
Connie Taylor andlor James Beck, Hawley Troxell knew that any purported
representation was not, and could not, be in the best interests of AIA Services or AlA
Insurance thereby exceeding any scope of purported representation.
24.

AlA Services and AIA Insurance's purported agents, boards andlor

officers, in which Hawley Troxell allegedly relied upon, exceeded the scope of all proper
acts as agents, board members and officers of AlA Services and AlA Insurance, which
further resulted in Hawley Troxell's acts exceeding the scope of any authorized legal
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andlor attorney-client representation. AU of the actions of Hawley Troxell, John Taylor,
Connie Taylor and James Beck were outside of the scope of their authorized acts and
duties.
25.

Reed Taylor's Complaint is comprised of three types of claims: (a) those

claims and damages personal and individual to Reed Taylor; (b) those claims and
damages that are personal to Reed Taylor and AlA Services andlor AIA Insurance, but
which are being brought by Reed Taylor directly against Hawley Troxell; and (c) those
claims that are owned only by AlA Services and/or AIA Insurance, but which are being
prosecuted by Reed Taylor derivatively on behalf of AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance.
26.

In addition, Reed Taylor will also pursue claims that are derivatively

being prosecuted on behalf of AIA Insurance directly on behalf of AIA Insurance should
he gain control of the company in the near future.

To the extent that funds and/or

property is recovered that exceed the amounts owed to Reed Taylor, he will deposit such

funds andlor property with the Court for the distribution to innocent shareholders of AIA
Services.

27.

Hawley Troxell is not, and has never been, authorized to represent AIA

Insurance or AIA Services in Taylor v. AlA Services, et af. Hawley Troxell is not, and
has not, represented the interests of AIA Insurance or AIA Services, but instead has
represented the interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman,
JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA and other interested parties.

28.

As the only authorized officer and board member of AIA Insurance, Reed

Taylor, has Dot and will not authorize or consent to Hawley Troxell as being attorneys for
AIA Insurance or representing the company in any fashion. As a person who is required

FmSTAMENDEDCOMPL~-9

INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

712~

to be a member of the board of AIA Services, Reed Taylor has not and will not authorize
Hawley Troxell to represent AIA Services.

Thus, Hawley Troxell has no scope of

representation because it is unlawfully representing AIA Services and AlA Insurance.
29.

Reed Taylor is the pledgee of aU of the shares of AlA Insurance, the only

shareholder of AIA Insurance by way of holding all of its shares as collateral, the only
officer and director of AlA Insurance, and by far the largest and only secured creditor of
AIA Services (Reed Taylor is owed over $8,500,000 and AlA Services is insolvent).
AIA Services and AIA Insurance's value and net assets are insufficient to pay the over
$8,500,000, plus interest and attorneys' fees and costs, owed to Reed Taylor. Therefore,
Reed Taylor is entitled to bring certain claims directly against Hawley Troxell for certain
damages.
30.

At all material times, Reed Taylor was owed over $6,000,000 by AIA

Services through a promissory note dated August 1, 1995.

Reed Taylor is presently

owed over $8,500,000 by AlA Services. At all material times, Hawley Troxell had :full
knowledge of AJA Services' debt and contractual obligations owed to Reed Taylor.

31.

AlA Services defaulted on the terms of the $6.000,000 promissory note

when it failed to pay the promissory note upon maturity on August 1, 2005. Although a
formal demand was unnecessary since the $6,000,000 promissory note matured on
August 1, 2005, demand for payment was properly served upon AIA Services by Reed
Taylor on December 12, 2006, a copy of which was also provided to Defendant Riley at
the law firm of Eberle Berlin pursuant to the notice provisions of the Redemption
Agreements. AIA Services was insolvent in 2001, and has continued to be insolvent
from said date.
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32.

Since 1996, as security for the over $8,500,000 owed by AIA Services,

Reed Taylor was granted and possessed a security interest in all of the stock of AIA
Insurance and all of the commissions and related receivables of AlA Insurance and AlA
Services. Pursuant to the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement dated July 1,
1996, Reed Taylor had the contractual right upon default of AIA Services to vote the
stock of AIA Insurance, and take operational control of AIA Insurance. Reed Taylor's
right to vote the stock of AlA Insurance was also perfected through AIA Services'
irrevocable power of attorney granted to Reed Taylor that was coupled with an interest as
required by I.C § 30-1-722.
33.

On February 22,2007, Reed Taylor voted the stock of AlA Insurance and

attempted to take control of it pursuant to his contractual rights as provided under the
law, the contract documents, and I.C. § 30-1-722. However, the interested directors of

AlA Insurance (including John Taylor) by and through Hawley Troxell intentionally
assisted in breaching the terms of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
and refused to acknowledge Reed Taylor's valid vote of the stock of AIA Insurance and
refused to surrender control as required.

34.

Hawley Troxell further engaged in inappropriate conduct in assisting

interested parties (including John Taylor) in obtaining and/or maintaining a restraining
order and preliminary injunction against Reed Taylor, when Hawley Troxell knew there
was no legitimate legal basis to do so, that doing so was an intentional violation and
tortious interference with Reed Taylor's contractual rights, and that the assets and funds
of AlA Insurance were being misappropriated andlor not safeguarded.

35.

Reed Taylor has a pending civil action against AIA Services, AIA
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Insurance, CropUSA, John Taylor, and others for claims of fraud, fraudulent conveyance,
civil conspiracy, conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims under Nez
Perce County Case No. CV-07-00208 ("Taylor v. AM Services, et af. "), and therein Reed
Taylor obtained an order of partial summary judgment for AlA Services' default of the
$6,000,000 promissory note and corresponding default of the Amended and Restated
Stock Pledge Agreement. By way of this partial summary judgment and/or his prior vote
of the stock, Reed Taylor would and should be in actual control of AIA Insurance but for
the actions of John Taylor, which Hawley Troxell, with full knowledge of Reed Taylor's
rights, facilitated and aided and abetted to the detriment of AlA Services, AIA Insurance
and Reed Taylor.

36.

With Hawley Troxell's full knowledge, Reed Taylor's claims asserted in

Taylor v. AlA Services, et aT. included claims for breaches of fiduciary duty, conspiracy,
fraudulent conveyance,

and fraud perpetrated by John Taylor and others (including

CropUSA), including but not limited to claims that John Taylor had wrongfully
transferred over $1,500,000 of AlA Insurance's cash to CropUSA, for no consideration
and had transferred approximately $700,000 of the assets of AIA Insurance to CropUSA
for no consideration. John Taylor was at all times material also an interested director,
officer and. shareholder of CropUSA. Also included in the civil action were other claims
that John Taylor and others had engaged in self-dealing and/or fraudulent transactions
with AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance to the detriment of the corporations and Reed
Taylor, and for the personal benefit of John Taylor and other interested parties (including
CropUSA).

1/1
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37.

In 2007, Hawley Troxell appeared in the civil action, Taylor v. AIA

Services, et aI., and assumed legal representation of two distinct clients, AlA Services, a
corporation, and AlA Insurance, a corporation, and also represented the interests of Jo1m
Taylor, an individual, and other interested parties (including Connie Taylor, James Beck
and Michael Cashman). At all material times Jo1m Taylor was an interested purported
CEO and director of AIA Services and AlA Insurance and an interested majority
shareholder of AlA Services.

The civil action clearly alleged acts of fraud, civil

conspiracy, conversion, and breaches of fiduciary duty perpetrated by John Taylor and
others against AIA Services and AlA Insurance, and such acts having damaged and
continuing to cause damages to the corporations, their shareholders and creditors. In
violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and their duty of care, Hawley
Troxell undertook to represent the three named clients AIA Services, AlA Insurance, and
CropUSA, which such entities had no true cornman interests and each having
irreconcilable conflicts of interest with the other.
38.

In May 2007, Reed Taylor's attorney advised Hawley Troxell that it was

not appropriate for Hawley Troxell to represent AIA Services and AIA Insurance, andlor
to take direction from John Taylor because of various conflicts of interest and the fact
that John Taylor was an interested party with substantial claims against him. Despite the
warning and demands made by Reed Taylor's attorney, Hawley Troxell also appeared
and represented Crop USA, which created additional conflicts of interest, resulted in a
breach of Hawley Troxell's fiduciary duties (including the duty of loyalty) owed to AIA
Services and AlA Insurance, and was a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
and their duty of care.
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39.

Hawley Troxell inappropriately entered into and/or participated in a Joint

Defense Agreement(s) knowing that AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA Insurance,

Inc., J olm Taylor and other named and unnamed individuals in Taylor v. AIA Services, et

al. had clear irreconcilable conflicting and diverging interests in violation of the Ru1es of
Professional Conduct and duty of care, and to the detriment AIA Services, AIA Insurance
and Reed Taylor. In Taylor v. AIA Services, et al., a Joint Defense Agreement was not
permissible or appropriate because it would perpetuate fraud, conspiracy, aiding and
abetting, and other causes of action, was entered into without obtaining informed consent
from disinterested representatives of the corporations, and the Joint Defense Agreement
was also independently not appropriate or permitted when certain parties to a joint
defense agreement should be asserting claims against other parties to the agreement.

40.

The Joint Defense Agreement(s) facilitated by Hawley Troxell has

assisted in others (including John Taylor, James Beck, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman
and CropUSA) to perpetrate and/or hide acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances,
conversion, breaches of fiduciary duties and other claims, while also assisting Hawley
Troxell in inappropriately and unlawfully obtaining payment of fees and costs for its
services and in violation of the Ru1es of Professional Conduct and Hawley Troxell's duty
of care.

41.

Hawley Troxell assisted AIA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA, John

Taylor, and others in entering into various inappropriate agreements and transactions
which were in violation of the Rilles of Professional Conduct and its duty of care, were
not in the best interests of the corporations, not authorized by disinterested parties,
constituted fraud and/or the inappropriate transfer of assets and funds belonging to AIA
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Services andior AlA Insurance, were not arms-length transactions, andior were done so
without requiring AIA Services, AIA Insurance andior CropUSA to retain separate
independent counsel that were retained by separate independent uninterested parties.
42.

As the purported attorneys for AlA Services, an entity, Hawley Troxell

owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and
under the law to the corporation and its shareholders to preserve and protect the assets
and businesses of the corporation, and since AIA Services was insolvent, to its creditors
including Reed Taylor. As attorney for AIA Services, and in light of the claims made
against John Taylor and others by Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell owed a duty to its entity
client not to assume representation of the interests of John Taylor, individually andlor
through a Joint Defense Agreement, or with any other interested parties.
43.

As the purported attorneys for AIA Insurance, an entity, Hawley Troxell

owed duties as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care and
the law to the corporation and its shareholders including a creditor pledgee of the
corporation's stock, Reed Taylor, with contractual rights to vote the shares and assume
control and who had exercised his contractual rights and had voted the shares but whose
rights were breached and rejected by interested directors and others who were in control
of the corporation including John Taylor. As attorneys for AIA Insurance and in light of
the claims made against John Taylor and others by the Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell
owed a duty to its entity client not to assume representation of the interests of John
Taylor, individually andlor through any Joint Defense Agreement, andlor of other
interested parties (including CropUSA, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Michael
Cashman).
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44.

As attorneys representing the interests of John Taylor through a Joint

Defense Agreement, Hawley Troxell owed its duties first and foremost to its purported
clients AlA Services and AlA Insurance as provided by the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct, duty of care andlor the law. As attorneys for John Taylor by and through taking
directions andlor accepting decisions made by him knowing that he was interested and
should have claims asserted against him, and in light of the claims against John Taylor by
the Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell owed a duty to its purported corporate clients not to
assume representation of the interests of John Taylor, CropUSA or other interested
parties.

Hawley Troxell failed to notify or obtain appropriate informed consents or

approvals from appropriate parties or disinterested shareholders in violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, Hawley Troxell's duty of care, and the Bylaws and Articles of
Formation of the corporations, all to the detriment of Reed Taylor.
45.

As the purported attorneys for AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance

(individually or through any Joint Defense Agreement) Hawley Troxell owed duties of
loyalty to the corporations and could not represent John Taylor or CropUSA in Taylor v.

AM Services, et al.. or represent or assist John Taylor in Danna J. Taylor v. R. John
Taylor because Hawley Troxell's loyalty belongs exclusively to AlA Services andlor
AlA Insurance. Furthermore, Hawley Troxell could in no way represent CropUSA or
participate in any joint defense of Crop USA or other interested parties (such as John
Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, and/or Michael Cashman) as AIA Services andlor
AlA Insurance should have been asserting claims against CropUSA, each other, and other
interested and uninterested parties.
46.

Hawley Troxell represented, and continue to represent, the interests of
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John Taylor (individually and/or through a Joint Defense Agreement) and with full
knowledge that John Taylor is an interested party and director of AlA Services and AlA
Insurance and is personally inappropriately conducting and controlling the course of
litigation involving Hawley Troxell's clients, AlA Services and AlA Insurance, while
also inappropriately representing CropUSA to the detriment of the corporations and Reed
Taylor.
47.

During the course of the civil action after March 28,2007, Hawley Troxell

has coordinated and participated with Quarles & Brady LLP ("Quarles Brady"), the law

finn that has represented AlA Services and AlA Services before and throughout
litigation, and Clements, Brown & McNichols, P.A. ("Clements Brown"), the law firm
that formerly purportedly represented AIA Service and AIA Insurance in Taylor v. AU

Services, er af. During the course of the civil action after March 28, 2007, John Taylor
and others have further engaged in inappropriate and/or wrongful transactions involving
themselves, AlA Services, AIA Insurance, and CropUSA, which transactions have
occurred with Hawley Troxell's knowledge and/or assistance, and to the detriment of
AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and Reed Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee.
48.

Hawley Troxell are liable to Reed Taylor for an amount to be proven at

trial because Hawley Troxell has encouraged, conspired with, provided substantial
assistance to, and/or aided and abetted John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael
Cashman, Bryan Freeman, IoLee Duclos, AlA Services, AIA Insurance, CropUSA,
and/or other interested parties in the commission acts of fraud, fraudulent conveyances,
conversion, tortious interference, breaches of fiduciary duties, and other unlawful acts.
TIle acts offraud, fraudulent conveyances, tortious interference, conversion, and breaches
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of fiduciary duties include, but are not limited to: 1) While purporting to represent AIA
Insurance and AIA Services, Hawley Troxell assisted andlor aided and abetted John
Taylor in the tortious interference with the assertion of Reed Taylor's contractual rights
to control and operate AlA Insurance, which has proximately caused damages to Reed
Taylor; 2) While purporting to represent AIA Services and AIA Insurance, Hawley
Troxell inappropriately assisted and/or aided and abetted John Taylor and other interested
parties to engage in tortious transactions involving John Taylor, AIA Services, AIA
Insurance, and/or CropUSA. which such transactions have been to the detriment of AlA
Services, AlA Insurance, and Reed Taylor, and proximately caused damages to Reed
Taylor as creditor and stock pledgee; and 3) While representing John Taylor, individually
or through a Joint Defense Agreement, Hawley Troxell has had full knowledge that its
client is an interested party and director of AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and CropUSA,
and is personally conducting and controlling the course of litigation involving Hawley
Troxell's former clients, AIA Services and AlA Insurance, and Hawley Troxell has
assisted and/or aided and abetted John Taylor and others (including, CropUSA) and has
coordinated and participated with Hawley Troxell and Quarles & Brady in John Taylor's
engaging in tortious transactions involving himself, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and
CropUSA, which transactions have been to the detriment of AIA Services. and AIA
Insurance and proximately caused damages to Reed Taylor as a creditor and stock
pledgee.

49.

In connection with Hawley Troxell's inappropriate representation and/or

joint defense of John Taylor, AIA Services, AlA Insurance, CropUSA, and other
interested parties (including Connie Taylor, James Beck, and Michael Cashman) Hawley
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Troxell accepted payments of attorneys fees and costs believed to exceed $500,000 in
violation of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and as participating
andlor assisting in inappropriate corporate acts and the aiding and abetting of others.
50.

Over the course of the litigation in Reed Taylor v. AlA Services, et at.,

Reed Taylor's attorney in that action, Roderick C. Bond of Smith, Cannon & Bond
PLLC, advised Hawley Troxell on numerous occasions that its conduct violated Idaho
Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, was inappropriate, and constituted the
aiding and abetting of other interested and uninterested parties (including John Taylor
and CropUSA), among other potential legal claims against them. In early 2007, Reed
Taylor'S counsel advised Hawley Troxell that its inappropriate actions would result in
claims being filed against them by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor's counsel reiterated these
warnings orally and in writing on numerous occasions. Despite the warnings from Reed
Taylor's counsel, Hawley Troxell conduct persisted thereby further damaging Reed
Taylor. Hawley Troxell's disregard of Mr. Bond's warnings can only be construed as
intentional improper acts to assist John Taylor and other interested parties to the
detriment of Reed Taylor.
51.

Hawley Troxell wrongfully assisted John Taylor and other interested

parties in operating CropUSA with the funds, assets, employees, trade secrets and other
things of value inappropriately obtained from AlA Services andlor AIA Insurance, and
by assisting John Taylor and other interested parties (including CropUSA) in preventing
claims from being asserted and prosecuted against them. Hawley Troxell wrongfully
assisted andlor failed to prevent interested parties (including John Taylor) in transferring
the

long~term

employees of AIA Insurance to CropUSA, while at the same time
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representing to the Court in Taylor v. AlA Services, et al., that the corporations were
being operated properly andJor failing to advise the Court of the inappropriate acts and
transactions.

All the while Hawley Troxell was aware of and/or assisted in the

inappropriate payment of salaries. benefits, compensation, and director fees of $20,000
per year when AlA Services was insolvent.
52.

Despite Reed Taylor's demands that Hawley Troxell take action to protect

the assets and funds of AlA Services and AlA Insurance and recover funds and assets
from John Taylor, CropUSA and other interested and uninterested parties for the benefit
of the corporations and Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell refused to act in accordance with
the Rules of Profession Conduct, its duty of care, and the law. Despite Reed Taylor's
demands that interests of the minority disinterested shareholders be considered andJor
protected because of the wrongful acts of John Taylor and other interested parnes,
Hawley Troxell refused to act and failed to fully and properly disclose all pertinent facts
to the disinterested shareholders and request their votes.
53.

In various motions, responses and affidavits submitted to the court in

Taylor v. A.lA Services, et aI., Hawley Troxell made arguments that did not benefit AlA

Services, AIA Insurance, or Reed Taylor, inappropriately made other arguments
preventing valid claims from being asserted against John Taylor, James Beck, Connie
Taylor, Michael Cashman, and other interested and uninterested parnes, and failed to take
action against responsible parties (including John Taylor, CropUSA, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, Michael Cashman, Lancelot Investors Fund, and others). In the instance of
Michael Cashman, Hawley Troxell successfully argued to the Court in Taylor v. AIA

Services,

el

aI., that Mr. Cashman should not be named as an individual when Hawley
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Troxell should have been taking action against Mr. Cashman and others.
54.

Despite Reed Taylor's demands that disinterested directors and/or parties

. must direct the litigation on behalf of the corporations, Hawley Troxen refused and
permitted and/or assisted John Taylor and other interested parties to direct the litigation
to the detriment of the corporations and Reed Taylor. Despite Reed Taylor's demands
that action be taken to terminate AIA Insurance's improper guarantee of a $15,000,000
line-of-credit for CropUSA, Hawley Troxell refused to act, failed to inform or fully
disclose to disinterested parties or shareholders the existence of such inappropriate loan
guarantees, and threatened to take legal action against Reed Taylor if he tried to rescind
or terminate the improper guarantee (since Defendant Gary D. Babbitt's threat, the
balance of the loan increased by over $5,500,000 to over $10,500,000).
55.

Hawley Troxell's conduct has violated Idaho Rules of Professional

Conduct and its duty of care, which require Hawley Troxell to disgorge all attorneys' fees
and costs paid to them in Taylor v. AIA Services, et aI., and for other related and/or
unrelated legal services. Despite Reed Taylor's demands to comply with the Rilles of
Professional Conduct and its duty of care, Hawley Troxell refused to do so.
56.

Through the acts of Hawley Troxell, the value of AlA Insurance and the

assets of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance have plummeted in value, the corporations'
value and assets have been impaired, and/or the assets and funds have been transferred to
CropUSA. Through the acts of Hawley Troxell, ownership of CropUSA was vested and
has remained vested in interested parties (including John Taylor), while the major
creditor Reed Taylor and minority shareholders were left with nothing. Despite Reed
Taylor's demands that action should also be taken for the interests of the innocent
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minority shareholders and creditors, Hawley Troxell has refused to take action and
inappropriately assisted the interested parties (including John Taylor. Connie Taylor,
James Beck and Michael Cashman).

57,

Despite Hawley Troxell having made several legal arguments that lacked

merit, lacked good faith andlor were not grounded in facts, Hawley Troxell provided a
settlement offer to Reed Taylor in Taylor v. AlA Services, et at,» which included a
provision that he release all claims against Hawley Troxell as a condition of the
settlement. The inclusion of such a provision was a violation of the Rilles of Professional
Conduct and Hawley Troxell's duty of care. Hawley Troxell also refused to make any
provisions for disinterested minority shareholders of AlA Services as requested by Reed
Taylor.
58.

Hawley Troxell has assisted in the inappropriate acts of John Taylor and

other interested parties in stopping all payments to Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor, Reed
Taylor's former' wife and the holder of all outstanding Preferred A Shares of AIA
Services. Like Reed Taylor, Donna Taylor is required to be a member of the board of
directors of AIA Services. Like Reed Taylor, Hawley Troxell has assisted John Taylor
and other interested parties in preventing Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor from being
members of the board of directors of AIA Services, which has further far reaching
ramifications and results in additional damages against Hawley Troxell.
59.

With full knowledge of AIA Services' obligations to ensure that Reed

Taylor and Donna Taylor are members of AIA Services' board until they were paid in
full, Hawley Troxell proceeded to attend and participate in inappropriate board meetings
andlor take inappropriate action based upon board meetings held by interested directors
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without Reed Taylor or DOMa Taylor being present and without providing them with
their right to be present, which further results in all such meetings and decisions being
null and void, and Hawley Troxell being liable for the associated damages for
substantially participating in such actions.
60.

Hawley Troxell represented AIA Services and AIA Insurance in litigation

with the state of Idaho. The litigation was funded by AlA Insurance by and through
commissions in which Reed Taylor held a security interest of which Hawley Troxell had

full knowledge.

The litigation was resolved, however, and instead of titling the

$1,200,000 Mortgage that was received as settlement in the name of AlA Insurance,

Hawley Troxell titled the mortgage only in the name of AIA Services in an inappropriate
scheme to keep the mortgage from AIA Insurance and Reed Taylor (Reed Taylor is also
entitled to possession of the Mortgage because it is a distribution from the The Universe,
which is another subsidiary pledged to Reed Taylor).
61.

Hawley Troxell inappropriately purportedly represented AIA Services,

AIA Insurance and CropUSA by drafting documents to assist in the inappropriate pledge
of the $1,200,000 Mortgage to CropUSA to facilitate the payment of Hawley Troxell's
services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of care, and the law.
Hawley Troxell assisted andlor failed to prevent ancllor notify disinterested parties or the
Court that AIA Services had inappropriately pledged its sale remaining other significant
asset, the $1,200,000 mortgage, to CropUSA to facilitate the payment of $500,000 for
Hawley Troxell's services in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty of
care, and the law.

62.

Hawley Troxell omitted andlor misrepresented material facts to the Court
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in Taylor v. AM Services, et 01., to the detriment of Reed Taylor. In several instances,
Hawley Troxell persuaded the Court to take action that was not in the best interests of the
corporations or Reed Taylor, to the detriment of the corporations and Reed Taylor
(including consenting to the issuance of only a $200,000 bond when I-lawley Troxell
knew that the corporations were not being operated properly or their assets safeguarded).
63.

Hawley Troxell has inappropriately assisted John Taylor and other

interested parties in misallocating and not allocating expenses and/or services provided
and borne by AIA Insurance and/or AIA Services for the benefit of CropUSA, John
Taylor and other interested parties. Upon information and belief. Hawley Troxell has
assisted in issuing inappropriate opinion letters to auditors of AIA Services, AIA
Insurance and/or CropUSA to assist John Taylor and other interested parties in
transferring and utilizing the assets, employees, labor, funds and resources of AIA
Insurance and/or AIA Services for the benefit of CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc while
providing little or no consideration in return.
64.

Hawley Troxell had full knowledge of John Taylor's Executive Officer's

Agreement, which, upon information and belief, was drafted by Defendant Richard A.
Riley. Regardless, Defendant Richard A. Riley had full knowledge of the existence and
terms of John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement with AlA Services. Even though
John Taylor has breached the terms of his employment contract with AIA Services by
competing against AIA Services through CropUSA (and violating the corporate
opportunity doctrine), by soliciting employees of AIA Insurance, and other inappropriate
actions, Hawley Troxell has intentionally refused to act in the best interests of AIA
Services, AIA Insurance, their shareholders, and/or Reed Taylor, to the detriment of Reed
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Taylor.
65.

Hawley Troxell assisted in inappropriately transferring and retaining

funds, assets and property to CropUSA to defraud AIA Services' creditor Reed Taylor
(including, without limitation, over $95,000 owed by Pacific Empire Radio Corporation
to AIA Insurance, assistance in transferring shares of the Pacific Empire Radio
Corporation to John Taylor. and failing to collect the over $300,000 owed by John
Taylor) by not reporting such acts to disinterested parties or other appropriate parties as
required by the Rules of Professional Conduct and its duty of care.
66.

In April 2007, Hawley Troxell permitted anel/or assisted interested parties

in holding a joint board meeting of AlA Services and AIA Insurance with full knowledge
that Reed Taylor and Donna Taylor were being intentionally denied their right to be on
the board of AlA Services and participating in such meetings (Donna Taylor has
subordinated her right to payment in favor of Reed Taylor). At the meeting held in April
2007, Hawley Troxell permitted and/or assisted John Taylor to appoint Connie Taylor
and James Beck to the boards of AIA Services and AlA Insurance knowing that they
were interested parties who AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance should be pursuing
claims against, that they inappropriately held shares in CropUSA. that they were
inappropriately being paid $20,000 per year to attend the board meeting of an insolvent
corporation, and that they did not meet the required standards necessary to be members of
such boards as set forth under the corporations' bylaws.
67.

Hawley Troxell inappropriately permitted anel/or assisted two interested

parties, Connie Taylor and James Beck, to approve anel/or consent to a Joint Retainer and
Joint Defense Agreement with Hawley Troxell and others. which also facilitated the
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inappropriate joint legal representations of interested parties with conflicting
irreconcilable interests and the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to various attorneys
in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and its duty of care.
68. .

Hawley Troxell has been fully aware of Reed Taylor's rights to property

in which he held a security interest and was pledged to him as collateraL

In fact,

Defendant Richard A. Riley represented AIA Services in the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares and the drafting of the Amended and Restated Stock Pledge Agreement
and other applicable agreements. Hawley Troxell was responsible for issuing opinion
letters relating to the transaction, which include various applicable representations and
warranties. Hawley Troxell is now asserting arguments counter to the representations
made in the opinion letter drafted by Hawley Troxell by and through Defendant Richard
A. Riley.

Hawley Troxell also assisted in the commission of torts by John Taylor,

CropUSA, and other interested parties by representing the corporations in various
inappropriate transactions.
69.

Hawley Troxell also knew that the disinterested minority shareholders of

AlA Services (innocent shareholders) were never advised of the significant claims

against the interested parties (including John Taylor and CropUSA) and the significant
misappropriation of the corporations' assets, but provided legal services on behalf of the
interested parties and accepted payment from AIA Services and AlA Insurance.

In

connection with the payment of attorneys I fees and costs to other named parties in Taylor
v. AIA Services, et al., Hawley Troxell failed to obtain the necessary approvals from Reed
Taylor or other disinterested parties to the detriment of AlA Services, AIA Insurance
andlor Reed Taylor.
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70.

Despite demands to the contrary, Hawley Troxell continued to take

instructions andlor directives from the unauthorized boards (or John Taylor) of AlA
Services andlor AIA Insurance knowing that the boards are not properly seated and are
comprised of interested parties (including John Taylor) with significant claims that
should be asserted against them in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, its duty
of care, andlor the law.

ll. HAWLEY TROXELL'S AIDING AND ABE'ITING AND CONSPIRACY
71.

Hawley Troxell is committing and has committed tortious acts in concert

with other parties (including John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman,
JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, CropUSA, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady, and others)
andlor pursuant to a common design or civil conspiracy with such other parties.
72.

Hawley Troxell knew that the conduct of other parties (including John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA. Bryan
Freeman, Clements Brown. Quarles Brady and others) constituted breaches of duties
andlor gave substantial assistance andlor encouragement to such other parties in
breaching said duties. Hawley Troxell knew that it was purportedly using the normally
lawful act of practicing law to commit andlor substantially assist others in committing
unlawful acts.

73.

Hawley Troxell gave substantial assistance to other parties (including John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA, Bryan
Freeman, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady, and others) in committing andlor
accomplishing tortious conduct and/or acls (including, without limitation, breaches of
fiduciary duties, fraud, constructive fraud, fraudulent conveyances, conversion, tortious
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interference, and other claims), and Hawley Troxell's conduct, separately considered,
constitutes the breaches of duties owed to AIA Services, AlA Insurance, andlor Reed
Taylor.

74.

Hawley Troxell conduct constitutes aiding and abetting of other parties in

the commission of the torts and/or caused of action alleged in this Complaint (including
John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, CropUSA,
Bryan Freeman, Clements Brown, Quarles Brady, and others) and/or constitutes the
conduct of a contributing tortfeasor, and such conduct has damaged AlA Services, AlA
Insurance, and Reed Taylor.

75.

Hawley Troxell's conduct constitutes the commission of civil conspiracy

in the commission of the torts and/or causes of action alleged in this Complaint,
including, without limitation, the conspiracy to jointly represent parties to commit torts as
further evidenced by Joint Defense Agreements.

76.

The paragraphs in this Section are incorporated by reference into each

cause of action below as necessary to support aiding and abetting andlor civil conspiracy
of the torts and/or causes afaction set forth below andlor contemplated in tIns Complaint

ID. FIRST CAUSES OF ACTIONS-CONVERSION
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions)

77.

Reed Taylor has, and has had during certain relevant time, a valid and

perfected security interest in the commissions and related receivables of AlA Services
and AlA Insurance and all proceeds relating to such security interests. Reed Taylor also
has a security interest in ail of the stock of AlA Insurance and the stock of all of AIA
Services' other subsidiaries, including The Universe and ail distributions and proceeds
relating to such security interests (i.e., the $1.2 Million Lewis-Clark Mortgage). Hawley
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Troxell had full knowledge of Reed Taylor's security interests in the foregoing property
and such other property reasonably contemplated by the Redemption Agreements.

7&.

By way of Reed Taylor's security interest in AlA Insurance's

commissions, his security interest in AlA Insurance's stock, and his asserted contractual
right to the possession and control of AlA Insurance on February 22, 2007, all of AIA
Insurance's revenues, assets, and income should be under the possession and control of
Reed Taylor, including, without limitation, the $1.2 Million Mortgage, settlement
proceeds in the approximate amount of $800,000, all funds and assets transferred or
utilized in any way by CropUSA, and every dollar of revenue generated by AIA
Insurance from all sources since February 22,2007.
79.

Reed is entitled to possession and control of all of the property to which he

bas a contractual right, including, without limitation, the property indicated above and all
other property contemplated in this Complaint through his security interest in the
commissions and related receivables and the proceeds related thereto, security interests in
the stock of all of AIA Services' subsidiaries and the distributions and proceeds related
thereto, and through the security and related rights set forth in the Redemption
Agreements.
80.

All of Reed Taylor's security interests and possession rights can be traced

through various sources to identifY all funds and ass.ets that Hawley Troxell has
unlawfully taken or assisted others in taking.

Hawley Troxell has taken control of

property, which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession and control, including without
limitation, all funds received for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs in Taylor v. AM

Services, et af. and attorneys' fees and costs paid for other purported services. Hawley
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Troxell bas exercised dominion and control over assets (including the $1.2 Million
Mortgage) andlor funds (any funds received from AlA Services or AIA Insurance) .in
which Reed Taylor is entitled to possession with full knowledge of Reed Taylor'S
possessory rights and security interests.

81.

Hawley Troxell has received substantial payments believed to exceed

$500.000 for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, which such funds Hawley Troxell
had no lawful right to possess or retain, funds that Reed Taylor had the legal right to
possess, and such funds were received in violation of the law, Rules of Professional
Conduct Hawley Troxell's duty of care. Hawley Troxell also assisted in the inappropriate
titling and pledging of a $1.2 Million Mortgage owned by AIA Services to facilitate the
payment of funds to it, which such funds and the $1.2 Million Mortgage Reed Taylor was
legally entitled to possess. Hawley Troxell has also accepted the payment of services for
attorneys' fees and costs rendered for CropUSA, which were paid by the money andlor
assets unlawfully derived from AIA Services andlor AlA Insurance, which such money
andlor assets Reed Taylor held valid security interests.

82.

Hawley Troxell's conduct constitutes the willful interference with

property andlor funds belonging to Reed Taylor, AIA Services andlor AlA Insurance;
and/or which such property andlor funds should be under the possession and/or control of

AIA Services, AIA Insurance andlor Reed Taylor, as the person entitled to such money
and property as a creditor and pledgee. Hawley Troxell intentionally deprived Reed
Taylor. AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance of possession of such property and/or funds.
Despite demands, Hawley Troxell has refused to return such property and/or funds, and
has unlawfully retained the property and/or funds.
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83.

As a direct andlor proximate cause of Hawley Troxell's acts andlor

omissions (which constitute conversion), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to
be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment.

84.

Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted andlor conspired with other

parties in the conversion of property that Reed Taylor is legally entitled to possess andlor
property to which AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance are entitled to possess (including,
without limitation, funds paid to Hawley Troxell, funds paid to John Taylor and other
interested parties, the pledging of the $1.2 Million Mortgage to CropUSA, and the $1.5
Million unlawfully transferred to CropUSA).

As a direct andlor proximate result of

Hawley Troxell's aiding and abetting andlor civil conspiracy relating to the conversion of
assets andlor funds that Reed Taylor, AIA Services, andlor AIA Insurance are legally
entitled to possess, Reed Taylor, AlA Insurance, and/or AlA Services have been
damaged in the amount to be proven at the time of trial or on summary judgment.
IV. SECOND CAUSES OF ACTIONS-TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
85.

Reed Taylor is a party to the Redemption Agreements. Hawley Troxell

has full knowledge of the Redemption Agreements. Hawley Troxell has intentionally
interfered with Reed Taylor'S contractual rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements
causing breaches of the Redemption Agreements.

Hawley Troxell's intentional

interference, includes, but is not limited to, tortiously interfering with Reed Taylor's
contractual rights to vote the shares of AlA Insurance, rights to possession of the
commission collateral, right to be a member of the board of AIA Services, right to be an
officer and director of AIA Insurance, right to possession and control of AlA Insurance,
other rights set forth in the Redemption Agreements, and rights set forth in the
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Subordination Agreement with Donna Taylor. Also included in this cause of action are
tortious interference claims based upon Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of AIA Services

andior AlA Insurance.
86.

Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA andlor other parties in the tortious interference of Reed Taylor's contractual
rights. Hawley Troxell's acts andlor omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting
and/or civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of Reed Taylor's
contractual rights.
87.

As a direct andlor proximate result of Hawley Troxell's acts and/or

omissions, Reed Taylor bas been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to be
determined at the time of trial or on summary judgment.
88.

AIA Services is a party to John Taylor's Executive Officer's Agreement.

Hawley Troxell has full knowledge of the Executive Officer's Agreement.

Hawley

Troxell has intentionally interfered with AlA Services' contractual rights set forth in the
Executive Officer's Agreement causing breaches to the Executive Officer's Agreement.
Hawley Troxell's intentional interference, includes, but is not limited to, tortiously
interfering with AIA Services' contractual rights prevent John Taylor from transferring
AIA Insurance's employees to CropUSA, rights to prevent John Taylor from competing
against AlA Services or AIA Insurance through CropUSA, and rights to control John
Taylor's compensation. All of these allegations have been repeatedly alleged by Reed
Taylor throughout the course of Taylor v. AIA Services, et al. Also included in this cause
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of action are tortious interference claims based upon Hawley Troxell, John Taylor,
Connie Taylor, James Beck, and other parties exceeding their authority to act on behalf of
AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
89.

Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted and/or conspired with Jolm

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA and/or other parties in the tortious interference of AIA Services' contractual
rights. Hawley Troxell's acts and/or omissions also constitute the aiding and abetting

and/or civil conspiracy with others in the tortious interference of AIA Services'
contractual rights.
90.

As a direct and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxell's acts and/or

omissions, AIA Services has been damaged and is entitled to damages in the amount to
be determined at the time of trial or on summary judgment
V. THIRD CAUSES OF ACTIONS-FRAUD AND/OR CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
(Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
91.

Hawley Troxell owed special duties to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or

AIA Insurance as described throughout this Complaint.
92.

As a former attorney for Reed Taylor and the attorney who provided an

opinion letter to Reed Taylor, defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and
through an opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge (representing
such facts as the transactions being fully legal and authorized by the corporations), which
further invokes personal liability to Riley. Reed Taylor had a right to rely on Riley's
representations and justifiably relied on such representations. Riley breached his duties
when he asserted that the transaction was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the
transaction was legal and supported by applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his
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duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed Taylor to incur damages from the payments of
attorneys' fees and costs and lost possession of property and funds because of AlA
Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of Riley's acts
and/or omissions (which constitute fraud), Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount
to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
93.

Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor of

AlA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance, a stock
pledgee in which Hawley Troxell knew had lawfully voted the shares of AIA Insurance,
the only authorized officer and director of AlA Insurance, the holder of a security interest
in all of the commissions and related receivables of AlA Services and AIA Insurance, the
holder of a security interest in all of the shares of all of AlA Services' other subsidiaries
and all distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Million Mortgage and $800,000
settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, and the only
party entitled to the remaining assets of AlA Services and AIA Insurance.
94.

Hawley Troxell owed and owes duties to AlA Services and AIA Insurance

to properly represent the best interests of the corporations and to not allow interested
parties (including, without limitation, John Taylor) from taleing actions that are not in the
best interests of the corporations, including, without limitation, unauthorized andior
conflicted persons directing litigation, misappropriation and tortious transfer of assets and
funds to interested parties to the detriment of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance, to
advise the Court and disinterested shareholders of the actions of John Taylor and other
interested parties, and to not issue opinion letters to auditors andior other parties to assist
in the commission of tortious conduct. Hawley Troxell has breached its duties and acted
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unlawfully (and all improper andlor unlawful acts set forth and/or contemplated in this
Complaint), and its conduct constitutes constructive fraud for which AlA Services andlor

AIA Insurance are entitled to recover damages in the amount to be proven at trial or on
summary judgment.

95.

Hawley Troxell has also aided and abetted andlor conspired with John

Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael Cashman, JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman,
CropUSA and/or other parties in the commission of fraud and/or constructive fraud and
to otherwise defraud Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.

As a direct

and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxell's acts, Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA
Insurance have been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial or on
summary judgment.

VI. FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS--MALPRACTJCE
(Reed Taylor;- AiA Services andlor AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
96.

Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor a special attorney-client relationship

for all of the reasons set forth in this Complaint (including, without limitation, the
allegations contained in Reed Taylor's breach of fiduciary duty cause of action). From
time to time, Hawley Troxell has also possessed funds and/or property which it should
have protected and safeguarded for Reed Taylor, but failed to do so. All of the foregoing
results in the existence of duties on the part of Hawley Troxell owed to Reed Taylor, or at
the minimum, a special duty to ensure assets and funds are protected for the benefit of
Reed Taylor in the event that he takes control and possession of AlA Insurance pursuant
to his contractual rights (which such event could have happened at any time during
Hawley Troxell's purported representation of AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance).
97.

Hawley Troxell's purported clients were trustees and/or fiduciaries
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performing similar functions for a non-client, Reed Taylor. Hawley Troxell knew that its
appropriate actions were necessary with respect to the representation of AlA Services
andlor AlA Insurance to take action to prevent andlor rectify the breaches of fiduciary
duties owed by AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance to Reed Taylor when such breaches
were crimes and/or fraud and/or Hawley Troxell assisted andlor are assisting in the
breaches. Reed Taylor was not able to protect his rights because of Hawley Troxell's
actions and Hawley Troxell's obligations to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance would
not be significantly impaired because the best interests of all the foregoing is to collect
sums owed by others and recover damages for the improper tortious conduct of others
(including, without limitation, 10hn Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, Michael
Cashman, loLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, and CropUSA).
98.

Hawley Troxell breached its duties (including, without limitation, the duty

of the standard of care) owed by it to Reed Taylor. As a direct and/or proximate result of
Hawley Troxell's failure to perfonn the duties owed to Reed Taylor, he was damaged in
the amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment.
99.

Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an

opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which further invokes
personal liability to Riley. Riley breached his duties when he asserted lhat the transaction
was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by
applicable law, Rlley's actions have breached his duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed
Taylor to incur damages for the payments of attorneys' fees and costs and lost revenues
because of AIA Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of
Riley's acts and/or omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven
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at trial or on summary judgment.
100.

Hawley Troxell owed AlA Services andlor AlA Insurance an aliamey-

client relationship for purportedly representing AIA Service andlor AIA Insurance, which
results. in the existence of duties on the part of Hawley Troxell owed to AIA Services
andlor AIA Insurance.
101.

Hawley Troxell owed AIA Services, AIA Insurance andlor Reed Taylor a

duty of care to provide, including, but not limited to, reasonable, prudent, ethical,
unconflicted, loyal and professional legal advice and legal representation in keeping with
the standard of care in the legal profession and as owed to the corporations (referred to
herein and above as "duty of care"). Hawley Troxell breached its duty of care as a result
of its acts and/or omissions thereby damaging the corporations and Reed Taylor, to the
detriment of Reed Taylor.
102.

Hawley Troxell breached its fiduciary duties owed to AIA Services, AlA

Insurance, and/or Reed Taylor, including, without limitation, the duties of care and
loyalty.
103.

Hawley Troxell's acts constitute professional negligence and/or breach of

Hawley Troxell's fiduciary duties, and such conduct have damaged the corporations and
Reed Taylor, in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary judgment
104.

Hawley Troxell breached the duty of the standard of care owed by it to

AIA Services andlor AIA Insurance. As a direct and/or proximate result of Hawley
Troxell's failure to perform the duties owed to AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance in
connection with the legal services purportedly provided by Hawley Troxell, AIA Services
and/or AlA Insurance were damaged in the amount to be proven at trial or on summary
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judgment.

vu. }'Dfl'H CAUSES OF ACTIONS-VIOLATIONS OF THE I.C.P.A.
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurancets Causes of Actions)
105.

Reed Taylor, AlA Services and AlA Insurance are all persons as defIned

by I.C. § 48-602. Hawley Troxell's purported practice of law constitutes services as
defIned by I.C. § 48-602. Reed Taylor, AIA Services and AIA Insurance have either
purchased services directly from Hawley Troxell, are known beneficiaries of services
provided by Hawley Troxell, and/or its attorneys are members of the Idaho State Bar
through which AlA Services, AlA Insurance and/or Reed Taylor has contracted for
services through trade and commerce.
106.

By way of the attorneys of Hawley Troxell's obligations to the Court and

as members of the Idaho State Bar, they owe duties to their purported clients,
beneficiaries of their services. and the adverse parties in litigation to comply with the
Rilles of Professional Conduct and the laws.

Hawley Troxell has served only the

interests of John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Michael Cashman, James Beck, IoLee Duclos,
CropUSA and other interested parties-who Hawley Troxell has not honestly represented
to the Court and Hawley Troxell's beneficiary andlor adversary that Hawley Troxell was
not complying with its obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct or the law, to
the detriment of Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance. Hawley Troxell's
unlawful and inappropriate acts have a direct impact on consumers and the integrity of
the legal system, and further constitute unfair methods and practices and violations ofLC.

§ 48-601, et seq.
107.

Hawley Troxell has falsely represented that it had approval from the Idaho

State Bar and approval from authorized constituents to represent AIA Services andlor
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AlA Insurance, when in fact it did not have such authority in violation of I.C. § 48603(5). Hawley Troxell (including, without limitation, Riley's services to Reed Taylor
through an opinion letter with individual responsibility) has falsely represented that its
services have been provided to a particular standard when in fact its services have not
met the appropriate standards (including the standard of care) in violation ofl.C. § 48~
603(7). Hawley Troxell has falsely disparaged the services of Reed Taylor's counsel in
violation of lC. § 48-603(8). Hawley Troxell has falsely represented that services were
not needed (Le., not making claims against John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck,
Michael Cashman, CropUSA and others, when it knew such claims were warranted) in
violation ofl.C. § 48-603(16). Hawley Troxell has engaged in acts and/or practices that
have been misleading to Reed Taylor, AlA Services and AIA Imrurance in violation of
I.C. § 48-603(17). Based upon all of the allegations in this Complaint, Hawley Troxell
has also violated other applicable provisions oflC. § 48-603 and/or I.C. § 48-601, et seq.
108.

Reed Taylor has purchased services and has lost property and/or money

and has been damaged by the methods, practices and/or acts of Hawley Troxell declared
unlawful by 1. C. § 48-601, et seq.
109.

AlA Services andlor AIA Insurance has purchased services and have last

property and/or money and has been damaged by the methods, practices and/or acts of
Hawley Troxell declared unlawful by I.C. § 48-601, et seq. AlA Services andlor AIA
Insurance is requesting that aU contracts for purported services provided by Hawley
Troxell be declared void and that all funds and/or assets paid under such contracts be
returned to AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance.
110.

Hawley Troxell knew or should have known that its conduct was
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perpetrated directly and/or indirectly against Reed Taylor in violation of I.C. § 48-608,
including, without limitation, for being an elderly person who has lost more than 25% of
his monthly income by way of Hawley Troxell's unlawful acts.
111.

Hawley Troxell's acts constitute violations of the Idaho Consumer

Protection Act, specifically, I.C. § 48-601. et seq. Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or
AIA Insurance are entitled to damages, treble damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees
and costs and/or such other requested relief as a result of Hawley Troxell's violations and
as available under LC. § 48-601, et seq. Hawley Troxell's violations or the unlawful acts
of attorneys (including attorneys as adversaries) are not any of the exceptions to I.C. §
48-601, et seq. as set forth in I.C. § 48-605.

vm.

SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTIONS-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Action)

112.

Hawley Troxell owed Reed Taylor special duties as the secured creditor of

.AIA Services, the sole pledgee of all of the outstanding shares of AIA Insurance, a stock
pledgee in which Hawley Troxell knew had lawfully voted the shares of AlA Insurance,
the only authorized officer and director of AIA Insurance, the holder of a security interest
in all of the commissions and related receivables of AlA Services and AIA Insurance, the
holder of a security interest in all of the shares of all of AIA Services' other subsidiaries
and all distributions related to the shares (i.e., the $1.2 Million Mortgage and $800,000
settlement), the most significant creditor of the insolvent AIA Services, and the only
party entitled to the remaining assets of AIA Services and AIA Insurance. Based upon all
of the foregoing and Hawley Troxell's possession of funds and assets of AIA Services
and/or AlA Insurance from time to time, Hawley Troxell owed a special fiduciary duty to
safeguard the assets and funds of AIA Services and AIA Insurance.

FIRST AMENDED C01v1PLAlNT - 40

INTERVENOR'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

113.

Hawley Troxell breached its fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor. As a

direct and/or proximate result of Hawley Troxell's breached fiduciary duties, Reed
Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven at the time of trial or on summary
judgment.
114.

Hawley Troxell. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, JoLee Duclos

and Bryan Freeman owed and/or owe fiduciary duties to AlA Semces and/or AIA
Insurance and to Reed Taylor as the only significant secured creditor of the insolvent
AlA Services and as the pledgee of all the outstanding shares of AlA Insurance (and the
person who voted the shares). Hawley Troxell has substantially assisted other parties in
breaching the Bylaws of AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance. John Taylor owed and/or
owes fiduciary duties to Reed Taylor by way of being Reed Taylor's brother.

The

fiduciary duties owed and breached include, but are not limited to, the duty of loyalty,
duty of care and duty to deal in good faith.
115.

Hawley Troxell had full knowledge of all of the fiduciary duties owed to

Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance. The fiduciary duties owed to Reed
Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance include (but are not limited to), the
obligation to safeguard AlA Services and AIA Insurance's assets and business
relationships and to recover funds and assets unIawftllly transferred from AIA Services or

AIA Insurance.
116.

Hawley Troxell, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck, JoLee Duclos

and Bryan Freeman breached their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services
and/or AlA Insurance; and Hawley Troxell knew that the foregoing parties' conduct
constituted the breach of fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AIA Services and/or AlA
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Insurance.

These breached fiduciary duties are ongoing and Hawley Troxell has

substantially assisted and/or encouraged the foregoing parties in the commission of
breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AIA
Insurance. Hawley Troxell also continues to substantially assist and/or encourage the
foregoing parties in breaching their fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AlA Services
and/or AlA Insurance.
117.

Hawley Troxell's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AlA

Services and/or AlA Insurance in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary
judgment by aiding and abetting andlor substantially assisting others (including John
Taylor and CropUSA) through a civil conspiracy in the commission of breaches of
fiduciary duties owed to Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA IDsurance.
118.

Defendant Riley owes Reed Taylor special duties by and through an

opinion letter that was based upon Riley's personal knowledge, which further invokes
personal liability to Riley. Riley breached his duties when he asserted that the transaction
was illegal. Although Reed Taylor believes the transaction was legal and supported by
applicable law, Riley's actions have breached his duties to Reed Taylor and caused Reed
Taylor to incur damages for the payments of attorneys' fees and costs and lost revenues
because of AlA Insurance being wrongfully withheld from Reed Taylor. As a result of
Riley's acts andlor omissions, Reed Taylor has been damaged in an amount to be proven
at trial or on summary judgment.
IX. SEVENTH CAUSES OF ACTION-EXCESSIVE COMPENSATIONIWASTE
(Reed Taylor, AlA Services and/or AlA Insurance's Causes of Actions)
119.

Hawley Troxell has known that AlA Services is insolvent and AlA

Insurance is pledged to Reed Taylor as collateraL Hawley Troxell has lmown that AIA
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,
Insurance is a wholly owned subsidiary of the insolvent AIA Services. Hawley Troxell
has known that AIA Insurance's business is in the final years of existence and that its
commissions are dwindling as new health policies have not been issued for years.
120.

Hawley Troxell has aided and abetted and/or conspired with John Taylor,

Connie Taylor, James Beck, and others to pay excessive compensation for salaries and
fees for purportedly being officers and/or directors of AIA Services and AlA Insurance.
Hawley Troxell has aided and abetted and/or conspired with John Taylor, Connie Taylor,
James Beck, Michael Cashman and others to waste the remaining assets of AIA Services
and/or AIA Insurance. All the while Hawley Troxell has lmown of Reed Taylor's rights
and AIA Services' insolvency. Hawley Troxell had full knowledge that John Taylor and
other directors and officers compensation was required to be set by the lawful board of
directors of AIA Services and/or AlA Insurance, but substantially assisted John Taylor
and others in obtaining inappropriate compensation.
121.

Hawley Troxell's acts and conduct has damaged Reed Taylor, AIA

Services and/or AlA Insurance in an amount to be proven at trial or on summary
judgment by aiding and abetting and/or substantially assisting others (including, without
limitation, John Taylor, Connie Taylor and James Beck) through a civil conspiracy in the
payment of excessive compensation.
X. DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL
1.

Reed Taylor demands a trial by jury of not less than tweive (12) on all

claims and damages so triable.

XI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Reed Taylor prays for the following relief:
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1.

For a judgmeot against Hawley Troxell. jointly and severally, for

$10,500,000 in damages ($3,500,000 in actual damages and $7,000,000 in treble
damages), the exact amount of which will be proven at trial and/or on summary
judgme~t,

2.

plus an award ofpre~judgment and post..judgment interest;
For a judgment against Hawley Troxell, jointly and severally. for treble

damages of $7,000,000, the exact amount to be proven at trial pursuant to I.C. §

48~

608(2);
3.

For a judgment requmng the disgorgement of the payments of all

attorneys' fees and costs paid to Hawley Troxell by AIA Services and/or AIA Insurance;

4.

For judgment against Hawley Troxell, jointly and severally, for additional

damages as provided under I.C. § 48~608;

5.

For such other relief as may be available to Reed Taylor pursuant to I.C. §

48-601, e/ seq. or the law, including, without limitation, obtaining a preliminary
injunction to restrain Hawley Troxell from undertaking further representation;

6.

For an award of attorneys fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to

Idaho Law. including, without limitation, I.C. § 48-608, I.C. § 12-120 and/or T.C. § 12121; and

7.

For such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this _ _ day of October, 2008.
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC

By:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Reed Taylor
Dntn\IJI5\1322\Amcndcd ComplninLI-ITEH.FlNAL.doc
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) 55.

COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )

I, ReedJ. Taylor, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the contents of this First
Amended Complaint, know the contents of this First Amended Complaint, and believe
that the facts in this First Amended Complaint are true and accurate to the best of my
knowledge and belief.

Reed J. Taylor

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _ _ day of October, 2008.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
My commission expires: _ _ _ _ __
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DIANE
ASH
_".' I
MICHAEL S BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLL.C
Attorneys for Appellant Reed Taylor
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VVA 99201
Tel: (509) 455··7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED 1. TAYLOR, an individual, who is
bringing this action on behalf of himself and
on behalfofthe creditors andlor shareholders
of AlA Services CorpOIation and AlA

Case No.: CV.-08-01765

NOTICE OF APPEAL

fnsurance, Tnc ;

Appellant,
v

GARY D BABBITT, an individual; D JOHN
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HA vv'LEY LLP, an Idaho limited
liability partnership; JANE DOES f-X,
unknown individuals;

.___.__~. ___._._._____.Respondents.
THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, GARY 0 BABBITT, D TOHN
ASHBY, PATRICK V COLLINS, RICHARD A RILEY, AND
. . HAWlEY. XRDXELLENNlS..& HAWLEY LLE .. AND. IHRPARllES'. __ . _
AT TORNEY JAMES D LAROE, ELAM & BURKE., P A, PO BOX
1539, BOISE, ID 83704; AND

TO:

TO:

THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
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NonCE rs HEREBY GIVEN lHA 1:
The above named Appellant Reed J TaylO! appeals against the above·
named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Order granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and denying Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint
entered in the above entitled action on the 23rd day of December, 2008, the Honorable

TeffM Brudie presiding
2.

Appellant has a light to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Judgments/Orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders undet and
pursuant to Rules 4 and 11(a)(l ), rAR.
3.

A preliminary statement of issues on appeal, which the Appellant intends

to assert in this appeal are as follows (several of which are issues of first impression);
provided, the following list of issues is not exhaustive and Respondents should expect
otheIs:

a

Did plaintiff state causes of action against attorneys for fraud,
breaches of fiduciary duties, conversion, excessive compensation,
andlor tortious interference andlor causes of actions pertaining to
aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the
commission of any of any of the foregoing causes of action

b Does the Litigation Privilege exist in Idaho and, if so, does it bar
claims against attorneys for fraud, constructive fraud, breaches of
fiduciruy duties, conversion, excessive compensation, and tortious
interference andlo! causes of action pertaining to aiding and
abetting andlor conspiracy to assist others in the commission of
any of the foregoing causes of action?

c -Does a plaintiff state a -canse--of actiorr-aga:in:st-arnrttomey fur· ..
conversion and other causes of action by alleging that the attorney
accepted pa.yment for attorney's fees and costs from funds the
attomey knew or should have known were funds in which the
plaintifiheld a valid and perfected security interest?
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d. Does a stock pledgee, who is also a secured creditor of the
revenues and all of the stock of the corporation. have standing to
pursue direct causes of actions against parties for claims owned by
the corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
derivative causes of action on behalf of the corporation?

e. Does a creditor of an insolvent corporation, who is also a secured
creditor of the revenues of the corporation, have standing to assert
direct causes of action against parties for claims owned by the
corporation? Does the same plaintiff have standing to pursue
derivative causes of actions on behalf of the corporation?
f.

Are allegations that an attorney has exceeded hislheI scope of
representation sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim based upon the Litigation Privilege?

g. Can an attorney represent corporate clients with diverging interests
when the representation was approved by persons with
director/officer conflicts of interest?

h .. Does Idaho's Consumer Protect Act bar a person fmm asserting
claims against an attorney, when the p1aintiff does not have pIivity
of contract with the attorney, fOI violations of Idaho's Consumer
Protection Act?

i

In considering a motion to dismiss under LR.C.P 12(b)(6), is it
permissible for the district court to take judicial notice of an
entirely different case in toto and/or to consider documents which
are not in the record for that case?

j

Can a stock pledgee of all of the stock and revenues of a pledged
corporation assert direct and/or derivative causes of actions for
malpractice against an attorney?

k Can a secured creditor, who is also the most significant creditor of
an insolvent corporation, assert direct andlor derivative claims for
malpractice against an attorney?
Can the district comt judge, who is the same judge for two related
'aG-tien&;--oomYider-pr-i¥ileged--OOetlnlen~:in-·wmrting·a

moti-on

to' ... ----- ., -

dismiss under IRep 12(b)(6) without requiring production of the
documents to the other pmty?
m If a party provides privileged documents to an expert and the
expert provides testimony thmugh an affidavit relying on the
privileged documents for the experts testimony, has the attorney-
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client privilege been waived and must the documents be produced
to the opposing party upon a motion to compel?
n, IfIdaho adopts the Litigation Privilege defense fot' an attomey, can
the defense be asserted to dismiss an action pursuant to IRC P
12(b)(6) for actions taken by the attorney which the attorney
asserts were under the scope of representation, when such scope of
representation was purportedly agreed to by representatives from
the corporation client, when the attorney knows or should have
known that: (1) the representatives of the corpOIation have
conflicts of interest; (2) the board of directors of the corporation
client have conflicts of interest; (3) the cotporation has not held an
annual shareholder meeting in years; (4) the purported scope of
representation was not in the best interests of at teast two
cOlporation clients with diverging interests; and (5) the scope of
representation was not in the best interests of each of the attomey's
three different clients.

o. Does an attorney owe a non~client any fiduciary duties, special
duties, and/or third-party beneficiary obligations when the attorney
knows or should have known (including, without limitation): (1)
that all of the shar'es and revenues of the corpolation client the
attorney is purportedly representing are pledged as collateral to the
non-client and another client is in default ofthe obligations which
trigger remedies pertaining to such secUIity interests; (2) the nonclient has voted the shar'es appointing himself as the sale officer
and director of the corporation client, the corporation client is
being wrongfully managed by persons breaching fiduciary duties
and not safeguarding assets; (3) the assets and funds ale
insufficient to pay; (4) that millions of dollars in assets and funds
may have been wrongfully transfened fi:'om the corporation client
by the very individuals directing the litigation (5) the parent
corporation of the pledged corporation is also being represented by
the attorney and the same non-client is owed millions of dollars by
the par'ent corporation client who is highly insolvent?
p

Does a plaintiff have a constitutional right (whether under the
United States Constitution or the State of fdaho's Constitution) to
obtain documents, prosecute causes of action and/or pursue causes
OI action. to..protect, andJ.oI-.reco~ ..asset&.:whicb..,.a.m_suhjec.t.1£La~ .
security interest and/or pursue causes of actions action attorneys
relating to anyone or more the foregoing?

4.

There has not been an Order sealing all or any pottion of this record

5

A repOIter's transcript is not requested.
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"<,

6..

Appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's

record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, IA R :
a

This Notice of Appeal;

b Defendants' Motion to Dismiss;
c. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss;

d- Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss;
e

Plaintiffs Motion to Amend and Supplement Complainr (including
the attached proposed First Amended Complaint);

f. Defendants' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
Amend Complaint; and

g

T.

Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint.

I certify that:
a

A copy of this notice of appeal has not been served oil a reporter
because a transcript has not been requested.

b. The clerk of the district court has not been paid any fee for
preparing a transcript because a transcript has not been requested
c

The estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been
paid

d

The appellate filing fee has been paid

e. Service has been made upon all parties required to be selved
pursuant to Rule 20

DA TED this 30th day ofJanuary, 2009.

i.

/0

BY:~L~!::::~~.
Michael S. Bissell

Attomeys for Appellate Reed Taylor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVIL"E

I HEREBY CERIlFY that on the 30th day ofJanuary, 2009, I call1ied to be served
a true and conect copy of Appellant's Notice of Appeal to the following:

______ HANTI DELIVERY

James D. LaRue

_---.2L_ U.S . MAIL

Elam & Burke, PA
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Tn 83704

___. ___ OVERNIGID MAlL

FAX TRANSMISSION

~.= EMAIL ( pdf attachment)
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FfLEt)

Michael E. McNichols
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
321 13th Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-6538
(208) 746-0753 (Facsimile)
ISB No. 993

2bOO fllft~ 10

Pfl 2. 15

Attorneys for Defendant R. John Taylor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person;

)
)

Plaintiff,

Case No: CV 07-00208

)
)

vs.

)
)

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
)
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and )
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
)
community property comprised thereof;
)
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; and
)
JOLEE DUCLOS, a single person;CROP USA)
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
)
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
)
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
)
community property comprised thereof;
)

DEFENDANT
R. JOHN TAYLOR'S
JOINDER IN INTERVENOR'S
MOTION TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT
WITNESS AFFIDAVIT OF
PAUL E. PEDERSON FILED
BY PLAINTIFF ON 02/26/09
& 03/03/09

)

Defendants.

)

DEFENDANT R. JOHN TAYLOR'S JOINDER
IN INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS AFFIDA VIT
OF PAUL E. PEDERSON FILED BY PLAINTIFF ON
02/26/09 & 03/03/09
-1-
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DefendantR. John Taylorjoins in INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL E. PEDERSON
FILED BY PLAINTIFF ON 02/26/09 & 03/03/09.
DATED this 10th day of March, 2009.
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the lOth day of March, 2009, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-8421
rod@scblegal.com

[]
[]
[]
[]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-Mail

Michael S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PllC
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416
Spokane, ViA 99201
Facsimile: (509) 455-7111
mbissel1@cbklawyers.com

[]
[]
[]
[]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-Mail

David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, ViA 99403
Facsimile: 758-3576
david@gittinslaw.com

[]
[]
[]
[]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-Mail

DEFENDANT R. JOHN TAYLOR'S JOINDER
IN INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS AFFIDAVIT
OF PAUL E. PEDERSON FILED BY PLAINTIFF ON
02/26/09 & 03/03/09
-2-

[
[
[
[

David R. Risley
Randall, Blake & Cox
P.O. Box 446
Lewiston,ID 83501
Facsimile: 743-1266
David@rbcox.com

]
]
]
]

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1225
Lewiston,ID 83501
Facsimile: 746-5886
CharlesABrown@cableone.net

[X]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-Mail
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-Mail

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
877 Main Street, Ste. 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Facsimile: (208) 342-3829
jash@hteh.com

[
[
[
[

[X]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-Mail

James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles & Brady, LLP
500 West Madison Street
Suite 3700
Chicago, IL 60661-2511
Facsimile: (312) 715-5155
jig@quarles.com

[]
[]
[]
[X]
[]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-Mail

]
]
]
]

Michael E. McNichols

DEFENDANT R. JOHN TAYLOR'S JOINDER
IN INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS AFFIDAVIT
OF PAUL E. PEDERSON FILED BY PLAINTIFF ON
02/26/09 & 03/03/09
-3-
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David A. Gittins
Law Offices of David A. Gittins
843 Seventh Street
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, W A 99403
Telephone: (509) 758-2501
ISB #6514

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an
)
Idaho corporation; AlA INSURANCE,
)
INC., an Idaho corporation; R. JOHN
)
TAYLOR and CONNIE TAYLOR,
)
individually and the community property
)
comprised thereof; BRYAN FREEMAN,
)
a single person; and, JOLEE DUCLOS,
)
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE )
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho corporation; and )
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
)
individually and the community property
)
comprised thereof,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
)

DEFENDANT'S BRYAN FREEMAN AND
JOLEE DUCLOS' JOINDER TO
INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS
AFFIDA VIT OF PAUL E. PEDERSON
FILED BY PLAINTIFF ON 2/26/09 AND
3/03/09

Case No. CV-07-00208

DEFENDANTS BRYAN FREEMAN
AND JOLEE DUCLOS' JOINDER
IN INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO
STRIKE PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT
WITNESS AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL E.
PEDERSON FILED BY PLAINTIFF ON
FEBRUARY 26, 2009 AND
MARCH 3, 2009

1

717/

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho)
corporation; and AlA INSURANCE, INC., )
an Idaho Corporation,
)
)
Counter-Claimants,
)
vs.
)
)
REED 1. TAYLOR, a single person,
)
)

Counter-Defendant.

)

---------------------------)

)

CONNIE W. TAYLOR and JAMES BECK,)
)

Counter-Claimants,
vs.

)
)
)

REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)

Counter-Defendant.

)
)

401(K) PROFIT SHARING PLAN FOR
THE AlA SERVICES CORPORATION,

)
)
)

Intervenor.

)

COME NOW Defendants, Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos, by and through their attorney,
David A. Gittins, and join in the Intervenor's Motion to Strike Portions of the Expert Witness
Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson filed by Plaintiff on February 26,2009 and March 3, 2009, and all
subsequent amendments, supplements, and filings relating to said Reply made by Intevenor 401(k)
Profit Sharing Plan for AlA Services Corporation.
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DATED this

/tl"-

day of March, 2009.
LA W OFFICES OF DAVID A. GITTINS

ByQ4_~
DAVID A. GITTIN6, ISB 6514
Attorney for Defendants Duclos and Freeman
Notice of Service by Electronic Mail
Nancy A. Goodman, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
I am a person over the age of eighteen (18) years and am not an interested party to the aboveentitled action.
On March 10,2009, I emailed the within document to the persons named below at the email
addresses set forth under each name.
Roderick C. Bond
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorney for Plaintiff
Email: rod@scblegal.com

Michael S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
Attorney for Plaintiff
Email: mbissell@cbklawyers.com

Michael E. McNichols
Clements, Brown & McNichols
Attorney for R. John Taylor
Email: mmcnichols@clbrmc.com

David R. Risley
Randall, Blake & Cox, PLLC
Attorney for Defendants C. Taylor & Becks
Email: david@rbcox.com

James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles & Brady, LLP
Attorney for Crop USA Insurance
Email: JJG@quarles.com
charper@quarles.com

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
Attorneys for AlA Services and AlA
Insurance
Email: Gbabbitt@hawleytroxell.com
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Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
Attorney for JoLee Duclos, Trustee
Email: CharlesABrown@cableone.net
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing Notice of Service is true and correct.

IO~

Signed at Clarkston, Washington this

day of March, 2009.

Nancy A. Goodman
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PATT O. WEEK~a,
CLERK F HE OIST.
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DAVID R. RISLEY, ISB No. 1789
RANDALL, BLAKE & COX, PLLC
P.O. Box 446
1106 Idaho Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
(208) 743-1234
(208) 743-1266 (Fax)
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Attorneys for Connie Taylor, James Beck and
Corrine Beck
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOJ\TD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE ,
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
Corporation; AIA INSURANCE, INC., an )
Idaho Corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and )
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the )
community property comprised thereof; )
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE )
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA )
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho )
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and )
CORRINE BECK, individually and the )
community property comprised thereof,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
CONNIE W. TAYLOR and JAMES BECK,
)
)
Counterc1aimants,
)
)

CASE NO. CV07-00208

REED J . TAYLOR, a single person,

v.

JOINDER OF CONNIE TAYLOR,
JAMES BECK AND CORRINE BECK
RE:
INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF THE EXPERT WITNESS
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL E. PETERSON
FILED BY PLAINTIFF
ON 02126/09 AND 03/0109

)
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Randall, Blake & Cox, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
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Counterdefendant.

COMES NOW, Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck, and

6
7

Counterclairnants Connie W. Taylor and James Beck, join in the Intervenor's Motion to Strike

8

Portions of the Expert Witness Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson filed by Plaintiff on 02126109 and

9

03103109 filed by Charles A. Brown, counsel for the Intervenor, on or about March 5, 2009.
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DATED this 11 th day of March, 2009.
RANDALL, BLAKE & COX, PLLC
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Taylor,
J ames Beck and Corrine Beck, and
Counterclaimants Connie W. Taylor and
James Beck
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Randall, Blake & Cox, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446

Lewiston, ID 83501
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CERTJFICATE OF MAILING
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I certify that on March 11, 2009, at my direction, the foregoing Joinder of Connie
Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck re Intervenor's Motion to Strike Portions of the Expert
Witness Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson filed by Plaintiff on 02126109 and 03103109 was served
on the following in the manner shown:
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Counsel for Plaintiff: (copy)
Ned A. Cannon
Smith, Cannon and Bond, PLLC
508 8th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
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Counsel for Plaintiff: (copy)
Michael S. Bissell
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, WA 99201-3816
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Counsel for AIA Services Corporation,
AIA Insurance, Inc. and Crop USA: (copy)
Gary D. Babbitt
[ ]
D. John Ashby
[ ]
Hawley Troxell Elmis & Hawley, LLP
[ ]
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
[ J/
P.O. Box 1617
[1.1
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Counsel for Crop USA Insurance: (copy)
James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles & Brady, LLP
500 West Madison Street, Suite 3700
Chicago, IL 60661-2511
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 746-8421
Overnight MaillFederal Express
Email (ncannon@scblegal.com)

US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (509) 455-7111
Overnight Mail/Federal Express
Email (mbissell@cbklawyers.com)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 342-3829
Overnight MaillFederal Express
Email (GBabbitt(Qlhawlevtroxell.com&jash(Qlhleh.com)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (312) 715-5155
Overnight MaillFederal Express
Email (charper(a).guarles.com&jjg@guarles.com)
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Randall, Blake & Cox, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LA W
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING (Continued)
Counsel for R. Jolm Taylor: (copy)
Michael E. McNichols
Clements, Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
P.O. Box 1510
Lewiston, ID 83501
Counsel for Duclos and Freeman: (copy)
David A. Gittins
Attorney at Law
843 Seventh Street
Clarkston, W A 99403

[~

US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 746-0753
Overnight MaillFederal Express
Email (lmncnichols@clbrmc.com)

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]/
['0'

US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (509) 758-3576
Over:ught MaillFederal Express
EmaIl (david@gittinslaw.com)
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]
]
]
]

Counsel for AIA Services 401 (K) Plan: (copy)
[ ]
Charles A. Brown
[ ]
Attorney at Law
[ ]
P. O. Box 1225
Lewiston, ID 83501
[ ]/
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US. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 746-5886
Overnight MaillFederal Express
Email (CharlesABrown@cableone.net)

15
16

17
18

19

20
21
22
23

24
25

26
27

28

JOINDER RE INTERVENOR'S MOTION TO STRIKE-Page 4

Randall, Blake & Cox, PLLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Post Office Box 446
Lewiston, ID 83501
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